

# Reason Papers

*A Journal of Interdisciplinary Normative Studies*

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A Eudaimonistic Perspective ..... *David L. Norton*
- Marxism: Religious Faith and Bad Faith ..... *Antony Flew*
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*Reason Papers* began publication in 1974. Until 1978 it was published at the Department of Philosophy, State University College, Fredonia, New York, where its editor taught philosophy. In 1979 *Reason Papers* was moved to the Reason Foundation, a then new educational, tax-exempt foundation whose board felt it would help the foundation's reputation and legal status to be the publisher of the journal. The editor of the journal began his tenure as educational programs director with the Reason Foundation at the same time. Later the editor was appointed Senior Fellow of the Reason Foundation and continued working with the foundation as academic programs director. In 1985 the editor left this post and in the Summer of 1986 the board of the Reason Foundation decided no longer to publish *Reason Papers*.

Starting with this issue, *Reason Papers* is being published once again independently, at the Department of Philosophy, Auburn University, where its editor is professor of philosophy. There are no editorial changes contemplated and many of the scholars previously associated with the journal will continue to assist the editor with its publication. Orders should be sent to the editor, *Reason Papers*, Department of Philosophy, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama 36849.

TIBOR R. MACHAN  
*Editor*

LIBERTY, VIRTUE, AND  
SELF-DEVELOPMENT:  
A EUDAIMONISTIC  
PERSPECTIVE

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**M**y argument is for the necessary conjunction of politics and ethics. It is therefore at odds with the modern resolve to divorce politics, as descriptive science, from prescriptive thinking, on the “is-ought” distinction. In the beginning of modernity, 400 years ago, the *realpolitik* initiative was expressly the resolve to rid politics of moral ideals and confine it to what Machiavelli termed *verità effettuale*, and what Hobbes termed “unvarnished facts.” This disjunction was institutionalized in classical liberalism’s distinction between the “public sector” and the “private sector,” the former being the sphere of politics and the latter the sphere of morality. And the disjunction has lately been perpetuated by positivism’s bifurcation between the objectivity of socio-political laws, and the subjectivity of the moral inclinations and disinclinations of persons as individuals.

Given the predication of political modernity upon the disjunction of politics and morality, to reopen the question of their interrelationship would be quixotic if the consequences of the *realpolitik*, classical liberal, and positivistic initiatives, as we live them today, were reasonably gratifying or satisfactory. But I believe they are demonstrably unsatisfactory, and in respects which directly reflect, and therefore call into question, the bifurcation of politics and morality.

As we understand it today liberty is a political concept which has scrupulously been cleansed of moral connotations. It is, as we say, “negative” in two senses. It is negative in the sense of representing “freedom from” rather than “freedom for;” and it is understood as a right which is negative, by which we mean a right to abstentions and not to performances by others. Liberty is understood as the condition in which the individual is not subject to coercion by other persons or

by human institutions. Historically it was the right to liberty in this sense that was the telling weapon in the enterprise to enfranchise the individual against the collective authorities of church and state, identifying the dominant theme in political modernity as “the rise of the individual.” But as Michael Oakeshott says, there were from the start premonitions of future trouble in this enfranchisement, for there were many “who found themselves invited to make choices for themselves in matters of belief, language, conduct, occupation, relationships and engagements of all sorts, but who could not respond. The old certainties of belief, of understanding, of occupation, and of status were being dissolved not only for those who had some confidence in their ability to inhabit a world composed of autonomous individuals (or who had some determination to do so) but also for those who by circumstances or temperament had no such confident determination.”<sup>1</sup>

Modernity has nevertheless witnessed a substantial achievement of liberty in the Western democracies; yet today liberty is everywhere endangered, and the trouble can be recognized as those early premonitions cited by Oakeshott, coming home to roost. The threat to liberty comes not from ignorance of it but from knowledge of it, and not from external agencies which seek to extinguish it, but from the relinquishment of it by those who possess it and the rejection of it by those who might have been expected to aspire to it. It is being exchanged on the one hand for ideological servitude, and on the other hand for distributive benefits, and the burning question in both cases is, Why? I will try to show that the answers in both cases embody fundamental fallacies, but also that the fallacies embodied in the rejection of liberty are generated by the foundational *realpolitik* fallacy of conceiving of liberty in independence of morality.

Those who trade liberty for ideological servitude assume at least that they are free to do so with impunity, and at most that they are obligated to do so by the absolute moral character of the ideology in question. The legitimating supposition in either case is false, but it is endorsed by the rights-primitivism of classical liberalism. For if liberty is a right, and rights are primitive in the logical sense of being underived, then liberty can be traded with impunity. The reason for this is that exercise of a right is not obligatory; included in the concept of a right is one's freedom to forego his exercise of the right. To choose servitude is to choose to forego the exercise of one's rightful liberty in perpetuity, but this too is a choice one can make with impunity in a rights-primitive framework. Why persons in large numbers should so choose is not hard to see if we compare the security of dependence with what Michael Oakeshott identifies as the “notorious risks”<sup>2</sup> of self-responsibility. I think we see this in its proper light when we recognize the developmental fact that no human being is born autonomous and self-responsible. Every person is in the first stage of his life a dependent being in whom subsists the potentiality for becoming an autonomous and self-responsible individual. Devel-

opmentally this means that toward the end of one's obligatory dependence one is likely to be comfortable with the terms of one's dependence and skilled at enacting them. On the other hand one's autonomy is one's introduction into a wholly novel world, to be navigated at first only by the clumsiest groping. There is, then, a distinct attractiveness to regression and developmental arrest. It occasioned only momentary surprise in Nietzsche's prophet when his news of the death of God only produced in his hearers the demand for newly-invented gods to obey.<sup>3</sup> Nietzsche himself was a moral individualist, and thus well-armed with arguments to deplore the rejection of liberty in favor of perpetuated dependence. But where liberty is conceived as an exclusively negative freedom, as it is in the tradition of modern political liberalism, then its exercise is strictly non-criteriological, and the choice to exchange it for perpetuated dependence is faultless.

Turning to the exchange of liberty for distributive benefits, the fallacy it embodies is what I will term the distributivist fallacy of supposing that all benefits can be conferred. If all benefits can be conferred, then an irresistible temptation exists to conceive of government as a vast distributive agency whose paramount function is to fulfill the needs and gratify the desires of citizens. The irresistibility arises from the inevitable problematicity of individual initiatives. As John Dewey says, "The distinctive characteristic of practical activity, one which is so inherent that it cannot be eliminated, is the uncertainty which attends it."<sup>4</sup> Famously, Dewey identifies the Greek metaphysics of incorporealized, changeless essences and eternal truths, and also Christian soteriology, as compensatory myths arising from the uncertainty of practical life. But there is a third compensatory myth generated from the same source, namely the modern welfare-statist myth of government as the guarantor of benefits which persons can only problematically self-provide.

Here is the place to begin to speak of the virtues. In one important aspect, the virtues are the personal resources by which individuals qua individuals can in significant measure overcome the uncertainty of practical life and enjoy significant success at achieving their ends. This is most evident with such of the traditional virtues as courage, fidelity, and wholeheartedness, but our extended argument is that it is no less true in the cases of justice, temperance, honesty, wisdom, generosity, and love. For example, wisdom in the classical Greek meaning importantly includes the ability to distinguish in oneself between true and false desires, right and wrong desires. And one of the severest impediments to the gratification of one's true desires is one's distractability in this undertaking by false desires. It was in recognition of this that Democritus is reported to have plucked out his eye when it followed a passing woman, while he was engaged at his studies. (There is no suggestion in the tale that he would have done the same thing had his studies been in a condition in which he could leave them for a time.)

Or consider love—not, however, in its Christian but in its classical Greek meaning. As Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle make abundantly clear, love is a development. It begins in self-love, which, however, by no means precludes but is instead the precondition of love of others. As self-love its object is not the actual but the ideal self, i.e. the innate potentiality in each person which it is that person's responsibility to discover and progressively actualize. Eros is the energy of actualization associated with right aim, and is thus a cardinal resource in the armory of the individual by which to overcome obstacles and thereby diminish the problematicity of practical activity. But we must postpone consideration of other virtues and trust that the present point is sufficiently made for our immediate purpose.

In their aspect as personal resources, the virtues outfit individuals to more effectively achieve their ends, thereby diminishing the uncertainties of practical life. But in the first place the uncertainties can only be diminished, not removed; and in the second place, these resources can only be acquired by persons through extended hard work. If the ends with respect to which the virtues are (in one aspect) means can be conferred upon persons, then the arduous enterprise of acquiring the virtues is gratuitous, and the objective becomes that of constructing the distributive agency.

Perhaps, as has been argued by von Mises, Hayek, Oakeshott, Tibor Machan, and others, the notion of government as a beneficent distributive agency contains an internal contradiction which blocks its realization. But the fallacy I want to lay bare is the supposition that benefits can be conferred. I will put the supreme question as it was presented upon the tragic state of Hellenic Greece, but I do so in the belief that this same question lies unarticulated beneath much contemporary alienation and anomie. Does it matter that you and I live? Will it matter that you and I have lived? The answer of Greek eudaimonism is that it matters and will have mattered if we live lives of worth. But worth must be earned, it cannot be conferred. The task of living a worthy life is a job, a piece of work, namely the work of progressively actualizing the distinctive potential excellence subsisting within us as a potentiality and distinguishing each of us as the individual he or she is. The work is arduous but intrinsically rewarding. The intrinsic rewards are the virtues themselves in another aspect (and in this aspect virtue is rightly said to be its own reward). As Aristotle says, no person who has experienced these rewards will trade them for rewards of any other kind.<sup>5</sup> And like the objective worth of actualized personhood, these rewards cannot be conferred but must be earned.

Let me return now to the fallacy alluded to earlier in the exchange of individual liberty for ideological servitude. If liberty is a right, and rights are logically primitive, or as Ronald Dworkin insists, "axiomatic",<sup>6</sup> then this exchange can be made with impunity. But from the eudaimonistic standpoint rights are not logically primitive. In the minimal conception of personhood what is logically primitive is not

rights but responsibilities, beginning with the fundamental moral responsibility of every person to discover and progressively actualize his or her distinctive potential excellence. Rights derive from responsibilities by the logic that "ought" implies "can". If a person ought to discover and progressively actualize his distinctive potential excellence, and if such self-discovery and self-actualization has necessary conditions, then he or she is entitled to those conditions. Notice that this conception "takes rights seriously," in Dworkin's phrase, for to take rights seriously means to affirm their inalienability. True to the classical liberal tradition, Dworkin supposes that this can be done only by axiomatizing rights in a rights-primitive conception of man. But rights are also inalienable when they are entitlements to necessary conditions of inalienable responsibilities. Our main point here is that if liberty is a necessary condition of inalienable responsibility, then it cannot with impunity be exchanged for ideological servitude. To so exchange it is to default on one's fundamental moral responsibility.

Returning once again to the fallacy of supposing that all benefits are conferrable, we have by adopting a eudaimonistic perspective introduced the idea that the highest rewards which life affords must be earned and cannot be conferred. But to understand the illusion of conferrability it is important to recognize that eudaimonism is a developmental perspective. Thus Aristotle, for example, cautions that nothing he says in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is applicable to children or youths. The earned benefits of self-actualization presuppose the autonomy of individuals, and no person is born autonomous. From birth persons may be said to possess the potentiality for autonomy, but every person in the first stage of his life is a dependent creature. It is upon the external authority of parents and community that the child is dependent for language, for concept-formation, for judgments, for the principles of conduct which lift his behavior out of randomness, for his repertoire of functional feelings, and indeed for his very identity. In this stage and by the very nature of dependence itself, benefits cannot be earned and must be and are conferred. Developmentally, then, the belief that *all* benefits are conferrable represents the thesis that persons are dependent children, not just in the first stage of their lives, but from the beginning of their lives to the end. And this is precisely the assumption of the *realpolitik* initiative with which political modernity begins. In Hobbes famous words persons have a life that is by nature "nasty and brutish."<sup>7</sup> Before him Machiavelli laid the *realpolitik* cornerstone by declaring that "one can make this generalization about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, liars and deceivers, they shun danger and are greedy for profit."<sup>8</sup> What *realpolitik* did was to build social order out of this understanding of persons. It did so by teaching persons to conceive of themselves in exclusively economic terms as selfish utility-maximizers. As A.O. Hirschman documents in his book, *The Passions and the Interests*, the 16th and 17th centuries witnessed a striking "semantic drift" by which such terms as "interest", "enterprise", and "worth" became con-

stricted in their meaning to “economic interest,” “economic enterprise,” and “economic worth.”<sup>9</sup> Social order was generated from the fact that, be he prince or peasant, so long as a man pursued his economic self-interest, his behavior became predictable.

The genius of *realpolitik* in building social order out of a conception of human being which corresponded to “the unvarnished facts,” in Hobbes’s phrase, is not to be denied. Indeed, *realpolitik* is faultless in its choice of starting-place. But by its non-developmental conception of human being, the social order it constructed was such as to ensure that the human life which was nasty and brutish should remain ever such. To put this in Aristotelian-developmental terms, the first stage of life subsequent to childhood dependence is devoted to what we would today term utility-maximization; it is what we would term the economic stage, and according to Aristotle it contains no virtue or excellence.<sup>10</sup> But beyond it is the socio-political stage which is the stage of the moral virtues, and beyond this is the philosophical stage which is the stage of the intellectual virtues. In light of developmental knowledge today there can be no question of slavishly following Aristotle’s format of the stages, but his basic point remains telling, namely that political modernity has conspired to produce developmental arrest in the first, or economic stage, and that with respect to this stage, the amputation of morality from politics meets with no resistance, for in this stage moral initiatives are merely latent.

The illusion of the conferrability of all benefits has been fostered by the economistic conception of man upon which political modernity was founded. From the standpoint of economics as the science which quantifies value, value is transferrable; it is exchange value. This eradicates the distinction between earned benefits and conferred benefits, for the unit of exchange value is monetary, and the money in one’s possession represents the same purchasing power, no matter whether one has earned it, found it, or received it as a gift. But to generalize an exclusively economic conception of man, *realpolitik* had to overturn the ancient *moral* doctrine of intrinsic, non-transferrable, earned rewards which had received new currency in Renaissance humanism and the so-called *via moderna*.<sup>11</sup> It did so by a slow but relentless *redefinition* of benefits which rendered them distributable.

Consider “happiness.” In Aristotle’s meaning it is activity in accordance with virtue, and must be earned. In the modern meaning, happiness is “pleasure in the long run,” or “a sum of pleasures,” where “pleasure” is the feeling of gratified desire. If what we desire is economic in the sense of distributable, as *realpolitik* teaches, then happiness is conferrable, for our desires can be gratified by awards by others or by distributive agencies.

Another telling example is afforded by the concept of “worth.” From the eudaimonistic standpoint, fundamental moral motivation subsists in all persons and consists of the aspiration to live a life of worth, where living a life of worth consists in self-discovery and progressive self-actualization. This motivation is neither selfish nor al-

truistic, but is instead a unity from which “egoism” and “altruism” are subsequently extracted and developed as abstractionist fallacies. Eudaimonistically, worth is to be earned by self-actualization, and as objective, is *of* worth to and for whomever is capable of appreciating and utilizing it. But in Hobbes we find the famous redefinition according to which “The value of Worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price—that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power—and therefore is not absolute but a thing dependent upon the need and judgment of another.”<sup>12</sup> It is the Hobbesian spirit at work today when B. F. Skinner economistically identifies “dignity” as being in no sense intrinsic to the person who possesses it, but instead awarded as a distributable commodity.<sup>13</sup>

I will conclude on the modern redefinition of benefits with a note on the progressive devolution of the concept of justice to an exclusively distributive justice. Eudaimonistically, justice is first of all not “recipient” but “productive”, and centers in each person doing what he or she does best and finds intrinsically rewarding to do. Distributive justice derives from this through the indispensable concept of *desert*. On the face of it what we mean by desert still requires to be earned, and for this reason many modern theories of justice endeavor to disregard it. But modernity’s striking enterprise of redefinition is in this case epitomized in John Rawls, for as Wallace Matson has been the first to point out, *A Theory of Justice* makes desert a distributable commodity.<sup>14</sup>

First Rawls disposes of the ground of desert according to eudaimonism. That ground is the innate potentiality within every person which it is his or her responsibility to discover and progressively actualize. Desert has both a lower limit and upper limit. Its lower limit is the desert which inheres by virtue of pure unactualized potentiality; its upper limit is entitlement to the distributable goods whose potential values can be actualized by virtue of the actualized potentialities of the individual. The foundation of this thesis is the recognition of potentiality as responsibility. Rawls disposes of it by regarding potentialities as benefits, unevenly distributed by the “natural lottery” of birth. As benefits they are not merely non-deserved but undeserved, and require “to be somehow compensated for.”<sup>15</sup> But Rawls retains the concept of desert and furnishes it with a new foundation in connection with his “difference principle.” He says, “At this point it is necessary to be clear about the notion of desert. It is perfectly true that given a just system of cooperation as a scheme of public rules and the expectations set up by it, those who, with the prospect of improving their condition, have done what the system announces that it will reward[,] are entitled to their advantages. In this sense the more fortunate have a claim to their better situation; their claims are legitimate expectations established by social institutions, and the community is obligated to meet them. But this sense of desert presupposes the existence of the cooperative scheme...”<sup>16</sup>

It takes but a moment’s thought to note the striking transformation

which is wrought by Rawls. That desert is the product of the just system means that Rawls's conception of justice is logically independent of desert. Moreover desert cannot here be a criterion of good government, as it is for Aristotle, for as Matson observes, Rawlsian desert is the creation of government.<sup>17</sup> Desert is here distributed, as worth is distributed by Hobbes, and dignity by Skinner, as the reward for accepting the terms laid down by the social system. The reason that Rawls, here as elsewhere, finds the *prima facie* intuitive support upon which he relies,<sup>18</sup> is that Rawls's readers are the end products of 400 years of conditioning in political theory based upon a rights-primitive conception of man, and rights-primitivism establishes a fundamental *recipient* orientation by which, not merely benefits, but the very self-identity of persons is conferred. Developmentally, a recipient orientation is appropriate to the essential dependence of the first stage of the life of all persons. Here the paramount question necessarily is, What shall I receive? But adolescence marks the displacement of this question by the primacy of the question, What shall I do?, with consequent exchange of a rights-primitive for a responsibilities-primitive framework. Consonant with political modernity as a whole, Rawls does not acknowledge the development of autonomy out of dependence, and what he means by autonomy turns out to be the internalization and voluntary endorsement of the terms of dependence.

If we now undertake to rectify the *realpolitik* conception of man with which modernity began by introducing the responsibility for the development of persons, the right to liberty exhibits new-found significance. It expresses the thesis and the determination that this development is to be the *self*-development of individuals, with respect to which political liberty is a paramount condition. But this conception of individuality as moral development is a eudaimonistic doctrine. The reason that man thus conceived is *zoon politikon*, is that this development has necessary preconditions, some of which cannot be self-supplied by persons as individuals, and are therefore social conditions. As Professor Fred D. Miller has pointed out, to follow Aristotle in identifying man as *zoon politikon* is not necessarily to imply the apparatus of the modern state, for in Aristotle the concepts of politics and the *polis* are not clearly identified with what we would term the political state as distinguished from the social community.<sup>19</sup> There are serious questions of responsibility and authority here, but to try to answer them at this point would be premature. What must be done first is to demonstrate the paramount importance of the self-development of persons as individuals, while recognizing that the imperative of self-development applies to all persons, and not an elite few who are privileged by the "natural lottery" of birth. What follows will be an attempt at such demonstration, by connecting the virtues of the self-development of which political liberty is a paramount condition.

Eudaimonistically conceived, the virtues are not a number of things which they have regularly been mistaken to be. In the first place they are not innate dispositions given to some but denied to oth-

ers by the "natural lottery" of birth. Nor are they socializing or moralizing "side constraints" on natively acquisitive conduct. Neither are they portable attributes, first learned independently and thereafter attached to selected behaviors. Finally they are not in a proper sense supererogatory functions. Eudaimonistically conceived, the virtues are the natural expressions of self-actualizing individuality. They are not supererogatory because self-actualization itself is each person's fundamental moral responsibility. They are not "side constraints" because, in the first place, "side constraints" are a concession to the social character of existence, while for eudaimonism, true individuality is intrinsically social in character. In this light the virtues are not concessions, but expressions of self-fulfillment which are themselves self-fulfilling. They are not sparsely distributed innate dispositions, but potentialities in all persons which are only rarely actualized, and the politics of eudaimonism is directed to securing the conditions under which their actualization can be generalized. And they are not portable attributes but natural expressions of an individuality which, by Spinoza's dictum *omnis determinatio est negatio*, is highly selective. It was the mistake of regarding the virtues as portable attributes that produced in Kant, for example, the conclusion that they are in themselves morally neutral, becoming good or evil according to the purpose to which they are put.<sup>20</sup> In this light courage, for example, is epitomized in the six-guns of an old West gunslinger, which are available for hire to the highest bidder. But in fact courage is highly selective, arising in the recognition that what the individual is responsible for doing will not and cannot be done if he or she does not do it.

To set forth eudaimonism's theory of the virtues as concretely as possible we can consider by way of example the much misunderstood virtue of generosity. Generosity is not self-sacrifice but self-fulfillment. For the self-fulfilling life is not the life of idle self-indulgence but the life of meaningful work, and in meaningful work lies a native theme of generosity which is expressed in two ways. In the first place meaningful work is self-actualizing work, and self-actualization is the objectivization of the self which is to be recognized as the gift of the best that one is to others. But "objective" here must be strictly distinguished from that objectivity which has shaped modernity in the depersonalization of civil association and objective social structures. In this modern usage "objectivity" and "subjectivity" bear mutually exclusive meanings, and endorsement of the objective has been accompanied by active disparagement of the "merely subjective." But this is an abstractionist fallacy. Nothing in human experience is "merely subjective." Every human impulse is subjective in its inception but objective in its intended outcome, and because its outcome is within it implicitly in its inception, it is never "merely subjective."

When objectivization is understood as the expression of subjective selfhood in objective and public form, then the generosity inherent in self-actualization becomes apparent. Self-actualization expresses the intention to live a worthy life which, as objectively worthy, is of worth

to whomever is capable of appreciating it as such. It is in this sense a gift which enriches the giver. It is likewise a gift which by its own nature selects its recipients. The gift comprises, distinguishably but inseparably, the distributable products of the enterprise of self-actualization and the qualities in the self-actualizing individual which we term the virtues. As Aristotle notes, "every virtue or excellence (*arete*) both brings into good condition the thing [person] of which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be well done."<sup>21</sup> By virtue of the nature of self-actualization as objectivization we may say that giving to selected others is the intention of the self-actualizing individual, implicit perhaps in the beginning, but becoming progressively more explicit as self-actualization proceeds. If this is correct, then the corollary of the labor theory or value, namely that the products of labor are by nature the exclusive property of the laborer, is a serious error. To account for it we may say, first, that it derives from the error of conceiving of individuality "atomistically", i.e. as exclusive of other persons.<sup>22</sup> But to this must be added the consideration of theft, which not only thwarts generosity, but can turn it into the reaction-formation of possessiveness and hoarding. Here it will not be purse-snatching and embezzlement that lay first claim upon our attention. What extinguishes the native generosity in meaningful work necessarily lies deeper than these. We find it where theft is ubiquitized under the aegis of law and popular morality, as it is by the egalitarian supposition that at bottom all persons are alike, and that every person is by nature possessed of equal entitlement to everything. This thwarts the native generosity in meaningful work, for when the individual gives himself through objectivization, he selects his recipients by virtue of the qualitative distinctiveness of the gift. The gift is *meant* for those who can appreciate and utilize the qualitatively distinctive values which have been embodied in it by the expressive labors of its maker. Thus Stravinsky's *Rite of Spring* is meant for those who possess the cultivated capacities to appreciate and utilize its distinctive values. This appreciation and utilization by others is a condition of the self-fulfillment of the individual. The reason is that self-actualization causes objective worth to appear in the world which, as objective, is of worth, by no means to the self-actualizing individual alone or primarily, but in principle to all persons, and in fact to such persons as fulfill in themselves the conditions of appreciation of worth of the distinctive kind in the given case. Therefore self-actualization is incomplete without recognition of its worth, not, to be sure, by all other persons, but by some others. We spoke earlier of necessary conditions of self-fulfillment, some of which cannot be self-provided by persons as individuals. Here is one such non-self-supplyable condition, namely the proximity of other persons who through their own self-actualization have the capacity to appreciate and utilize the contributions of a given individual. I think the glorification of solitude by romantic individualists is a reaction-formation to their own discovery that no one in their time and place is capable of appreci-

ating their distinctive excellence. Where such is the case, then by eudaimonistic lights genuine injustice exists. But the glorification of solitude, though perhaps satisfying to the vanity of the individual, is a self-defeating resort. The task instead is to generalize self-actualizing individuality by uncovering and instituting its necessary preconditions, thus insuring as far as possible that virtues do not go unrecognized.

Our description of the eudaimonistic conception of generosity is far from complete, but within the limits of this paper I can only very briefly touch upon one more aspect. Eudaimonism abhors what Durkheim called the "malady of infinite aspiration."<sup>23</sup> Individuality is qualitative finitude, which means that in the domain of value the fulfilled, self-actualized individual is a determinate *this* which is not *that* and the *other*. But the "thats" and "others" are likewise determinate kinds of value. To actualize them is the responsibility of others. It is an aspect of the native generosity in the self-fulfilling individual that he entrusts to others the varieties of value which it is their responsibility to actualize. In so doing he acknowledges the entitlements of others to those distinctive kinds of goods, in appropriate amounts, which constitute conditions of their fulfillment of their responsibilities. To their goods he recognizes that he has no claim, and he advances none. On the other hand egalitarianism extinguishes this form of generosity by endorsing equal claim by all persons to all goods. The effect of this is supply mindless envy with spurious warrant.

We have spoken here only of generosity, but the extended eudaimonistic thesis is that what is true of generosity holds equally for such of the virtues as wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, honesty, wholeheartedness, resourcefulness, and love. Alike they are natural expressions of developed individuality. Alike they represent the explication of a form of sociality which inheres in personhood from the beginning, and is progressively explicated through self-development, namely the intrinsic sociality of true individuals. The principle of this sociality, as I have argued elsewhere,<sup>24</sup> is not the "at bottom" uniformity of persons, but the complementarity of perfected differences. In this aspect the virtues *are* this complementarity, as it is manifested in different but overlapping situations. Justice, for example, is not a non-natural artifact, but an expression of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is knowledge of one's fundamental moral responsibility, and of the finite entitlements which derive from it by the logic that "ought" implies "can". The foundation of justice appears in the acknowledgment by the individual with the lesser claim to a distributable good that his claim is the lesser.

The history of political liberalism has been the history of resolute defense of the right of the individual to political liberty. What remains is to connect liberty with worthy, self-responsible, self-determined, intrinsically rewarding individuality. But to do this requires going beyond liberty to identify others of the necessary preconditions of self-discovery and self-actualization, and by instituting them, to generalize self-actualizing individuality itself. It is noteworthy that Hobbes

acknowledged self-responsible, self-determined individuality to be the securest foundation of justice, but declared it politically irrelevant by reason of its rarity.<sup>25</sup> But Hobbes took it to be an endowment sparsely distributed by the natural lottery of birth. The eudaimonistic thesis is that it is, instead, a potentiality in all persons which is only rarely actualized, thanks to neglect of its preconditions. Today we possess sufficient knowledge of development to be able to identify these necessary preconditions, and we are capable of instituting these preconditions, thereby generalizing the opportunity of self-development. The meaning of Aristotle's identification of man as *zoon politikon* is that self-actualizing individuality requires a supportive cultural context. To provide such is, I suggest, our paramount social responsibility.\*

1. Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 275.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), pp. 95-96.
4. John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons Capricorn Books, 1960), p. 6.
5. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1166a, 20-23.
6. Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (London: Duckworth, 1977), p. vx., p. 181.
7. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan Parts I and II* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Library of Liberal Arts, 1958), p. 107.
8. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, translation by George Bull (London: Harmondsworth, 1961), p. 96.
9. A.O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), esp. pp. 31-42.
10. Aristotle, *Politics* 7, 13; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1, 13.
11. For an excellent presentation of the moral politics of Renaissance humanism and the *via moderna*, see Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), vol. 1.
12. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 79.
13. B.F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Bantam Books, 1972).
14. Wallace Matson, "What Rawls Calls Justice," *The Occasional Review*, Issue 8/9, (Autumn 1978), pp. 45-55.
15. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 100.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
17. Matson, "What Rawls Calls Justice," p. 50.
18. R.M. Hare has documented Rawls's extensive reliance upon the "intuitions" of his readers; see Hare, "Rawls' Theory of Justice—1," *Philosophical Quarterly*, 23, No. 91 (1973), pp. 144-155.
19. Fred D. Miller, Jr., "The State and the Community in Aristotle's *Politics*," *Reason Papers* No. 1, pp. 62-69.
20. Immanuel Kant, *The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics*, translation by Otto Manthey-Zorn (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938), pp. 8-9.
21. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1106a, 15-18.
22. Eudaimonistically conceived, personhood is intrinsically social in the beginning (as dependent childhood) and intrinsically social in the end (as autonomous individuality); but the two socialities are very different in kind. This is developed in my *Personal Destinies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Chs. 8-10.

23. Cited in Steven Lukes, *Essays in Social Theory* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 78.
24. *Personal Destinies*, Chs 8-10; and in a book forthcoming from Princeton University Press entitled *Political Individualism: A Eudaimonistic Perspective*, Ch. 3, "The Two Socialities."
25. See Michael Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975, rev. ed.), p. 124.

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# MARXISM: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND BAD FAITH

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## A “CULT OF PERSONALITY”

**I**t is remarkable, and should be remarked far more often than it is: both that substantial and, we are told, increasing numbers of professing social scientists nowadays proclaim their attachment to the theories and putative methods of a nineteenth century predecessor; and that there is, apparently, only one particular predecessor able to inspire such widespread and continuing devotion—such a “cult of personality,”<sup>1</sup> you might say.

This is a phenomenon which should make anyone sincerely committed to enquiry both suspicious and curious. One discouraging yet possibly instructive parallel is with the applied pseudo-science of psychoanalysis; where we hear first of the great divide between Freudians and Jungians, and then of further faction fights among rival disciples of these founders. In the social sciences, however, such party loyalty is mainly if not only for one particular *Victorian Sage*.<sup>2</sup> Still more peculiar, and still more deserving of remark, is the fact that the devotion extends beyond the wide limits of one area of study. For in this unique case all the author’s works on every subject, and often too his political policies, are treated with a similar respect, and taken to be similarly authoritative.

Contrast the natural sciences—and, above all, the standard-setting, paradigm science of physics. There not even the greatest contributors attract this kind of posthumous, partisan devotion. Their contributions are quietly added to the ever expanding corpus of at least provisionally established truth; while their names appear in the current literature and in the textbooks solely in stock descriptions of eponymous principles, laws, or effects. Even in biology the enormous contribution of Darwin—work to which Engels in his address at the graveside dared to compare that of Marx in social science<sup>3</sup>—has not

inspired loyalties of the same sort. For although almost all biologists presently subscribe to the Neo-Darwinian Synthetic Theory of Evolution, and although there were once Social Darwinists, no one now takes Darwin's works as authoritative even in biology, much less in anything else. As for the incomparable Newton, most of his writings have never been and most likely never will be published at all. For they deal not with physics but with religion.

My suspicions aroused by the existence and extent of this contemporary "cult of personality," I propose to develop and to support, although I cannot hope with tolerable brevity to prove, two suggestions. In so far as these two suggestions are correct, there is something rotten in the state of the social sciences. The first suggestion is that, whatever may have been true in earlier and more innocent periods, these continuing Marxist loyalties today constitute a religious rather than a scientific phenomenon. The second is that, at any rate in our time, the maintenance of the doctrinal and behavioural commitments of this new godless religion—its "unity of theory and practice"—calls for a deal of bad faith, both academic and political.

(a) With my first suggestion the crux is that what is right in Marx was by no means peculiar to him, while what was distinctive is not right. The predictions based upon his theories have not been fulfilled, while the policies which he recommended have not produced the results which he promised. To this predicament the devout may respond in two quite different ways.

One is to try to make out that he never actually made the claims which have been falsified. There is plenty of scope for this kind of response: first, because Marx wrote so much, often unsurprisingly saying one thing at one time and, at another time, something else entirely inconsistent; second, because his writings are on occasion obscure and, it appears deliberately, evasive; and, third, because—unless you count the *Manifesto*, which is scarcely composed as a theoretical document directed towards scientific colleagues—neither Marx nor Engels ever produced a crisp, clear cut and unambiguous statement of exactly what it was which in their correspondence they always referred to as "our view" or "our theory" or the like.

The contrast with Darwin is as complete as it is revealing of the true character and concerns of both men. For, years before he ventured to publish anything about evolution by natural selection, Darwin had for his private, purely scientific purposes written a "sketch of my species theory;" a sketch which was intended to force him to recognize the difficulties which, if they could not be overcome, would demand the amendment or abandonment of that theory. (Is it possible to point to any of the passages in all the massed volumes of MEGA in which Marx accepted that anything constituted such a difficulty for "our view?")

(b) The second possible response to the falsification of the predictions, and the non-fulfillment of the utopian political promises, is to admit everything, or almost everything, yet still to insist upon de-

fiantly maintaining all the old commitments. Two notorious specimens of this kind are provided by György Lukács and C. Wright Mills. It was, of course, Lukács who once insisted that the validity of the supposedly distinctive method of Marx could, and should, survive the falsification of all the findings thereby yielded.<sup>4</sup> Wright Mills too, calling himself “a plain Marxist” and commending above all the *method* of Marx, is, it appears, equally reluctant to judge by results.<sup>5</sup> Understandably unwilling or, more likely, unable to offer a clear account of what that putative method was, he proceeds to list the seventeen “most important conceptions and propositions of classic Marxism.” With one exception all these are then dismissed as “false”, or “unclear”, or “imprecise”, or “misleading”, or “unfruitful”, or “careless”, or “confused”, or “quite clearly wrong.” Number II, that sole exception, is correctly put down as a tautological truism.<sup>6</sup>

So, at the end of the day “the plain Marxism” of C. Wright Mills simply is his invincibly stubborn commitment to (what only a Greek can without affectation describe as) Marxist *praxis*. He continues to avow his total solidarity with “the new world” extending already from China and the USSR to Cuba.<sup>7</sup>

### THE SECULAR CRUSADE OF OUR CENTURY

When Bertrand Russell returned from visiting the USSR in 1920 to write *The Theory and Practice of Bolshevism* he became perhaps the first to describe what was not yet labelled Marxism-Leninism as a new secular Islam.<sup>8</sup> Since then several critics have urged, that what Marx and Engels and their twentieth century followers have loved to call “scientific socialism” is a religious system rather than a scientific theory, and that its claims to be scientific are both as baseless, and advanced for the same propaganda reasons, as those of Christian Science. Lewis Feuer, for instance, picked out the Mosaic myth as “the invariable ingredient” of all revolutionary ideologies; pointing out similarities between the conversion experiences both of modern revolutionaries and of the more traditionally religious.<sup>9</sup> Again, Sidney Hook has often argued that “‘Marxism’ today signifies an ideology in Marx’s original sense of that term, suggestive more of a religious than of a strictly scientific or rational outlook on society.”<sup>10</sup>

Two things have not perhaps been brought out so fully. First, that the apocalyptic eschatology, the utopian historicism which has been of such decisive importance in winning converts to Marxism,<sup>11</sup> was originally derived, by what Marx was pleased to call a philosophical analysis, from the Hegelian secularization of a Christian philosophy of history.<sup>12</sup> The lifelong atheism of the Founding Fathers (Marx and Engels) irrecoverably deprived such reassurances of their only sensible foundation—the promises of a provident Creator.<sup>13</sup>

The second thing to emphasize is that there are numerous close resemblances between the various desperate defensive expedients favoured by today’s intellectual Marxists and many of the equally des-

perate apologetic manoeuvres performed by apologists for the Christian religion. One of the most ancient as well as the most outrageous is that summed up in the Patristic slogan "*Credo ut intelligam*" [I believe in order that I may understand]. A sacred system is immunized against hostile criticism by insisting that the necessary prior understanding is vouchsafed only to the totally committed.

This is a tack taken by Althusser and by Lukács, among many others: "The application of Marxist theory to Marx himself appears to be the absolute precondition of the understanding of Marx;"<sup>14</sup> and "A non-Marxist cannot understand ... to do so requires actual participation in the revolutionary movement."<sup>15</sup> Whatever might be said about tokens of this type of manoeuvre in a religious context, to offer them as science is an indecency. If this is what is meant by "Marxist social science," then the word "Marxist" in that expression is as much an alienating adjective as "Christian" in "Christian Science" or "People's" in "People's Democracy."

Another traditionally religious way of dealing with what an honest scientist would rate as, at best, a difficulty and, at worst, a falsification is for the devotees, when such material is somehow forced upon their attention, to treat it as a salutary test of the strength of their faith, the firmness of their commitment. This was the option ostentatiously preferred by my own sometime school friend Edward Thompson when he decided to write "An Open Letter to Leszek Kolakowski," reproaching him for his apostasy.<sup>16</sup> Very understandably, Thompson scarcely attempted to confute contentions that the distinctive Marxist propositions are false, and the consequences of implementing Marxist-Leninist policies lamentable. Instead Thompson had the effrontery to fault Kolakowski for not having remained, despite all temptations, strong in the faith. He should, it seems, have continued to labour, with Thompson and his comrades, both for unilateral Western disarmament and for the consequent extension of what Moscow likes to call "The Socialist Commonwealth."

Another leading client of this second traditional religious tactic is Steven Lukes. He employs it to dispose of evidence about the actual effects of Marxism-Leninism in practice. These, he says, "an egalitarian socialist," which he himself pretends to be, must treat "as a challenge, rather than a source of despair."<sup>17</sup> Again, in his most recent work, Lukes makes it clear from the beginning that no criticism, however damaging, is to be permitted to result in root and branch rejection: "This book is," he assures us, in a revealingly religious phrase, "not just another anti-Marxist tract."<sup>18</sup>

Lukes does, however, have some reluctant disapproving words "for Stalin's terror, the purges and the trials, the mass deportations and the vast network of labour camps, for the social catastrophe of Mao's Cultural Revolution, for the 'murderous utopia' of Pol Pot's Cambodia, and for the grim, surveillance-minded, demoralized world of contemporary 'actually existing socialism,' above all in the USSR and Eastern Europe."<sup>19</sup>

But no reference to these now admitted horrors and miseries of “actually existing socialism” is to be allowed to inhibit the drive to impose that same system everywhere; to promote, as Lukes has it, “the cause of socialism.” Nor has he even one good word to say for any who have fought to prevent such catastrophes. For him, as for Thompson and so many others, all resistance is nothing but the “capitalist imperialism and neo-colonialism ... presently visible behind the moralistic facade of United States foreign policy, especially in South East Asia and now in Central America.”<sup>20</sup> Rightly presenting his work as both theoretically and practically important, Lukes remains, apparently, too bigoted and too indifferent to the actual effects of socialism to allow that work to result in any substantial change in his own convictions and practice.

### IGNORING THE OBJECTIONS

The previous section displayed and denounced two favourite traditionally religious tactics for preempting or diverting formidable criticism. But the more common practice, when such criticism is not being forced into attention, is simply to ignore it. Thus the author of a recent series of studies of fourteen *Thinkers of the New Left* first lists the names of several of the most powerful critics of Marxism, from Weber to Popper, and then asks himself a rueful question: Since all these “have made *no impact whatsoever* on the fundamental items of left-wing belief,” and have apparently failed “even to *attract the attention* of those whom they have sought to persuade;” then “how can *he* hope to make an impact?”<sup>21</sup> He goes on to give case after case of that refusal even to attend. Thus “Althusser praises the labour theory [of value] and purports to be persuaded by it.”<sup>22</sup> So what does the prophet Althusser make of the overwhelming critical literature, from the early marginalists, on through such giants of the Austrian school as Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Ludwig von Mises? Nothing. All profane pagans are silently ignored.

Althusser is perhaps an egregiously scandalous and certainly a demented figure. By contrast several contributors to the *Dictionary of Marxist Thought* edited by Tom Bottomore do take rather more notice of objections. Yet even at their best they too still choose to emasculate or ignore the most powerful. Nor do they ever so much as entertain the thought that the whole system ought to be abandoned utterly, rather than here and there amended. Thus, in their entry “Critics of Marxism,” the editors manage to mention Popper, but not *The Open Society*, only *The Poverty of Historicism*, his feeblest work. They themselves conclude with genuflections: both to “the distinctive explanatory power of Marxist thought ... notwithstanding some unresolved problems;” and to “its capacity to generate not a religion, but a body of rational norms for a socialist society ...”<sup>23</sup>

Again, the article “Lenin” takes care not to mention Sidney Hook or any of the others maintaining that the success of the October coup

in the Russian Empire falsifies a characteristic and surely fundamental claim in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*: "... no social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have been developed ..."<sup>24</sup>

In professing social scientists all such evasive responses to strong and relevant objections have to be construed as indications of academic and political bad faith. Descartes once remarked that, in determining what people sincerely believed, he preferred to look to what they did rather than to what they said. His advice is equally sound with regard to sincerity in general. Hence, in order to prove that they are indeed sincerely pursuing some purpose, the one thing above all which people have to do is to be constantly concerned to monitor their success or failure in fulfilling that purpose. If ever and whenever this monitoring reveals that they are not succeeding, all truly sincere purposers will there and then make that sincerity plain by their readiness to adopt fresh tactics offering better promise of success.

Dropping down now from abstract and general to concrete and particular, let us suppose that someone professes to be in business in order, no doubt among other things, to turn a profit; or suppose, again, that the captain of a sports team says that he is playing, no doubt again among other things, in order to win. Then what credence could we give to these professions if there is no care to keep, in the one case, accounts and, in the other, the score?

In order to discuss the methodology of Karl Marx, I shall now relate these modest revelations of what should be familiar logical linkages to the two main *methodological* recommendations of Sir Karl Popper. As everyone knows Popper makes proposals which are of course close in kin the one to the other, for the spheres of both theoretical science and practical policy. In each case Popperian methodology can be seen as the direct and necessary outcome of sincerity in the appropriate purposes. It is the more worthwhile to represent these recommendations in this way in as much as he himself seems never to have done so. This negligence, and the consequent failure to deploy the most powerful supporting arguments, has probably to be explained by referring to his generous yet unrealistic reluctance to recognize, in any opponents, discreditable distractions or even sheer bad faith.

The aim of theoretical science is truth. Given this aim the critical approach must follow. The person who truly wants the truth cannot and will not embrace unexamined candidates. He must and will be ever ready to test, and test and test again. But testing for truth is in this context precisely what criticism is. The purposes of practical policies, and of the institutions established for the implementation of those policies and the fulfillment of those purposes, are as multifarious as human desires. Yet parallel considerations apply here too. In this case criticism is just probing the effects and effectiveness of the policies in question. How, therefore, can anyone who has indeed been

promoting some policy solely in pursuit of some particular cherished end be indifferent to evidence that that end is not being achieved, or be unwilling to alter course in the hopes of securing better success?

### INSINCERITY IN BOTH THEORY AND PRACTICE

It would, I submit, be intolerably invidious to go now, in a fourth and final section, to apply these uncomfortable morals about academic and political bad faith directly to particular, named contemporaries. Instead, in order to show that "Evasion and obscurity are present from the beginning,"<sup>25</sup> I will return to the Founding Fathers. (a) In the first part of his obituary address, mentioned earlier, Friedrich Engels asserted: "Just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history." This part concluded with the claim: "*So war dieser Mann der Wissenschaft*" [Thus was this man of science]. In the second Engels spoke of Marx as a revolutionary; working tirelessly, we are asked to believe, for the enrichment of the poor and the emancipation of the oppressed.

In an oft-quoted rebuke to Malthus, Marx wrote: "A man who tries to *accommodate* science to a standpoint not derived from science itself ... but from outside interests that are alien to science itself, such a man I call *gemein*" [cheap]. It was, nevertheless, a charge of which he was himself all too often guilty.

Look first at *Capital*, the magnum opus which was, and still is, supposed to provide the long promised<sup>26</sup> scientific proof for the sweeping historical theses of the *Manifesto*, for its "philosophy of history." Perhaps the most fundamental of these was the Immiseration Thesis; that, in the words of *Capital*, "The accumulation of wealth at one pole is ... at the same time the accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalization at the other ..." Faced with falsification Marx simply suppressed the data. Hence, in the first edition, various available British statistics are given up to 1865 or 1866, but those for the movement of wages stop at 1850. In the second edition all the other runs are brought up to date, but that of wage movements still stops at 1850.<sup>27</sup>

Or suppose we look at the correspondence, never forgetting that this was subject to at least two systematic prunings before its eventual publication. The Marquis de Vauverargues once noted that "For the philosopher, clarity is a matter of good faith." His maxim is equally true for the scientist. So we call in evidence a letter to Engels, dated August 15th 1857. It is especially notable in as much as it also reveals something of what Marx had in mind when he spoke of dialectics (or the dialectic method). In the works published during his lifetime those are (or this is) sometimes commended but never so frankly explained. But here we read:

I took the risk of prognosticating in this way, as I was compelled to sub-

stitute for you as correspondent at the Tribune ... It is possible I may be discredited. But in that case it will still be possible to pull through with the help of a bit of dialectics. It goes without saying that I phrased my forecasts in such a way that I would prove to be right also in the opposite case.

*So war dieser Mann der Wissenschaft!*

(b) But now, what about the second part of that obituary address, and the charge of political bad faith? The most damning evidence on this count is that of the consistent and persistent refusal of Marx to make any serious attempt to answer those critics who argued that the enforcement of full socialism, Marxist style, would inevitably result, as in fact it has, in a vastly intensified and more universally repressive form of oriental despotism; or of, as it is euphemistically labelled by Marxists, "the Asiatic mode of production." The fact that Marx so swiftly abandoned his studies of that phenomenon is doubly significant: first, because it could not be encompassed within, and therefore constituted a falsification of "our view" of a progressive, unilinear, historical development; and, second, because it provided the best available evidence of the likely political and social effects of establishing a totally centralized command economy.

Criticism on this count in fact began very early, even before the first publication of the *Manifesto*. Already in 1844 Arnold Ruge, who was "still a democratic, not a socialist revolutionary," protested that the realization of such socialist dreams would be "a police and slave state."<sup>28</sup> In the year of the *Manifesto*, when Engels explained its ideas to the Vice-President of Louis Blanc's party, that luminary responded: "You are leaning towards despotism."<sup>29</sup> The fullest contemporary development was to come in 1873, in Bakunin's *Statehood and Anarchy*.

It is illuminating to compare this failure, or this refusal, with the indifference shown by most of our socialist contemporaries, even those who repudiate the Marxist name, towards the charges that total socialism must inevitably become totalitarian; and that a pluralist economy is in fact a necessary condition of pluralist politics, though certainly not sufficient. The motives are in both cases, presumably, the same.

Such Hayekian theses<sup>30</sup> are, of course, nowadays accepted, not to say relished, by the chief enemies of both individual freedom and authentic rather than People's Democracy.

Consider, for instance, the statement issued in 1971 by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow. With its eyes then mainly on Chile and France, it sketched a programme for achieving, through "United Front" or "Broad Left" tactics, irreversible Communist domination: "Having once acquired political power, the working class implements the liquidation of the private ownership of the means of production ... As a result, under socialism, there remains no ground for the existence of any opposition parties counterbalancing the Communist Party."

In my own country the usual response today to all such objections, from those still pretending to be democrats as well as socialists, is to raise the snide question: "What about Chile?" Its frivolous irrelevance reveals that for these people, as—on his own admission by Regis Debray—for President Allende, democracy is no more than a temporary and disposable means toward the supreme end of irreversible Leninist domination. They do not sincerely care about democracy or about other liberal and humane values. Neither, I submit, did Marx.

1. This is the standard English translation of the Russian phrase employed by Stalin's successors to characterize whatever they are prepared to admit as evils in the period of his dictatorship. It is, and is of course in that context intended to be, a very indefinite description.
2. John Holloway, *The Victorian Sage* (London: Macmillan, 1953).
3. I have in *Darwinian Evolution* (London: Granada Paladin, 1984), III 3, examined this proud boast at some length, concluding—mainly because of the truth of the second claim, that Marx was always before all else the revolutionary—that it is altogether insupportable.
4. G. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness* (London: Merlin, 1971), p. 1. Mills too takes the same line. How can people professing to be any sort of scientists accept as serious and honest colleagues those who would assess an investigatory method by anything but its fruits?
5. C. Wright Mills, *The Marxists* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963), pp. 96ff.
6. It states: "*The opportunity for revolution exists only when objective conditions and subjective readiness coincide.*"
7. Compare the treatment of "Marxism and History" in B. Ollman and E. Vernoff (eds.) *The Left Academy* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1982). The authors allow "Marxist historians" to reject any and every major historical thesis of Marx, provided only that they continue to give total support to the maintenance and extension of Marxist-Leninist despotism throughout the whole world.
8. For a reappraisal of this book, see my "Russell's Judgement of Bolshevism," in G.W. Roberts (ed.) *Bertrand Russell Memorial Volume* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979).
9. Lewis Feuer, *Ideology and the Ideologists* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).
10. Sidney Hook *Revolution, Reform and Social Justice* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976), p. 95. Compare R.G. Wesson *Why Marxism?: The Continuing Success of a Failed Theory* (London: Temple Smith, 1976), p. 217: "Marxism is an ideology in the Marxian sense—that is, a cover for unconfessable interests."
11. See, for instance, Wesson *Loc.cit.*, p. 46; and, for a rather more topical instance, compare Nikita Khrushchev: "Communism lies at the end of all the roads in the world. We shall bury you."
12. The key paragraph is in the Introduction to the (unwritten) *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*. See *Karl Marx: Early Writings* translated by R. Livingstone and G. Benton and introduced by L. Colletti (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 256.
13. For a fuller treatment see the section of my *Darwinian Evolution* recommended in Note 3, above. Contrast another contribution to *The Left Academy* which sees nothing odd in the presupposition of the question: "What in the world is blocking mankind from achieving the paradise for which it seems biologically destined?" (p. 187). How can atheists believe such comfortable eschatological falsehoods, and after Darwin too?
14. Louis Althusser, *For Marx* translated by B. Brewster (New York: Vintage, 1972), p. 38.
15. Quoted in L. Kolakowski, *The Main Currents of Marxism* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), p. 298.
16. In E.P. Thompson, *The Poverty of Theory and other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978).

17. "Socialism and Equality," in L. Kolakowski and S.N. Hampshire (eds.) *The Socialist Idea: a Reappraisal* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), p. 95.
18. Steven Lukes, *Marxism and Morality* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), p. xii.
19. *Ibid.*, p. xii.
20. *Ibid.*, p. xii.
21. Roger Scruton, *Thinkers of the New Left* (London: Longman, 1985), p. 5: emphasis original.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
23. Can this be a genuflection towards *A Critique of the Gotha Programme*? For all the earlier works of Marx are full of denunciations of those who would ask for or provide "cookbooks for the future."
24. The inexpugnable fact that Lenin, as Trotsky was later to concede, played an indispensable part in both the initiation and the triumph of that coup also at the same time constitutes an equally knock-down refutation of any other philosophy of history pretending that either the activities of great men, or the operations of whatever else is in respect of social forces a matter of chance, cannot have a decisive influence upon historical development.
25. C.B. Martin, *Religious Belief* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1959), p. 2.
26. Volume I of *Capital* was originally published in 1867. Marx signed his first contract to produce such a book in 1845. See Leopold Schwartzschild, *The Red Prussian* (London: Pickwick, New Edition 1986), p. 109.
27. See, for instance, Bertram Wolfe, *Marxism: One Hundred Years in the Life of a Doctrine* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1967), pp. 322-2, and *passim*. Compare also D. Felix Marx as *Politician* pp. 161-2 for an account of how, in his Inaugural Address to the First International, Marx supported this same, crucial, false contention by misquoting W.E. Gladstone as having said in his 1863 budget speech the diametric opposite of what with perfect clarity and truth he actually did say.
28. Schwartzschild *Loc.cit.*, p. 80.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
30. See, for instance, F.A. Hayek *The Road to Serfdom* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1944).

# MARXISM AS PSEUDO-SCIENCE

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**F**ew people have influenced humanity as much as Karl Marx. His doctrines now dominate an increasingly powerful portion of the world, with which we must come to terms. Yet they are seldom studied in this country.

In this article I will try to sketch the ideas of this German who died in London in 1883. I shall conclude that most of Marx' theories which are not mistaken are meaningless. Marx remained influential, however: his influence never was based on the scientific truth-content of his theories but on their psychological appeal.

## I

Following French and German writers, Marx thought that society must move from lower to higher stages of development, and that it can be objectively determined which is which, and which stage therefore, follows which. Marx was sure that this necessary historical progress is propelled by scientifically determinable "economic laws of motion." He thus predicted that socialism and communism are historically inevitable. Since he thought that the inevitable and the good are the same—socialism became inevitable because good, and good because inevitable. But unfortunately the good is not inevitable—as shown by the existence of communism itself. And the inevitable—which is simply what which has not been avoided—often is not good as shown once more by communism.

Though he was proud of his scientific method, most of Marx' predictions are like Jewish prophecies and Christian revelations, inspiring, sometimes self-fulfilling, certainly true for the faithful, but not testable by scientific means. Yet, unlike religious texts Marxist theory pretends to a scientific status. However, Marxists are unable to tell under what conditions they would concede Marx to be or to have been wrong. But a theory can remain right regardless of what happens, only if it does not include testable predictions. This is the case of

Marx. Marx discovered, however unconsciously, that to be inspiring to our age, one must *appear* scientific. It took years for Madison Avenue to catch up.

## II

Marx thought of his doctrine as an indivisible whole culminating and based on his analysis of the historical process. Consider first his sociological and economic doctrines.

According to Marx, "political ... religious ... artistic ... etc. development is determined by economic development" which, under capitalism, opposes those who own capital to the proletarians who own only themselves. This "class struggle" is the decisive element determining people's behavior and the course of history. Apply this theory of "historical materialism" to capitalism, Marx found its past merits to be immense but, writing in 1848, he felt that capitalism inevitably was becoming a "fetter on production" ripe for being overthrown. The class struggle between capitalists and proletarians unavoidably would become more intensive as capitalism develops: wealth is concentrated, the "misery", i.e., poverty, of the proletariat grows, and crises and wars arise from the various "contradictions" of capitalism; ultimately the workers who have "nothing to lose but their chains," overthrow the system and replace it with socialism which abolishes private ownership of the means of production—capital—and thus classes and class struggles. All the evils of this world would then wither away, for they are due to the capitalist system. Hence no more crime, war, government, etc. The average man will rise to the stature of Aristotle.<sup>1</sup> Homosexuality, anti-semitism and crime will disappear. (Marx, like Rousseau before him, believed that men are good and made bad only by bad social systems. Unlike Rousseau, he believed that these systems arise from historical necessity. It occurred neither to Marx nor to Rousseau—as it did to Madison—that bad men corrupt good systems just as often as vice versa.)

Marx believed that social class is the decisive group to which people belong, that *intra*class conflicts are trivial, *inter*class conflicts decisive; that *intra*class economic bonds are naturally stronger than *inter*class bonds, such as nationality, sex, age, or religion. Yet people belong to, and are influenced by, many groups—religious, national, sex, age, occupational, geographical, etc. and there is no evidence that "class solidarity" is stronger than other group bonds.

"Proletarians are ... by nature without national prejudice ... essentially humanitarian." National and religious wars, or the voting patterns of a democracy, as well as everyday observation, all indicate that Marx' doctrine is wrong—unless it be so qualified as to become meaningless. One way out is to say that "objectively" people have common class interests and should act according to the class struggle pattern—but that they are not always "class conscious."<sup>2</sup> They suffer from

“false consciousness.” But this is (a) not true; nor would it (b) help much if it were.

a) There often are conflicts among objective economic interests within a Marxian class—e.g., among workers. Conflicts occur over migration, international trade, religion or race. And workers often have objective interests in common with capitalists and in conflict with the interests of other groups of workers. Class membership is no more, and possibly less, decisive than, say, race membership in determining one’s political views. If you insist on the importance of race, you may persuade people to act according to their “racial interests” for awhile—as the Nazis did. If you convince people that they should act according to what you tell them are their class interests, they might. The prophecy becomes self-fulfilling. But the action comes from race or class *propaganda*—not from race or class as objective facts.

b) Further, if we assume that classes are as important as Marx thought but that people do not act accordingly because, not having read Marx, they are not class conscious—if “class consciousness” becomes independent of class membership—and if class membership is neither sufficient nor necessary to bring the expected class behavior, then social classes become one of many groups that influence man’s action on some occasions. This would be a correct theory. But the distinctive point of Marxian theory is that class membership is *decisive* in determining most and particularly political actions. This is patently wrong.

How could Marx make such a foolish mistake? Actually, when he wrote, class membership, much more decisively than today, influenced one’s life chances, and mobility—changes from one class to other—was minimal. Education, for instance, was practically unavailable for the sons of workers. Marx thought this a characteristic of capitalism. Actually, it was a remnant of feudalism. Wherever capitalism has developed, it has promoted mobility and loosened class bonds. Further, contrary to Marx’ prediction, the “misery of the workers” has not increased. On the contrary, their living standards have risen more, and more rapidly than those of the middle and upper classes. For this reason, the revolution that Marx predicted as a result of the *presence* of capitalism has occurred, or is threatening, only where capitalism is *absent*—in the undeveloped countries. Far from becoming a fetter on production, capitalism has accelerated the rate of economic progress since Marx wrote.

### III

History, according to Marx, is pushed forward by economic forces. Again this is either so qualified as to be correct but unhelpful, or, just wrong. Marx never made clear whether he meant that historical change 1) can occur *only* if economic change precedes it; 2) does occur *always* when economic change occurs. If we define “historical

change” and “economic change” independently from each other it becomes obvious that historical change is not caused necessarily by economic change which is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about historical change. The way out is, of course, to make Marx assert only that there is a strong and, sometimes, decisive relation between economic and other historical factors. This would be true but it would be a truism. Perhaps in Marx’ time it was not as much a truism as it is today. Marx surely has the merit of having called attention to economic factors which had often been neglected.

This brings us to the economic heart of Marx’ doctrine.

#### IV

As did Adam Smith and David Ricardo before him, Marx asked: what causes value and what causes the value of one thing to differ from that of another? Marx found that value equals “the quantity of labor,” with skilled labor reduced to “average social labor,” while raw materials and machinery “give up to the product the value alone which they themselves lose.” Unlike the classical economists, Marx did not admit that anything but labor could create value.

The value of labor itself is equal to the quantity of labor needed to produce and sustain the laborer. Employers pay to workers the value of their labor, but, nevertheless, “exploit” them. For labor does create value in excess of its own. This excess—the surplus value—is appropriated by employers—hence exploitation. It may take ten potatoes to support a worker for an hour. This is the value of that hour. But he produces twenty potatoes in that hour. The ten surplus potatoes are appropriated by the employer who has paid the worker the value of his labor.

How sound is this theory? The value of the output of all factors of production—labor, land, capital—must exceed the value of the input—else production is not worthwhile. But why attribute this excess to labor? Why not to capital? Or to land, as the physiocrats did in the 18th century? We have here a *petitio principii*: What Marx asserts and wishes to prove—that labor gets less than it should—is merely reasserted in the conclusion, not proved. Labor is defined as the source of value—yet the excess value of the product over cost depends no less on the other factors of production. A definition is taken for a proof. And the definition is quite arbitrary.

Generally speaking, the idea that economic value depends on any or all factors of production is mistaken. If it were true, then a producer could never lose. Actually, the value of the product and the value of what went into it are each independently determined by relative scarcity. If the value of the product is less than cost, the producer loses and stops producing it.

Things obviously do not sell on the market in proportion to the labor embodied in them. For instance, look at the frequent changes in the price of oil, wheat, cotton or diamonds. Can they be correlated to

changes in the quantity of labor needed to produce them? Obviously not. Marx tried to solve this problem by insisting that only “socially necessary labor” confers value on the product. But what determines whether the labor used was “socially necessary”? Marx did not find an independent standard—in fact, whether labor was or was not “socially necessary” will be found out only after one knows whether what it produced is or is not valuable. Hence, the theory is circular: value depends on the quantity of labor used in the product, but it turns out that it is not the quantity of labor *actually* used which confers value; only “socially necessary” labor does; and only that labor is “socially necessary” which confers value. Hence, instead of deriving value from labor, we really derive “socially necessary labor” from value. Marx attempts to save his theory in the face of reality, but made it meaningless.

## V

Unlike some modern admirers of Marx, I believe that the labor theory of value is essential to the architecture of Marx’ theory. Without it, exploitation, revolution and socialism are no longer unavoidable. Yet, the effects are odd. Marx intended with this theory to demonstrate scientifically that the existing distribution of income—the result of private ownership of means of production—was wrong. Yet, inequalities in the distribution of income, of power, and of prestige are greater in the Soviet Union than in most capitalist countries; all the “surplus value” goes to the government, and all means of production are publicly owned. Hence, there is no exploitation and no class struggle as Marx defined these terms. Thus, what began as an indictment of inequality lends itself to its defense. Marx, in his zeal to indict capitalism “scientifically,” overlooked the obvious fact that income can be distributed with excessive inequality whenever there is an unequal distribution of power. Marx did not realize that power can determine income. Nor did it occur to Marx, and to many socialists, that the profit motive is not abolished by public ownership. Even if we were all government employees, we would still strive to be rewarded maximally—and the rewards would still be income, prestige, and power, just as now, and just as in the Soviet Union. Only we would depend on bureaucrats to determine our merits, rather than being rewarded or punished by the market.

## VI

Marx did not spend much time telling us what socialism would be like. He was more interested in studying the conditions under which it would occur. Nonetheless (in the “Critique of the Gotha program”) he described socialism as a state in which everybody would be rewarded according to his contribution; communism as a state in which

everybody would be rewarded according to his need. In both cases everybody contributes according to his ability.

Now what does it mean to be rewarded according to one's contribution? Am I so rewarded today? The value placed on my contribution—I mean the economic value—has been the result of the estimate of buyer and seller of what it would take to get me to do this article. How would that be changed under socialism? In what way would it be improved? Who would determine what my services are worth? Marx left these questions unanswered.

Under communism, one is rewarded according to need. Who would determine my needs? Welfare workers—God forbid! I? They are infinite as far as I am concerned and no economy could produce enough to satisfy them. The economic problem is to allocate things when fewer are available than are desired. This problem is now solved by the market. It surely cannot be solved by defining it away and simply assuming that people's desires are *not* practically infinite, or, that resources—including people's willingness to work—are.

What about that willingness to work? If we are rewarded according to our need, not according to our work, how do you get people to work at all—they would get their income if they need it without work? Further, how would one get people to work where they are needed, rather than where they want to if their income is independent of their work and of the demand for it and depends only on their need? Compulsion would have to replace the inducements of the market which now attract people to the occupations in which they are needed and to the employers who can use them. Only slave labor can be rewarded according to need—as seen by the slave holder, of course. And slave labor is not efficient. Therefore the Soviet Union has now returned to an incentive system which differs from ours only by being much steeper and leading to greater inequalities.

If a demonstration was needed, the recent events in Poland certainly furnish it. In that socialist country the workers went on strike against the management of the socialized industries. What more is needed to make it clear that the classless society Marx imagined in which everyone would share the same interest is a dream that cannot be realized, contrary to what he thought, by socializing the means of production? Indeed, the Polish workers feel exploited by the bureaucrats who run the factories and everything else. The bureaucrats did not even allow the workers to bargain or form their own organizations. That was not necessary, according to Marx, since the workers' interests would not differ from those of the management. The Polish workers have rather forcefully shown that they do not think so. Workers in all the communist states would do the same if they could overcome, as they did in Poland, the power of the secret police and of the whole oppressive apparatus of communism.

The gulf between the income and power of the government bureaucrats—who have replaced the private owners of the means of production—and the workers, is greater than it was when the means

of production were privately owned. Socialism has brought about not only inefficiency and general impoverishment but also a concentration of power and wealth—defined as the ability to dispose of goods and services—far greater than any in the capitalist world.

Unfortunately I cannot predict that Marxism will disappear simply because it has been demonstrated in fact and in theory, that it produces a new era of slavery, tyranny, cruelty and inefficiency. Theories quite often survive because of the promises inherent in them regardless of how often these promises are shown to be false. Scientology survives and astrology does. I suspect Marxism will too. People seldom learn from experience; but it seems to me that Eastern Europe is giving the world a lesson which is unlikely to be overlooked.

1. Leon Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1957).
2. It may be charitable to assume that by "class" Marx meant "income group." He actually suggested that class is determined by employer (owner of means of production, bourgeois) and employee (seller of his labor, proletarian status). Taken literally that would mean that a highly paid executive must be classified as a proletarian. But one should give Marx the benefit of the doubt.

# THE ETHICS OF HUNTING: KILLING AS LIFE-SUSTAINING

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In recent years there has been a great deal of discussion and political activity in regard to firearm ownership and use. But, there has not been the same degree of discussion in regard to hunting. What makes this surprising, if for nothing else than its political implication, is that 48% of all firearms owners in the United States have stated that they own guns in order to hunt.<sup>1</sup> Anti-gun advocates would make their case much stronger politically if they could ban hunting as immoral (following the same basic line that went into Prohibition) and thus close off the gun ownership debate through the back door. But, oddly enough, neither the anti-gun advocates nor the pro-gun advocates deal directly with the hunting issue. Both seem to take for granted the morality of hunting, that is, killing animals for sport.

Such complacency in regard to hunting, for either side, would seem to be ill-advised. Three factors present in our society indicate a shifting of mood in regard to the morality of hunting, a shifting that could affect the political environment in the near future. The three factors are: 1) a growing movement among philosophers to develop theories of animal rights in the strict sense;<sup>2</sup> 2) the general impact of the media upon children in regard to the "personalization" of animals, as in Disney animated cartoons; 3) the affective distance/separation between predation and eating that has occurred due to the industrialization of the food-gathering process. These three factors, one intellectual, two affective, have had and may continue to have a reinforcing effect on the emotional attitudes of people in regard to the killing of animals, especially if that killing is done not for food directly nor defense, but for the challenge of sport hunting.

In this paper I would like to discuss the ethics of hunting. I will discuss the problem of animal rights to life and freedom from harm, as well as the ethics of fair chase and proper weapon and shot selection. I will do this from within the perspective of general rights theory as

its has been developed in Western Society, but especially during the past two hundred years or so.

My principal thesis is this: hunting under both forms of food-gathering and trophy is moral so long as it occurs under proper legal and moral restraints. These restraints derive from man's moral obligation to himself to survive in a complex, biologically interrelated world in which reproduction, food supply, and adequate predation are essential ingredients to survival.

### HUNTING AND ANIMAL RIGHTS

The basic argument against hunting of any sort is that it violates the animal's right to life. A right, we generally agree, is an entitlement to something that limits access or use of that thing by another without the permission of the title holder. Rights indicate ownership of one kind or another and with that, the necessity of informed consent by the owner if that entitled object is to be used by another.

Now in order to advance the thesis that hunting is unethical because it violates animal rights, one must clearly show that animals possess those specific qualities known as rights which provide the principle of limitation or restraint upon another's actions in this regard. Since traditionally only persons or rational beings are said to have rights, in order to advance a theory of animal rights in the strict sense, the distinction between human persons and animals must be blurred. Either humans must be viewed as merely sentient animals, and thus claim that rights are entitlements granted because of sentience or solely by law or agreement, not by any unique human characteristic, specifically intelligence and volition, or that animals must be viewed as possessing intelligence and volition.<sup>3</sup> In either case, the clear distinction between human and non-human sentient animals must be blurred or done away with completely.

In general, the emphasis seems to be to lower man to the level of a highly complex sentient animal and thus deny any special status to intelligence and volition. Rights, in such a theory, generally are said to be due to sentience or, depending upon the theory being advanced, upon positive imposition by law or contract.

But, as stated above, there is also the tendency to elevate animals, at least some of the higher types, to the level of rational beings by trying to show certain mental activities on their part that seem to be similar to specifically human activities, namely, reflection and the ability to make serial distinctions.<sup>4</sup>

The latter position, of course, is the more rigorous position and the one that if established would have the most telling effect on the argument. It is the latter position that attempts to establish true personal inviolability. If successful in argumentation, then it would be mandatory on the part of the state to forbid hunting the same way it forbids and punishes all acts of aggression upon innocent persons.

The former position, while suggesting the continuity and common-

ality of man with animals, possesses greater plausibility from within an evolutionary perspective, but loses any secure ground as far as identifying clearly what rights are and who possesses them. I suspect that in the end such a theory would identify rights with positive contractual agreements, and by extension, to whatever or whomever one agrees to extend them to.

I believe the most important argument is the latter argument that attempts to deny hunting on the grounds of strict violation of animal rights to life and well-being. Therefore, I want to address this issue briefly.

The general theory of rights identifies rights with persons insofar as persons possess intelligence and freedom. In the late 18th century Immanuel Kant provided one of the finest formulations of the theory of rights through his second formulation of the categorical imperative: always treat the humanity of your own person and that of others as an end and never as a means only. This meant for Kant that each person had to be treated as an intelligent and free agent who possessed the right to consent freely to how he/she was to be treated by others. Kant derived this principle from his conviction that only rational beings could recognize the universal implications of their motives and thus universalize them into absolutely binding moral laws. Man for Kant was thus a moral legislator and due the respect of all other moral legislators.

Animals, on the other hand, evidence no such rational and volitional traits. They certainly evidence enormous powers of sensation and instinctual responsiveness. But, so far as our evidence shows, they do not exhibit the ability to know and articulate *universal* concepts and values that form the basis of moral law and personal rights. Though there have been some interesting experiments with chimps that indicate the ability to do some kind of serial reasoning, these experiments, to the best of my knowledge, have yet to establish the presence of clear universal concepts that form the basis of what we strictly mean by intelligence and moral reasoning. It is precisely the status of universal concepts in the reasoning and volitional process that distinguishes between human and non-human though sentient activity.<sup>5</sup> Without such evidence a theory of rights as applied to animals seems only to be far-fetched, arbitrary and fanciful, or merely anthropomorphic.

The attempt to anthropomorphise animals finds little support in the Judeo-Christian tradition of morality. There exists no blurring of distinction between man and animal. Adam names the animals and thus is "lord" over them. Throughout the Old and New Testaments the sacrifice of animals is an integral part of worship. Christ is mythologized by the Christian tradition as the Paschal Lamb who is led to the slaughter.

But, on the other hand, one must not forget that neither the Bible nor Western Tradition view man as separate from the natural world. Biblical man, though little less than the angels, is very much a citizen

of the world. Philosophically, there have been traditions stemming back to Plato and including a number of the modern rationalists which have tended to portray man as merely a soul entrapped in a body and thus alien to the world of nature. But, though this is a deep part of Western Tradition and one that critics claim fuels our disdain for animals and all things natural, it is not the main and deepest vein of Western Thought insofar as that Thought combines both philosophic insight and the Judeo-Christian view of man, God, and the world. Even Plato corrects his stark dualism in his later works, and tradition cannot be referred to without reference to the hylomorphic theory of Aristotle.

Therefore, though viewed as essentially different from mere sentient animals and religiously "little less than the angels," man is very much an animal in continuity with other animals in this world. And it is as an animal, though a rational and free animal, that his rights to kill and thus his rights to hunt are founded.

Alfred North Whitehead wrote a half-century ago that "life is robbery."<sup>6</sup> For something to live, something else needed to die. The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus wrote that the basic law of reality is the law of sustained violence—sustained counterforce. He simply said that all things change according to a *logos* or rule. That rule is the rule of opposition, the law of balanced violence. Life processes continue only if there is a sustained balance of violence of one living being on another, so long as there is balanced predation.

Because all living beings live off the death of others, life itself exists within and on the basis of a delicately balanced system of contravening violences which constitute the ecosystem. When Whitehead wrote that life is robbery he also wrote that robbery or death had to be in the service of sustaining life.<sup>7</sup> Predation is the act of killing, but it is killing for the sake of life. Predation, in other words, is "life sustaining." When such predation is lost, paradoxically, killing becomes rampant and disorderly and as a result, killing ceases to be life-sustaining. History and ecological studies have taught us this lesson quite well.

Our right to kill, therefore, stems from our right to life. We have every right to kill other living beings other than man because we have a right and an obligation to sustain our existences and the conditions for our existences. As predatorial animals we have obligations to ourselves as rational controllers of the ecosystem (given our massive urbanization, industrialization, and highly competitive existences), to manage the life systems through controlled killing, not only to feed ourselves but also to sustain that proper balance of competitive species which the sustaining of life requires. We have, in short, the right *and* obligation to take life because the taking of life is crucial to the sustaining of life.

This is an extremely important point. The right to kill and the obligations of restraint, which we will discuss further on in this paper, are generated through the basic right of life that belongs to man. It is

this right to life and the conditions of life, given this ecosystem that obliges him to kill in order to sustain his own life and the conditions necessary for life sustenance. There are no other rights involved and therefore no other sources of obligation.

### HUNTING FOR SPORT

Apart from and beyond the ethical issue of the right to kill animals, a second and much more troubling question for the hunter is raised in regard to hunting purely for sport, trophy hunting. The basic questions are these. Can killing for sport pure and simple be moral? Does not killing inflict unnecessary pain upon animals? Is this ethical since food procurement is not the issue? Shouldn't animals be given a fair chance to escape, if nothing more?

The basic question really comes down to this: haven't animals at least the right to be free from undue harm and suffering, let alone death, if food-gathering needs are not strictly present in each act of killing?

In response to these questions, at least one general reply must be made: killing may never be done wantonly nor indiscriminately. In every act of killing there must be a proportionate reason for the killing. A proportionate reason must be present because killing is an evil, though not necessarily a moral evil. Some moralists call such non-moral evils ontic or material evils. They mean by this that in such acts there is a loss of something good, in this case, the life of the animal. And for there ever to be the deliberate taking away of something good, there needs to be a proportionate good that provides an adequate reason for this deliberate loss. If the reasons are not proportionate then the material or ontic evil (assuming the motive is the reason) becomes a formal or moral evil.

Under this general principle, may hunting for sport be moral? May, in other words, hunting for sport be a sufficient reason for justifying the killing of a non-threatening animal?

As stated above, ecological balance requires the taking of life for life to be sustained. But sport hunting is neither for the sake of food-gathering nor ecological balance, strictly speaking. It is for fun, plain and simple. The hunter stalks his game for the thrill of taking the game. The eating of the game is secondary to the pursuit. The thrill is in the predational act itself, not in the corollary benefits of food and/or natural balance.

In the strictest sense such forms of hunting do not violate any moral law so long as sufficient reason exists for the action. If animals haven't a strict right to life, they haven't the right either not to be pursued for sport. Only human rights have bearing in this discussion. Therefore, from a strict interpretation of rights and obligations, animals haven't *in se* any rights that could or would limit the hunter in his pursuit of his quarry.

The sufficient reason necessary to justify the action is the challenge

involved in the pursuit. Trophy or sport hunting always entails limiting or handicapping conditions, otherwise known as "fair chase", which tend to balance instinct against intelligence and technology in such a way that the hunter must employ tremendous skills in finding, stalking, and taking of game. This exercise of skill and challenge is a sufficient reason for the hunt and kill. The killing is part and parcel of a rationally restrained use of human skills and this use is sufficient to justify the ontic evil of taking the life of the quarry.

If animals haven't a right to life and if the challenge of pursuing game in their natural habitat under constrained conditions is sufficient reason to justify the taking of animal life, then why discuss the ethics of hunting? What more is at stake?

Three other related areas of ethical concern in hunting remain to be discussed. They are: 1) ecological balance and excessive killing; 2) fair chase; 3) unnecessary infliction of pain and the proper selection of weapons and their use.

In regard to the first issue, ecological balance and excessive killing, the basic moral principle is that the killing must always be proportionate to the numbers of animals and the ratio of animals to habitat. In other words, ecological balance and killing, even for trophy, must be correlative to each other. So long as the killing is life-sustaining to the herd or species, then no moral issue is involved. Only if the killing is destructive of the species or seriously harmful to it, and thus dysfunctional in terms of the life systems involved, does a moral issue arise. Excessive killing is immoral because it endangers the system upon which man depends and survives, even if remotely and indirectly. Put simply and practically, so long as the hunt is legitimate and not wanton and so long as the animals taken fall numerically within the amounts biologists and game managers identify as life-sustaining rather than life-diminishing, trophy or sport hunting is moral. Killing a moose, for instance, from a passing jeep while on military duty in Alaska simply because the moose, weapon and opportunity are there is not ethical because the killing is wanton rather than a piece of the general process of culling the herd. The desire to kill the moose is insufficient to justify the killing because of the scarcity of the game and the risk of harming the herd (since if one can do it all can do it).

Generally, the observance of basic game laws and the principles of fair chase cover the morality of trophy hunting. Killing under these conditions is rarely wanton and rarely negatively effect the herd. If fact, killing under these conditions is generally accepted by biologists and game managers as life-sustaining.

The second issue, the ethics of fair chase, is more complicated. If killing for sport is moral and animals have no intrinsic moral rights, why must they be sought under the handicapping conditions of fair chase?

In order to answer this question, I will come through the back door of an objection. If hunting were for food under the conditions of necessity, fair chase would be meaningless. It would be as absurd for a

hunter in need of food to wait until dawn to kill a deer as it would be for a cougar to wait. Whatever fair chase may mean, it cannot mean that the animal has a right to be pursued in this manner. If this is true, then, why should the hunter be handicapped in his pursuit of game? Why is fair chase a moral condition of sport hunting?

The morality of fair chase evolves from two interrelated issues: the efficiency of modern weapons and the need for maintaining the delicate balance of the ecosystem.

The efficiency of modern weapons and calibers, the extension of effective hunting ranges and times through modern sighting systems, the modern means of transportation, ground and air, and the pressure on game populations due to the density of hunters in the woods create an ever-increasing risk that animal populations will be unduly depleted and a general dysfunction will occur in the ecosystem if restraint upon these modern technologies is not kept in place. Our hunting technologies have become so sophisticated that the animal's natural instinctual defenses cannot cope with them. The unrestricted use of these technologies would simply devastate animal populations. Instincts for survival have not evolved sufficiently quickly enough to match the modern weapon, sighting system, and means of transportation. The polar bear, for instance, has no defense against a hunter firing a high-powered, well-scoped rifle from an airplane. If polar bears were to be hunted in this manner, hardly any would survive. A magnificent species of animal would be lost and with it a link in the biological-ecological chain. The balance of arctic life would be negatively affected.

In such an unrestricted manner of hunting, killing would not be life-sustaining but life-diminishing. Hunting in the long run would become the wanton destruction of life and life systems and thus threatening not only to the general animal kingdom, but threatening to the life of man himself.

Fair chase, then, is a significant element in the morality of hunting because it is a self-imposed form of restraint upon killing, a restraint that is intended to ensure that killing will be life-sustaining. It is required therefore by the rights of man who is a participant in and dependent upon the ecosystem.

The last condition for the morality of trophy hunting concerns the proper selection of weapons/calibers and shot selection.

Hunters generally agree that the taking of game must be done quickly, cleanly, and with the least pain possible to the animal. Therefore, hunters are quite explicit in recommending minimum allowable calibers for specific game, along with proper bullet weights, velocities and ranges. They also strongly recommend sufficient practice with the weapon to ensure clean, quick kills. Poor shot selection because of improper caliber, excessive range, or poor judgment in regards to personal skills are usually strongly condemned by experienced hunters. The reasons are simple and clear. Failure to use weapons properly means 1) unnecessary suffering on the part of the animal, and

2) lost game because of wounded and/or unretrievable game. In the latter case, killing risks becoming excessive since more than the allowable number of game tends to be taken.

What is the reason for the necessity of quick and clean kills? The answer is basically the same as given in regard to killing in general. Suffering, like death, is a material or ontic evil. One may not increase suffering without due reason. The act of killing is not sufficient reason for increasing suffering if the suffering could be avoided. The right to kill is not the same as the right to make suffer. We are obliged by our own rational dignity to minimize the amount of pain involved in all our actions, even the action of killing. It is irrational to do what is evil, even materially or ontically evil, if it can be avoided. The willing of pain for its own sake or even its tolerance, when it could be avoided, is a failure to live up to the rational requirements of doing good and avoiding evil.

Proper weapon selection, practice, and shot placement ensure that the taking of game, whether for food or sport, is done quickly and cleanly, inflicting the least amount of pain possible.

Secondly, and of almost equal importance, is that the improper use of weapons leads to wounded game which eventually die and are lost to the hunter. The ecosystem, it is true, will absorb these animals. The coyotes will feed better on a given day. Furthermore, the damage done in a single instance is insignificant. *But*, the issue is the ethics of the hunter's actions and this must be considered universally. Even though one or a few particular acts are insignificant, wholesale acts of this sort would be devastating. If everyone used improper weapons and took unwise shots, a great deal of game would be lost and this would be harmful. The old problem of exception comes in here. How does one judge him/herself to be sufficiently unique to bypass the generally agreed upon restraint which safeguards against wanton destruction of game through careless shot selection and placement? If one could argue that he or she is an exception, all could and probably would.

If done on a wide enough scale, not only would there be a large and unnecessary increase in animal suffering, but also an increase in the erratic taking of game, thus making game management next to impossible. On a large scale, ecological balance might be in jeopardy. The problems in Africa in regard to poaching and attempts at game management are testimony to what can occur if restraint is not present. Therefore, even weapons and shot selection must factor in the taking of game. These are not entirely arbitrary issues.

When one looks at such an argument, one might be tempted to say that such an imbalance is virtually impossible and thus that the argument is implausible. But, if one simply recalls the devastation that occurred in the wetlands of America due to the devastation of the beaver population during the last century, or the impact of the loss of timber wolves and coyotes on the elk population, one will not be too quick to claim that disbalance is not possible or probable.

The system of legal restraints imposed by the state under the rubric of game management attempts to balance reproduction, habitat, and restricted predation. The observance of these laws, laws that include game allowed to be taken, season lengths, numbers allowable, and weapon selection, generally ensures this balance. The observance of these laws is therefore a moral issue, at least indirectly, since these laws are geared to uphold and sustain the balance of nature which we as humans depend upon for our existence. Thus, though it may sound preposterous, it is nevertheless true, that weapons selection, practice, and shot placement are all part and parcel of a broad moral issue, the issue of human survival in a very complex, very delicately balanced ecosystem.

### CONCLUSION

The importance of any discussion in ethics is to discover consistent principles which lend themselves to intelligent application in human affairs. I have tried to do this in this paper. My thesis throughout has been simple. All killing of non-human animals is moral if there is proportionate reason. This reason must in the final analysis be consistent with the general principle that man alone among the animals has rights to life and the conditions for life. Thus, under this principle, hunting is moral if it contributes to man's welfare, the welfare of the ecosystem. To refer once again to Whitehead's remark, hunting is moral if it is in the end life-sustaining.

1. NRA Firearms Fact Card, NRA-Institute for Legislative Action, Washington, D.C.
2. Tom Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1985); Regan and Peter Singer, *Animal Rights and Human Obligations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976); Singer, *Animal Liberation* (New York: Avon, 1977); Singer, "Animals and the Value of Life," (ed.) Regan, *Matters of Life and Death* (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 338-380.
3. Singer, "Animals and the Value of Life," p. 360-364.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
5. Singer, using Goodall's experiments with chimps, argues here that serial judgments are being made by the animals, along with choices. This of course would imply intelligence in the strictest sense. My response is this. There appears to be evidence of very sophisticated responses to stimuli. And there certainly appears to be evidence of certain characteristics of response that resemble human choice making. But unless evidence is found for true universal concepts and general values, the identity of kind between chimp and man is not established. Singer is not entirely clear here. I'm not sure anyone could be clear here unless a clear and intelligible language employing universal concepts were to be discovered. But, and this is my second point, if such were to be discovered, then the attribute of person should be attached to these animals and, in my judgment, they should be given the same protection of law against aggression as would be received by a child.
6. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Torchbooks, 1929), p. 160.
7. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1925), pp. 296-297. Also confer Paul Grimley Kuntz, *Alfred North Whitehead* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984), pp. 70-77.

## EXPLOITATION

One of the most provocative and ideologically distinctive components of conventional Marxism is the charge that capitalists exploit workers. Traditionally, this charge has been linked to the labor theory of value and its corollary, the theory of surplus value. But the labor theory of value has been substantially discredited, leaving Marxists to choose between abandoning the charge of exploitation or finding a new foundation for it. Because the charge of exploitation is so provocative, the latter alternative would certainly seem to be preferable from the perspective of a defender of Marxism. However, the obstacles to grounding the charge of exploitation might well make the first alternative preferable, despite the fact that this would mean giving up much that is distinctive of the Marxist critique of capitalism. G.A. Cohen's attempt to ground the charge of exploitation, which is at once simple and innovative, illuminates these obstacles.

In a position developed in "The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation"<sup>1</sup> and refined in "More on Exploitation and the Labour Theory of Value,"<sup>2</sup> Cohen argues that the labor theory of value is not, in any case, the real basis for the Marxist charge of exploitation. Rather, the real basis is a "fairly obvious truth" that is superficially quite similar to the labor theory of value but is not beset by the same difficulties. Although the laborer does not produce (i.e., create) value, it is clear that he produces something: the product which has value. Further, Cohen argues, it is *only* the laborer who produces the product; the capitalist merely supplies capital. The activity of the capitalist is analogous to that of a person who lends another a knife so that the latter can cut something. This does not make the lender a *cutler* of any sort. Likewise, the capitalist's contribution to the process of production does not make him a producer of any sort.<sup>3</sup>

This "fairly obvious truth" is the basis for what Cohen calls the "Plain Argument" for the charge of exploitation:

- (17) The laborer is the only person who creates the product, that which has value.
- (11) The capitalist receives some of the value of the product.
- (18) The laborer receives less value than the value of what he creates, and

- (19) The capitalist receives some of the value of what the laborer creates.
- (10) The laborer is exploited by the capitalist.<sup>4</sup>

The crucial premise in this argument is (17); it replaces the labor theory of value—the theory that labor alone determines and/or creates value—with what Cohen thinks is a much more plausible claim.

On its face, however, the first premise of the Plain Argument seems no more plausible than the labor theory of value. There are a variety of contributions that the capitalist makes to the process of production—capital accumulation and risk bearing, for example. These activities, unlike entrepreneurial or management activities, are ones that the capitalist performs *just as a capitalist*. And they are essential features of any set of economic arrangements. Production, and especially modern industrial production, necessarily involves capital accumulation and risk bearing. Insofar as these are necessary components of the process of production, i.e., insofar as they are activities that someone must perform if production is to take place, it is far from obvious that the laborer is “the only person who creates the product.”

Cohen seems to have something like this concern in mind when he allows that the activities of the capitalist may be “productive” even though the capitalist is not a producer. To act productively, Cohen says, “it is enough that one does something which helps to bring it about that a thing is produced, and that does not entail participating in producing it.”<sup>5</sup> But I do not understand why Cohen thinks this distinction between producing and productive activity reinforces, rather than merely restates, the first premise of the Plain Argument. I will return to this point below.

Even if we accept the first premise, the Plain Argument is incomplete in other ways, a fact which Cohen himself recognizes. In “The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation,” he says the argument lacks a crucial normative premise to the effect that “under certain conditions, it is (unjust) exploitation to obtain something from someone without giving him anything in return,” and a characterization of pertinent features of capitalism “such as the fact that the laborer is *forced*, by his propertylessness, to work for the capitalist.”<sup>6</sup> In “More on Exploitation and the Labour Theory of Value,” he retracts this and argues that the case for exploitation rests on the moral status of private property:

If it is morally all right that capitalists do and workers do not own means of production, then capitalist profit is not the fruit of exploitation; and if the pre-contractual distributive position is morally wrong, then the case for exploitation is made. The question of exploitation therefore resolves itself into the question of the moral status of capitalist private property.<sup>7</sup>

If private property is morally illegitimate, then profit is exploitation, whether or not the laborer is *forced* to work for the capitalist.

What the Plain Argument does *not* require, according to Cohen, is a normative premise to the effect that the laborer is entitled to the full value of his product:

One more caveat. I do not suppose in the above paragraphs or anywhere else that the correct principle of reward is productive contribution. One can hold that the capitalist exploits the worker by appropriating part of the value of what the worker produces without holding that all of that value should go to the worker. One can affirm a principle of distribution according to need, and add that the capitalist exploits the worker because need is not the basis on which he receives part of the value of what the worker produces.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, the laborer is exploited by the capitalist whether or not the laborer is entitled to the full value of his product.

However, Cohen is wrong on both these counts. A premise to the effect that capitalist private property is morally illegitimate is not alone sufficient to complete the Plain Argument. What is required is precisely a principle of entitlement which implies that the worker is entitled to the full value of his product.

Consider, first, how a premise to the effect private property is morally illegitimate might strengthen the Plain Argument. It might lend some plausibility to the claim made in the first premise that only the laborer creates the product which has value. If the capitalist's control over the means of production is illegitimate, then we might say that his contribution to the process of production is superfluous. In a world that was more just than ours, he would not be able to make any contribution. Thus, we might conclude that he really makes no contribution at all or, at least, no morally relevant contribution. And this, in turn, might lead us to conclude that he has no legitimate claim on the value of the laborer's produce. If he does claim some of this value, he is exploiting the laborer.

But not even this much is certain. For Cohen explicitly denies that one has a claim to something simply because one creates it (whether the "it" be value or the product which has value).<sup>9</sup> Hence, Cohen cannot and explicitly does not argue that the laborer is entitled to all the value of the product because he has created the product. But this entails that one also could not argue that the capitalist is *not* entitled to any of the value of the product because he did create the product.

In other words, and this is my second point about the incompleteness of Cohen's Plain Argument, the charge of exploitation must be grounded in a principle of entitlement. Consider Cohen's claim that one can affirm a principle of distribution according to need and still maintain that the capitalist exploits the worker. The principle of need is sufficient to ground the charge of exploitation *only if* the capitalist's appropriation of some of the value of the product prevents *the laborer*

from satisfying his needs. This may not be the case and, in many modern capitalist societies, it usually is not. If anyone is exploited in such societies it is *the third party* whose needs are not met because some of the value of the laborer's product is transferred to the capitalist. And it is the fact that this third party's needs are not met, rather than the fact that need is not the basis on which the capitalist receives part of the value of what the laborer produces, that grounds the charge of exploitation.

Indeed, if Cohen is right about what a principle of distribution according to need entails, the laborer himself will often be vulnerable to a charge of exploitation. If the value of what the laborer produces is more than sufficient to meet his needs, he must distribute it to others who are in need or be guilty of exploitation. And similar remarks could be made about any other principle of distribution (or entitlement).

Cohen has simply failed to see that a specific charge of exploitation, i.e., the charge that a specific individual or class is exploited by another, entails more than just a maldistribution of value. If the charge that capitalists exploit workers is to be maintained, it is not enough that (1) capitalists appropriate from workers part of the value of something that the workers alone produce, and (2) capitalists are not entitled to this value. A third condition must be met: the putative victim of this appropriation, the worker, must be entitled to the value he does not get. Exploitation is, in other words, a maldistribution of value that results from the misuse of the exploited, rather than simply any maldistribution whatever.

This conclusion has rather important consequences for the Marxist critique of capitalism. Cohen may be correct to argue that the labor theory of value and the theory of surplus value are neither necessary nor sufficient to ground the charge that capitalists exploit workers. But the difficulties Cohen encounters illustrate an important point: that the logical connection between these theories and the charge of exploitation may well be less important than the psychological connections. If one believes that labor creates value (what Cohen calls the popular version of the labor theory of value) or that socially necessary labor determines value (what he calls the strict version), it is quite natural to view the relationship between the capitalist and the laborer as one of exploitation. For after all, what is the capitalist doing but growing fat off the sweat and toil of those who labor to give value to a recalcitrant material world? But if the source of value is something other than labor, the charge of exploitation is likely to lose much of its emotive force.

An even more important upshot is that Marxists may be forced to abandon the most distinctive and provocative component of their critique of capitalism. The labor theory of value is a persuasive and compelling ground for the charge that capitalists exploit workers even if it is not an adequate one. Cohen's attempt to ground this charge, and others like it, are likely to be neither. This would leave as the pri-

mary focus of the debate on the morality of capitalism questions of distributive justice and the moral status of private property. Some would applaud such a development. (I count myself among them because I think these are the sorts of questions on which the morality of capitalism turns.)

But a critique of capitalism that flowed primarily from consideration of these questions would not be distinctively Marxist. What is most distinctive of Marxism, and what has provided much of the intellectual impetus for its revolutionary manifestations, is the charge that capitalists exploit workers. If this charge cannot be maintained, then so much the worse for the Marxist social theory.

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1. G.A. Cohen, "The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 8 (Summer 1979), pp. 338-360.
2. G.A. Cohen, "More on Exploitation and the Labor Theory of Value," *Inquiry*, vol. 26 (1983), pp. 309-331.
3. Cohen, "The Labor Theory of Value," pp. 353-355.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 356. The numbers assigned to the premises reflect the order in which they are introduced in the text.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 355.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 343, 360, note 24.
7. Cohen, "More on Exploitation," p. 316.
8. Cohen, "The Labor Theory of Value," p. 357, note 21.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 356-358.

## HOW THE JACKSONIANS OPPOSED INDUSTRIALIZATION: LESSONS OF DEMOCRATIC BANKING POLICIES

**F**or many Libertarian writers, especially historians, the Jacksonians are frequently held up as heroes of the free market. In a recent article in this journal, Paul McGouldrick offered arguments on a series of topics, all of which suggested that the Jacksonians favored industrialization. Regardless of the Jacksonians' positions on tariffs or other industrial policies, the Democrats' approach to banking regulation deserves a hard look based on the evidence, not on romantic assumptions about what these supposed *laissez-faire* advocates should have favored. In fact, it is clear that especially at the state level—but even at the national level—the Jacksonians pursued activist policies that involved the government completely in the economy. Finally, they pursued only slightly less enthusiastically a national program of centralizing the banking system. Thus, using banking as a weather vane, in no way did the Jacksonian winds blow in the direction of *laissez-faire*.<sup>1</sup>

The antebellum South provides an excellent testing ground for any discussion of Jacksonian policies because the Democrats had relatively free reign in at least six of the eleven Confederate states for approximately forty years. In the remaining five states, the Whigs formed an effective counterbalance to the Jacksonians' policies. A clear comparison in cause and effect is then possible, based on what, exactly, the Jacksonian-controlled states did. These six states—Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas—will be referred to here as “New South,” a term that captures the demographic shifts associated with the demand for agricultural land in the 1820s and 1830s. New South states certainly had their share of Whigs after 1830, but in general the Democrats controlled the statehouses rather consistently and in many cases dominated the national legislative delegations (Alabama elected none but Democratic senators in the antebellum period). More than their numerical superiority, the New South Jacksonians maintained consistent control over a period

of time long enough to put their policies in effect. It cannot, therefore, be argued that the Whigs had a chance to “undo” or pervert Democratic programs.<sup>2</sup>

An examination of developments in New South states will clarify the nature and the extent of Jacksonian actions. Generally, the Jacksonians followed one of two policy programs toward banking: monopoly through creation of a state bank, or activist chartering through state extension of subsidy support. Alabama and Arkansas followed the first model (Texas tried, but failed), while Mississippi and Florida followed the second. Tennessee drifted toward the first model, but never fully established a monopoly with the Bank of Tennessee.

Alabama reacted to the control of credit by a group of Georgia immigrants (called the Royalists) who had established the first bank in Alabama, the Planters and Mechanics Bank at Huntsville. To extend credit to other groups, the anti-Royalist faction created the Bank of Alabama and its branches. As the legislature increasingly became dominated by Jacksonians, so did the bank. The Democrats attempted to eliminate competition, first by using the power of the legislature to drive the Huntsville bank out of business, then by not chartering any other private banks when the Tombeckbe Bank went into bankruptcy. That left only the small but extremely solid Bank of Mobile to compete with the state system. For almost twenty years, the only bank created that was not a part of the state system was the Planters and Merchants Bank in Mobile. Nevertheless, Alabama's credit needs far surpassed what the state system could provide, both because the state banks proved inflationary (as most government credit institutions tend to be), therefore proving unstable, and because the credit that the state banks extended was based on political rather than economic considerations.<sup>3</sup>

In Alabama, the first weakness became readily apparent during the Panic of 1837, when the state system saw its specie reserves drained. The total ratio of specie to circulation for all banks in the state stood at 0.11, whereas the private banks' ratio held at a level more than double that of the state total (0.28). William Stone, president of the Tuscaloosa branch of the Bank of Alabama, transferred all of his branch's bills of collection from the state branch in Mobile to the private Bank of Mobile, “indicating that, when the chips were down, the state bank administrators knew which banks were solvent.” As if the state were not in enough trouble with its virtual banking monopoly, the legislators sought to spend their way out of the dilemma by issuing \$2.5 million in new bonds to supplement the banks' capital. Instead of reducing circulation—the proper market response to declining specie reserves—the banks now had reason to issue additional notes. Eventually the state banks (but not the private banks) resorted to the ultra-inflationary tactic of speculating on cotton by issuing notes based on cotton reserves. Finally, the political pressures for lending directed capital away from industrializing areas of the state in the

1840s and early 1850s and transferred it to the plantation-dominated counties. Alabama's state bank semi-monopoly succeeded in retarding industrialization while at the same time it protected and nurtured a slave-based system that the market would not have sustained.<sup>4</sup>

Fortunately for Alabama, the citizenry recognized the evils associated with a dominant state bank, and the legislature began killing it and its branches in 1841. The state adopted a policy of chartering competitive banks, adding a free-banking law in 1850. Still, despite the virtues of free banking, there was no rush to take advantage of the free-banking regulations, because the chartering laws had been sufficiently relaxed that obtaining a charter was as easy as opening a bank under free-banking laws. Democrats had led the move into state banking; Whigs actually led the attacks against it. But it was not the Jacksonians who pressed for adoption of the free-banking laws. Rather, coalitions favored such legislation. In Arkansas, Tennessee, Alabama, and Florida Whigs joined Democrats in wielding the power of the state. For Whigs this was hardly unexpected, but arguments that the Democrats engaged in laissez-faire policies at the state level must be reexamined.<sup>5</sup>

Arkansas clearly demonstrates this need for revision. The legislature created the Real Estate Bank of the State of Arkansas in its first act, with Democrats joining the Whigs in voting for the bill. In activist fashion, the state furnished \$2 million in bonds for capital but did not control the operations of the bank. It established branches in Helena, Little Rock, Columbia, and Washington, and its obvious goal was to help the agricultural interests in the eastern and southern sections of the state. A group of families, headed by the Sevier family (but referred to as the Bourbons) soon controlled the bank, dispensing its largesse to friends and political cronies. But Arkansas showed a clear difference in the results of Democratic policies as opposed to those of the Whigs that persists to this day between modern Democrats and Republicans: the antebellum Democratic policies relied on inflation as opposed to Whig legislation that utilized taxation as a means to pay for state intervention. For example, the Real Estate Bank permitted stockholders to borrow half of the maximum allowed \$30,000 worth of stock based on the original collateral. Moreover, when bond sales flopped, the directors permitted unsold bonds to be used as collateral on a loan, a tactic of questionable legality. Consequently, the chief justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the state had speculated in the bond market and was thus liable for the full par value of the bonds (\$170,000 *more* than the bonds brought when sold).<sup>6</sup>

As serious as these problems were, they masked the real mischief created by Democratic state banking policies. Government control of banking usually involves some abuses, and the fact that the Jacksonians were the party in power proved no exception. In 1842, with the Real Estate Bank in a state of collapse, the directors transferred a deed of assignment to trustees, who demonstrated even greater generosity toward debtors (most of them friends) than had the bank's di-

rectors. Individuals had borrowed huge sums with virtually no collateral, and most of that of dubious value. Recognizing the monster it had created, for thirteen years the legislature tried desperately to regain control from the trustees, succeeding in 1855. At that time "the chancery court of Pulaski county [was] flooded with suits on behalf of the stockholders of the bank."<sup>7</sup>

Whatever disappointment with state regulation the Real Estate Bank caused, a second state bank, chartered with a thirteen-to-three bipartisan vote in the senate, promoted even less optimism. The Jacksonians were firmly entrenched in the state bank's organizational structure, outnumbering Whigs in positions of authority by a margin of 86 to 53. Directors demonstrated little concern with public funds, planning and building extravagant banking structures that were "splendidly furnished." The Fayetteville branch was a "superb building." Worse than their spendthrift habits, the directors of the state system showed complete ineptitude in simply policing the employees. One cashier made off with \$46,000, while a second "failed in the discharge of his duties" by neglecting to keep books correctly. Minutes of a board meeting of October 15, 1841, reveal that the directors resolved to bring suit against the latter cashier only two weeks after they had tendered their thanks to him for his "fidelity and ability ... as clerk." Many other corruptions ate away at the system. After receivers were appointed to liquidate the affairs of the bank in 1852, one of them embezzled at least \$14,000. Arkansas reacted to the ordeal of the Jacksonian state banking monopoly by banning all banks—in yet another anti-laissez-faire measure. At no time did the Arkansas Jacksonians permit competitive banking, even among banks that could have been chartered by, and regulated by, the state legislature.<sup>8</sup>

Where both Arkansas and Alabama Democrats established government monopolies in banking, the Jacksonians of other Southern states exercised activist powers in a different way. Florida, for example, wherein Democrats were powerful and often dominant, quickly shifted from a policy of creating only as many banks as the market would bear to one of issuing territorial bonds to finance private banks that would generate capital. Although laundering the money through "private" banks, the state (a territory until 1838) capitalized the financial community by pledging its "full faith and credit" to nearly \$4 million worth of bonds. When the Panic of 1837 struck, Florida legislators found the state liable for the entire amount. Florida responded by simply repudiating the debt—a tactic quite prominent in Jacksonian rhetoric because those who held bonds were mostly the wealthy or foreigners. Equality, to the Jacksonians, meant confiscation, inflation, and breaking contracts, an attitude not conducive to laissez-faire economics or a healthy economy, and certainly not an attitude that would promote economic growth. This Floridians learned firsthand when they attempted to borrow money abroad in the Civil War, only to receive emphatic rejections.<sup>9</sup>

Mississippi, another Democratic-dominated state, copied Florida's

pattern, again because planters found themselves dissatisfied with what they saw as an inadequate money supply. A strong, solvent bank, the Bank of Mississippi at Natchez, had acted under monopoly privilege since 1819, but in 1832 the legislature actively participated in credit generation by pledging the state's "faith and credit" to the Planter's Bank, as well as subscribing to \$2 million worth of the stock and appointing a majority of its directors. As the land boom of the 1830s set in, however, even the credit generation of the Planter's Bank disappointed Mississippians, who demanded and received a bank at "every cross-road town." Nevertheless, of the total capital in Mississippi, the state loomed as the single largest participant, authorizing the massive Union Bank to be capitalized at \$15.5 million backed by the state's "faith and credit." This meant that Jacksonian-led legislatures had directly pledged \$17.5 million of the \$30.4 million total banking capital in the state in 1840. But the impact of the legislature's actions was even deeper, because many investors who made up the \$12.9 million of private capital were encouraged and influenced by the speculative frenzy caused by the flood of state funds.<sup>10</sup>

Mississippi's banking management proved no different than that of Arkansas, and easy lending terms contributed to the weak financial condition brought on by the Panic of 1837. Worse, bond sales sank, and a Democratic-led repudiationist movement took root. Democratic repudiators captured the 1842 election, and the state formally denied and ignored its contract with the bondholders. Banking confidence remained so low that no major bank returned to operations before the Civil War. Like Florida, Mississippi appealed to foreigners for a loan during the Civil War, with the same sharply negative results.<sup>11</sup>

These examples represent the most clearly illustrated cases, but the Jacksonians' pattern appeared consistently in other Southern states as well as in the North. Tennessee created a state bank with a bipartisan vote, and the Democrats controlled it; nevertheless, enough competition had existed from earlier administrations that the Jacksonians faced some major restraints in their attacks on *laissez-faire*. Wisconsin Democrats, who controlled early state politics, attempted to prohibit banks entirely. They succeeded only in driving out chartered banks; but the most stable and successful bank in the Old Northwest emerged outside of state regulation. George Smith, a Scotsman, opened an insurance company that issued its own money, redeemable in gold. While the frustrated Jacksonian legislators searched for a legal way to close the bank, Smith's money circulated throughout Wisconsin, Iowa, and Illinois, becoming the region's most dependable monetary standard because Smith without exception redeemed his notes in gold.<sup>12</sup>

It is time to stop assuming that the Jacksonians stood for certain principles and to look at their policies. Clearly, their policies in the states in which they held effective majorities reveal a party that believed in an activist state government. The Jacksonians did not hesi-

tate to establish state monopolies, and they prohibited competition even to the point of prohibiting all banking activity in Arkansas, Wisconsin, and elsewhere. This evidence does not support an interpretation that the Jacksonians favored *either* laissez-faire or economic growth as it is defined by free-market economists.

Many historians have accepted Jacksonian rhetoric at face value and have then interpreted the evidence to support the rhetoric. In this essay, having begun with the evidence of Jacksonian policies, it is therefore useful to reevaluate Jacksonian rhetoric and monetary theory.<sup>13</sup>

Historians tracing the William Gouge-John Taylor stream of Democratic thought on banking overlook the serious inconsistencies in the ideology. Some Democrats railed against paper money, others indicted banks themselves, and yet others wanted "more banks and less governmental interference," or so they said. Yet this attitude hardly stands up to the postwar shifts of many Jacksonians into the Greenback party. Francis Blair, for example, once a hard-money man, asked in 1869, "Why may not the Government bank on its own credit.?" Moreover, large numbers of Jacksonians drifted into the Populist party, calling for a nationalized money supply. These groups "were not an aberration of Jacksonianism, but its essence."<sup>14</sup>

The best analysis of the Democrats' intentions appeared in articles by the economic historian David Martin, who showed that a national banking system was the final beam in a gold-based Jacksonian financial structure. The Gold Bill, passed in 1834, constituted the first plank. The, branch mints were established (all in the South), followed by passage of a bill to extend legal-tender status to foreign coins. All of these bills passed relatively easily because they expanded the nation's gold supply. However, the final two planks encountered much more difficulty. One measure—the prohibition of small notes—had always been on the Jacksonians "hit list," for good reason. If the government could control small-note issues, it could control *all* note issues. The Jacksonians' goal was not the denomination of money, but rather control of the money supply itself. Historians have traditionally glossed over the attempts to pass small-note-prohibition bills by admitting that they represented a fear of inflation without acknowledging the corresponding extension of governmental authority that such a prohibition would require.<sup>15</sup>

Prohibiting small notes, however, was less controversial than the fifth plank in the new Jacksonian structure, which was a new national bank. Whereas one Libertarian writer argued that the "attack on the [B.U.S.] was a fully rational and highly enlightened step toward . . . a laissez-faire metallic monetary system," the evidence of inflationary binges by Jacksonian state governments and the political intentions of national Jacksonians suggests just the opposite. First, the major body of literature on the Bank War concludes that it was political in nature—not economic—and that Jackson greatly expanded the power of the federal government, and especially the executive branch,

through his actions. Second, Jackson received considerable second-hand prodding to centralize the banking system from Issac Bronson, who submitted a ... *Plan for a National Bank* ... to the House Ways and Means Committee in 1833. Bronson, in a private letter, said that the beauty of the plan lay in the fact that it would "remove that bugbear—constitutional scruples." Jackson told his cabinet in March 1833 that he would consider a new national bank if a "full and fair experiment" with the pet banks proved unsuccessful. "Indeed, he had already embarked on a plan to sue the pet banks to suppress small notes."<sup>16</sup>

Certainly divisions within the party existed. "Hards" fought "softs" over the desirability of an all-metallic currency. In most Southern cases, Democratic governors such as Archibald Yell of Arkansas and Alexander McNutt of Mississippi shifted their positions as the Panic grew worse, often supporting or personally engaging in speculation before the Panic but moving into the "hard" camp later. What the Jacksonians found most difficult, however, was to maintain their rhetoric of equality in the face of evidence that not all would profit equally in a laissez-faire system. From the view of many Jacksonians, equality of opportunity meant availability of credit, whether the market would provide it or not. This required government activism, as each of the Southern case studies shows. Although the *Washington Globe* predicted "a man will soon be known as belonging to the *Gold party* or the *Paper party*," Francis Blair revealed that the real war would pit "the *bank* of the US against the *mint* of the US." Thus, the true battle was between market control (a private institution, the B.U.S.) and central government control. Nationalizing the money supply by making U.S.-minted gold coins the only circulating medium would not have been a blow for state's rights. Quite the contrary, it would have made it easier for the federal government by fiat to convert to an all-paper standard. Indeed, William C. Rives of Virginia suspected that the government's purpose was "to supply, thro' the national Treasury, a *government paper money*." That most Democrats *thought* they opposed a strong centralized government has little to do with what policies they enacted.<sup>17</sup>

Several reasons suggest that control over the money supply, and not its composition, remained central to the thinking of the Jacksonians. First, the apparently inconsistent adoption of Greenback principles by Democrats after the war, as well as the enthusiasm with which many of them embraced the Populists' programs of government control, shows that "hard money" itself constituted a relatively minor issue. Second, Jackson's personal request in 1829 that Amos Kendall design a *new* national bank plan *not* based on hard money (but permitting federal note issue) shows that Jackson himself favored a national bank as long as it was *his* national bank. Third, the egalitarian rhetoric of the party was at odds with the realities of any market economy. Fourth, the actual policies adopted by the Jacksonians were based on anything but laissez-faire principles. Finally, there is an in-

ternal dynamic toward centralization that enveloped *both* antebellum parties.<sup>18</sup>

Alexis de Tocqueville observed this final tendency, predicting that statism would be the promise of American life. His perception stemmed from his understanding of the party system created by the Jacksonians. Martin Van Buren and William Crawford had devised a program designed to substitute party loyalty for sectional allegiance by rewarding service to the party with patronage. Tocqueville, among others, understood that by its very nature this system would cause the federal government to grow with every election if only in the numbers of jobs it gave away. This also meant that the executive, in whom resided the appointment powers, would also increase in power. Jackson, for example, exercised the veto more than all of his predecessors combined, and in the nullification crisis he clearly stood for federal authority over states' rights. But Tocqueville also foresaw the tremendous appeal of equality, and the Jacksonians above all stood for equality. Appeals for equality, Tocqueville argued, would lead to the destruction of such intermediary institutions as the state government, the market, the church, and the family. In fact, the Jacksonians feared the market so much, as J. Mills Thornton showed in his study of Alabama, that the encroachment of commercialism and capitalism into that state threw the Jacksonians into chaos. The market threatened, for Southerners, to end slavery, something few Jacksonians would have tolerated. To summarize, then, in two separate ways the Democrats had generated unintended growth in the size and power of the federal government through the party system: to be elected each candidate had to offer more jobs; and the office of the executive accordingly gained power and influence. At the same time, the market forces challenged the Southern Jacksonians' peculiar institution. Whigs generally had no problem with the growth of the central government and were candidly committed to it. Thus, both parties rolled in the direction of growing federal power.<sup>19</sup>

No longer can the rhetoric of equality used by the Jacksonians be seen as a *laissez-faire* type of equality. It contained strong strains of egalitarianism for whites while maintaining bondage for blacks. Banking policy clearly stripped away the Democrats' pro-industrialization rhetoric and exposed their affinity for using the government as an agent of economic growth, especially through inflation. Whigs, even at their most active phase, never generated as much inflation through their policies. Industrialization did not prosper under these programs. On the contrary, as state studies show, especially that of Thornton, the Jacksonians opposed railroads, mines, and industry whenever they appeared. It was in their banking policies, however, that the Jacksonians fought the market the most. Whig legislatures never created state bank monopolies, nor did they pledge any state government's treasury to ensure bond sales. Even if unintentionally, at the national level the Democrats moved toward centralization. Quite intentionally, at the state level they used government to inter-

vene in the market repeatedly. Before the Jacksonians are made into heroes of the free market, their actions should be more carefully examined.

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1. Paul McGouldrick, "How the Jacksonians Favored Industrialization," *Reason Papers*, Spring 1985, pp. 17-32. Also see Jeffery Hummel, "The Jacksonians, Banking and Economic Theory: A Reinterpretation," *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, Winter 1979.
2. See Larry Schweikart, "Banking in the American South, 1836-65" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1983).
3. Larry Schweikart, "Alabama's Antebellum Banks: New Evidence, New Interpretations," *Alabama Review*, July 1985, pp. 202-21; William Brantley, *Banking in Alabama, 1816-1860*, 2 vols. (Birmingham, Ala.: William Brantley, 1961, and Oxmoor Press, 1967); J. Mills Thornton, *Politics and Power in a Slave Society, Alabama, 1800-1860* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978).
4. "Consolidated Statement of Bank Reports, June 13, 1837," in Brantley, *Banking in Alabama*, appendix, p. 293; Schweikart, "Banking in the American South," p. 60; Thornton, *Politics and Power*, pp. 35-58, 281-321, and *passim*.
5. Schweikart, "Alabama's Antebellum Banks," pp. 213-14.
6. For material on Arkansas banking, see W. B. Worthen, *Early Banking in Arkansas* (Little Rock, Ark.: Democrat Printing and Litho Co., 1906); W. D. Blocher, *History of Arkansas Finances* (Little Rock, Ark.: Evening Star Office, 1976). Also see James Sharp, *The Jacksonians vs. the Banks: Politics in the States After the Panic of 1837* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Blocher, *History of Arkansas Finances*, p. 10.
7. Ted Worley, "Arkansas and the Money Crisis of 1836-1837," *Journal of Southern History*, May 1949, pp. 178-91; Ted Worley, "The Control of the Real Estate Bank of the State of Arkansas, 1836-1855," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, December 1950, pp. 403-26.
8. *Arkansas Gazette*, June 19, October 30, 1839; Ted Worley, "The Arkansas State Bank: Ante-Bellum Period," *Arkansas Historical Quarterly*, Spring 1964, pp. 65-73. For instances of corruption, see the Letterbook of the Fayetteville Branch of the State Bank, 1840-1846, Arkansas History Commission, letters dated July 2(?), 1841, February 4, April 2, July 15, October 1, 15, December 12, 1842.
9. Material on Florida banking appears in Fred Marckhoff, "The Development of Currency and Banking in Florida," *The Coin Collector's Journal*, September-October 1947, pp. 118-23; J. E. Dovell, *History of Banking in Florida, 1828-1954* (Orlando, Fla.: Florida Bankers Association, 1955), pp. 1-40.
10. Charles Brough, "The History of Banking in Mississippi," *Mississippi Historical Society Publications* 3 (1960); Robert Weems, "The Bank of the Mississippi: A Pioneer Bank of the Old Southwest, 1809-1844" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1952); Sharp, *Jacksonians vs. the Banks*, pp. 55-109; Schweikart, "Banking in the American South," tables 3.4 and 6.6.
11. Sharp covers the repudiation movement well in *Jacksonians vs. the Banks*, pp. 73-88.
12. Thomas Abernethy, "The Early Development of Commerce and Banking in Tennessee," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, December 1927, pp. 311-25; Claude Campbell, *The Development of Banking in Tennessee* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1932). Also see Larry Schweikart, "Tennessee's Antebellum Banks," Pts. 1 and 2, *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, in press. For George Smith's banking activities, see Alice Smith, *George Smith's Money: A Scottish Investor in America* (Madison, Wis.: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964).
13. Among the historians who have accepted Jacksonian rhetoric and developed inter-

pretations to fit the rhetoric are Bray Hammond, *Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1945); and even Libertarian writers such as Jeffery Hummel, "Jacksonians, Banking, and Economic Theory." Only Sharp and McFaul have presented alternative approaches, although both treated the Jacksonian policies as ambiguous and poorly conceived rather than as deliberate programs that resulted from the party's own ideology.

14. Sharp, *Jacksonians vs. the Banks*, pp. 6-7; McFaul, *Politics of Jacksonian Finance*, p. xi. See Robert Sharkey, *Money, Class and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science, 1969), pp. 104-7.

15. David Martin, "Metallism, Small Notes, and Jackson's War with the B.U.S." *Explorations in Economic History*, Spring 1974, pp. 227-47.

16. Hummel, "Jacksonians, Banking, and Economic Theory," pp. 161-62, n. 12; Abraham Venit, "Issac Bronson: His Banking Theory and the Financial Controversies of the Jacksonian Period," *Journal of Economic History* 5 (1944): 201-14; Bronson to G. Tomlinson, January 24, 1834, cited in *ibid.*, p. 201, n. 21, and Bronson to Elisha Whittlesey, February 26, 1836, cited in *ibid.*, p. 210; Andrew Jackson to James Hamilton, February 2, 1834, in James Hamilton, *Reminiscences of James A. Hamilton* (New York: C. Scribner, 1869), pp. 269-70.

17. Washington *Globe*, July 15, 1834; William C. Rives to David Campbell, October 31, 1837, David Campbell Papers, Duke University. See, for example, such perceptive editorialists as "Jefferson," who suspected Whig policy was to destroy local banks with the Democrats' help in order to establish a new national bank, while a writer to the Jackson *Mississippian* said the Democrats were "advocating a National Bank" (*Richmond Enquirer*, June 2, 1837; Jackson *Mississippian*, February 23, August 10, 1838, June 28, 1839).

18. "Plan for a National Bank," in Amos Kendall to Andrew Jackson, November 20, 1829, Box 1, File 6, Tennessee Library and Archives; Schweikart, "Banking in the American South," chap. 4. Also see Larry Schweikart, "Southern Bankers and Economic Growth," *Journal of Southern History*, in press.

19. The dynamics toward centralization are discussed in Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 2 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), 1:3, 2:109, 204, 317; Harry Jaffa, *Crisis of the House Divided* (New York: Doubleday, 1959); Robert Loewenberg, *Equality on the Oregon Frontier: Jason Lee and the Methodist Mission* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976).> David Kelley's

*Book Section*

*Review Essay:*

David Kelley's  
*EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES:  
A REALIST THEORY OF  
PERCEPTION*

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**T**his is an important book. This is so in spite of the fact that the publisher, Louisiana State University Press, is not one of the major academic presses, and in spite of the fact that Kelley is not a name known everywhere in the Anglo-American philosophical world. The importance of the book has three sources. First, it is a defense of a striking proposal—what Kelley calls the “realist theory of perception”—that is sharply out of tune with conventional wisdom in Modern philosophy. Second, it had its origin in a dissertation from Princeton, supervised by Richard Rorty; for some time, Kelley’s work has been known, mostly by word-of-mouth in libertarian-philosophical circles, as a professionally competent defense of epistemological theses originating with Ayn Rand. Third, apparently because of Kelley’s participation in cognitive-science colloquia at Vassar, this volume has come to have a life of its own in “artificial intelligence” circles: there have been lively debates about it on “ai.phil”, one of the electronic news services used by AI professionals.

Beginning with Plato and Aristotle, and including such philosophers as Aquinas and Kant, it is a well-known phenomenon that most epistemological and metaphysical theories (at least for major, speculative philosophers) have had behind them complex, and sometimes obscure, political, ethical and religious (or anti-religious) agenda. This is not to accuse these philosophers of being “biased”, or to accuse them of the presentation of sophistical shams in order to lay a foundation for their *real* theory of politics, ethics or religion. It is rather merely to be “adult” about where human interests really lie, and where the energies of philosophical expositions are—in the case of most better philosophers, at least—ultimately directed.

*The Evidence of the Senses* falls within this category. Behind the apparent preoccupation with “merely” epistemological foundations, lies a concern to set the stage for certain political and ethical theses. This agenda is apparently an Objectivist one, following roughly the lines of Rand’s well-known but much-disparaged theory of individualism. Kelley is not in the least heavy-handed in showing how his epistemological theories are intimately tied to certain ethical and political claims. In fact, to do so might for some impatient readers constitute a *reductio ad absurdum* of the narrowly epistemological claims, which are clearly deserving of a fair-minded hearing, irrespective of the ethico-political Weltanschauung that inspired them. But neither does Kelley try to conceal his agenda, which is made clear in the Preface and in occasional remarks in the text. There might nevertheless be the temptation to say of a book such as this, especially when one is accustomed to the distinctly American style of philosophizing in which one *never* shows one’s real agenda—the phrase “neutered philosophy” comes to mind—that one sees in works of Quine, Goodman, Kripke or Chisholm, that it is “biased” or violates the canons of good philosophical taste. But the American philosophical preoccupation with hiding one’s wider agenda—or worse, of never having one—is the exception and not the rule in the best work in the history of philosophy. It is perhaps best seen as a peculiarly American habit of (intellectual) personal cleanliness—on a par, vis a vis the Europeans, of making certain that our bodies never have a distinct smell, preferring either a total absence thereof, or the scent of flowers. Kelley’s work thus does not fall neatly in line with the best recent American philosophy, but rather—in at least the respect of its admitted wider agenda—with the best philosophy in the wider sense.

Having said this, and also admitting both that I am not irrevocably hostile to its background agenda and that I find some sections of the book first-rate, I do not think it is a very good book. It is murky at precisely the places where clarity is absolutely necessary. At other places, it comes dangerously close to begging the important question (i.e., in its definition of perception). Although far more nuanced and literate in its treatment of certain difficult philosophical issues, as well as of major philosophers whose views are strongly rejected (e.g., Kant) than one finds in the work of political cohorts (such as A. Rand and L. Peikoff), it nevertheless is occasionally naive to the point of being ignorant. Finally, I find the preoccupation with the themes of certainty, perception and knowledge among philosophers such as Kelley and even Rand, ostensibly so devoted to human “action” and initiative, to be perverse. Of the bidirectional interaction between an individual human being and the “external” world, knowledge and perception is the hopelessly passive direction. In fact it is Kelley’s main aim to demonstrate just how passive and non-creative perception and knowledge are. Where is the individualist theory of human action? As almost an observation about literary style and rhetoric, I conjecture that no tome on realistic epistemology can animate vig-

orous, individualist *anything*. The epistemological stress on passivity in such a theory is horribly at odds—as a “literary” theme—with the main focus on vigor and self-development central to the individualist ideology.

### DESCARTES, KANT AND “REPRESENTATIONALISM”

As I have already indicated, Kelley gives us a relatively fair and sophisticated picture of “enemies” of the thesis he wishes eventually to advance, such as Descartes and Kant. The contrast here is with Rand, whose comments on these figures could at best be described as “pithy” in their brevity, and at worst as casual or cavalier. Comparison of Kelley’s work with Peikoff’s—who was obsessed with showing the origins of Naziism in Kant’s philosophy—is thankfully impossible.

The view Kelley traces to Descartes, and which he then wishes to pin on almost all of Modern philosophy is termed *representationalism*. It perhaps can be seen as having reached maturity in the works of Brentano and Meinong, and interestingly forms the basis of much research being pursued in artificial intelligence along the direction of “cognitive modeling.” Representationalism is the view that, whenever we have thoughts about the world, presented to our thought is an object—a representation—that can be metaphorically seen as a “picture” of the (real) world “outside” of us. Modern philosophy can then be seen essentially as a discourse on how exactly a representation arises and of what it consists (e.g., sensations), of how reliable it is, and of how much it is “like” the external world of which it is a “picture”—or even of whether there is an external world. The primary, direct object of experience, thought, and awareness is therefore, according to this picture, the representation (variously called the “idea,” the “phenomenon,” or the “thought-object” by Modern philosophers). The “external world” outside of the perceiver’s mind and/or body is then at best *indirectly* experienced or inferred—perhaps not reliably (Kant), and perhaps only mythically (Berkeley). One principle question is then how much of a representation is determined by the perceiver’s “mode of cognition,” and how much is determined by the “real object” in the external world “causing” the representation.

Even in his exposition of representationalism, one can easily guess what Kelley’s point is going to be. Perhaps awareness and thought are not “of” representations, but “of” real objects themselves. That is, perhaps the Cartesian model of directly being aware of representations, and only indirectly (or inferentially) being aware of real objects is fundamentally incorrect. Although Kelley only later drives home the point, the suspiciously simple dichotomy between “correspondence” and “coherence” theories of truth is itself predicated upon a representationalist model. Namely, in the correspondence theory, the question is the extent to which our representations are “like” reality. But as noted by Berkeley, and observed repeatedly since, represen-

tations and “real” objects are very little alike, and we are in any case never in a position to measure their similarity, lacking direct access to the latter, and, as Kant would observe, also lacking any concepts that apply to both. A coherence theorist is even more exclusively dependent on representations, since it is representations of some sort (ideas, thought-objects, sentences, whatever) that are judged according to their “coherence.” Kelley’s isolation of and arguments against representationalism, incidentally, are clearly inspired by similar observations made by his teacher, Richard Rorty, in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*.

In a matter strictly of historical exegesis, one is surprised to find the distinction—later in the book criticized as pernicious—between secondary qualities, perceived by one sense, and primary qualities, perceived by more than one sense, laid at the feet of Galileo (because they are not quantifiable like size), and having still more dubious origins in the complaints of “Greeks” (p. 17) that qualities such as those of taste and smell are notoriously subjective. One is puzzled by remarks that Locke accepted the Galilean view that secondary qualities were “subjective.” This was hardly Locke’s point. What is disingenuous here is that roughly the distinction between secondary and primary qualities was also made in the Aristotelian tradition as one between the “particular” and the “common” sensibles. (Kelley later even refers to it.) But of course Aristotelians are the good guys here, and mentioning their distinction would have muddied the critique of Locke et al.

Most bizarre perhaps is the handling of Kant. Kant’s main theses are in fact treated quite clearly and precisely. “There are noumena outside consciousness, and they serve as the perceptual trigger (Kelley carefully avoids ‘cause’ here) for the response of the perceptual faculty, but they do not determine the content of its response”—i.e., they do not determine the representations. And so on. But what of Kant’s *arguments* for his position? Elsewhere, Kelley brings forth and attempts to rebut the usual arguments from dreams, bent sticks in water, hallucinations, perceptual relativity, brains in vats, and so on—the tiresome stock of tricks of the epistemological trade invoked since Plato—that perceptions are not “reliable.” But of course Kant never uses one of these examples. His main argument is instead an extensive and subtle argument based on our conceptions of space, time, and cause. Without reading Kant, a glance at the table of contents of the *Critique of Pure Reason* will tell one this. Kelley has only one thing to say of Kant’s main argument for his position (and perhaps his supreme intellectual accomplishment):

What is the basis of this view? Kant offers various reasons in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and elsewhere for regarding space and time as forms of perception; they derive from the intricacies of an eighteenth-century debate about the nature of space and time. But the fundamental reason for his distinction ... [lies elsewhere].

What is Kelley's point here? That Kant's observations about space, time, and cause are now old-fashioned arcane and that the nature of each is now well understood? If so, Kelley is profoundly uninformed. Throughout *Evidence of the Senses*, there is not a hint of the profound difficulties that still infect our understanding of these concepts (whether in philosophy or in the empirical psychological literature Kelley often cites). Kelley takes the common-sense understanding of them—whatever that is—as well-defined and perfectly usable in scientific explanation itself. He then shifts the discussion away from the role space, time and cause play in experience of the world to the exceedingly simple-minded world of the perception of middle-sized objects (which Kant never deigns to address). Reflections on the concepts of space, time, cause and free will build the only arguments one sees in the *Critique*. If Kelley does not understand what these arguments are, he should bow out of historical criticism.

### THE PRIMACY OF EXISTENCE

Against all the representationalists, but especially against idealists of all stripes, Kelley proposes a thesis that he terms the "primacy of existence"—a phrase used with mind-numbing frequency in some Objectivist tracts, but here made comprehensible. This is the thesis that "consciousness is radically noncreative, radically dependent on existence for its contents." Now, the 'radically' here suggests that consciousness/awareness is *never* creative, which is an implausible claim we will later have to examine. But quibbling aside, and following upon his exposition of representationalism, Kelley's presentation of this, the core of his "realism", is not unattractive. He is also extraordinarily cautious to note that this thesis cannot be the conclusion of an argument, but rather "must serve as an axiomatic foundation for any inquiry into the nature and functioning of our cognitive capacities."

So far, so good. But then comes an argument with the primacy of existence as its conclusion. Namely, Kelley does a phenomenological analysis of his experience of sitting at his work table: "When I reflect on my awareness of [the desk, typewriter, etc.], I am aware of it as something completely noncreative, merely a revelation of what there is." (p. 31):

I am aware of [my awareness itself?]  
as non-creative.  
Therefore, awareness is non-creative.

From a similar phenomenology argument, Kelley later concludes that perception is "non-inferential." But there is a terrible non sequitur here. Can something be creative, yet we are not aware that we are "creating" it? Can we make an inference, yet not be aware of so doing? If one means by "create" *intentionally* create, or *intentionally* infer, then of course not. But saying that we are certain we do not intentionally

create our environment, or that we are certain we do not intentionally infer anything when we perceive an object before us, does not serve to establish that some element of our consciousness is not making a contribution to our awareness. So these, and additional points about non-creativity, (intentional) inference, (intentional) computation, and so forth, miss their mark entirely. Just because we do not “feel” our creativity hardly implies that our consciousness is making no contribution and that reality “determines” the content of our consciousness—this is a point about the phenomenology of experiencing creativity. Harking back to an earlier observation, we lack a theory of human action, and what it is to experience something as an intentional action, and the result is a pretty hopeless muddle.

### DIRECT AWARENESS AND CAUSAL DISTANCE

Kelley does an excellent job of exposing a myth concerning “direct awareness” that has obscured a number of issues in the theory of sensation and perception. The myth goes something like this. For awareness to be direct, the causal path between mind and external object must “short”; otherwise we have a case of indirect awareness. Since Kelley also wants to argue that perception is direct awareness of an external object, he must either show that the causal path is indeed short, or that “causal distance,” as I have called it, is irrelevant. He takes the latter approach.

That is, Kelley argues, persuasively I think, that it is not the number of causal links between mental event and physical object causing it that is relevant. He notes, for example, that there is no single measure of the complexity of a causal chain: one can describe a causal chain in almost any detail one wishes—depending, that is, on the state of science at that point in history.

Unfortunately, what Kelley does not tell us is what kinds of causal chains count toward a case of genuine perception. He says only: “Perception, then, is a unitary product of physiological causes.” Although the term ‘unitary’ is here significant, in contrasting his theory with sensationalism, requiring *physiological* causes seems trivial: any state of awareness whatsoever is presumably a consequence of *some* physiological causes (being physicalists about the matter). And certainly perception is not dependent only on the nature of the physiological causal chain: Is seeing a mirror image *perceiving* the object? Is seeing a TV image? A recorded TV image? A photograph of a person? Seeing a footprint of the person? A photograph of a footprint of a person? In the first two cases, Kelley gives an honest (and admirable) response: we are perceiving the object—so long as the object is sufficiently differentiated from its background. In the latter cases, which involve, among other issues, a time delay between the object’s causing a certain chain of events and my perceptual awareness, Kelley “bites the bullet,” admitting that an object need not now exist in order to be perceived. This is of course consistent with his view that the length of

the causal chain, however this is to be measured, is not crucial to perceiving or direct awareness.

The admission of time delays may, however, conflate memory and perception. For certainly, my now recalling seeing my car is little different from “long” causal chains by reflected images in which I “now” see my car as it was. There is a certain phenomenological difference that is *usually* present: namely, in the case of memory, I *decide* to recall. But then, I can decide to perceive, too—although what I perceive (just like what I remember) is not given by the mode of cognition. Memory is veridical, too. And then there are cases where I failed to *notice* something at the time I was sensing it: I now see my car keys dangling in the ignition. When did I perceive the car keys? They made no impact upon my awareness while I was in the car—so we cannot be said then to have perceived them. On the other hand, to say we now perceive them further blurs the edges between memory and perception.

But suppose we have a machine which, when a person is in its video-camera field, transmits an image of a black dot on a white background. Otherwise, the image is a diffuse white field. We know this. Now, when we see the black dot on the TV screen, are we perceiving the person? Kelley in fact has one escape from this dilemma. He might say that in the case as I have described it, there is conscious inference: I see the black dot, and intentionally, consciously infer that there is a person in front of the machine’s camera. But let us suppose that I have been trained for some time simply to judge that there is a person in front of the camera when the black dot appears. Inference is no longer conscious. (Just as a security guard, when he hears a burglar alarm, may no longer need consciously to infer that a door was opened.) I think Kelley would then have to admit that such a situation constitutes a case of direct awareness, of perceiving, the person. It is true that our justified perceptual judgments about the properties of the person is impoverished: we don’t know how he is dressed, the person’s gender, size, and so on. But this occurs in many cases of fog, poor angles and lighting, etc., in which Kelley admits we still have a case of perception of the person.

Kelley’s strangest remarks in connection with the theme of “directness” come in his discussions of inference and computation.

An inference requires knowledge of the connection between premise and conclusion, and hence an inferential view must explain this knowledge. (p. 78)

We can understand direct awareness only by contrast with knowledge that results from consciously directed processes of integrating information. (p. 68)

But [a number of authors] have merged the concept with the ordinary meaning of directness, by assuming that any processing of receptor responses must involve computation or inference.

It is clear on phenomenological grounds ... that perception is not the product of conscious cognitive processes which combine or interpret sensations.

The first quotation is multiply perplexing, not least because it is said in the context of discussing Helmholtz, who endorsed “unconscious inferences.” Certainly, unconscious inferences do not require *knowledge*—one is uncertain how seriously Kelley is using the word here, however—of connections between premises and conclusion.

In all three cases: inferences, computation, calculation, (as well as for the apparent genus “conscious cognitive process”), Kelley has not told us what he means. In fact the last quotation—“on phenomenological grounds” perception is not the product of “conscious” cognitive processes—is especially unhelpful, since of course we will not have phenomenological access to the *unconscious* ones, and by speaking of “conscious” cognitive processes, Kelley surely is admitting that there are some unconscious ones.

But Kelley is spinning a web that belies his lack of sensitivity to action-theoretic problems and from which he cannot extricate himself. Surely, the way we now speak and think implies that calculation and computation can be done “without consciousness.” This is what calculators and computers do. And then too, the tip off is not the phenomenologically question-begging issue of whether our awareness is “conscious” but whether it is done *intentionally*. All of these terms—computation, calculation, and even inference—have senses which indicate (intentional) *action*, and those which indicate mere “activity” or behavior. No one has ever argued that perception necessarily involves cognitive *actions*—intentional manipulation of sensory or other entities. Hence their lack of appearance in phenomenological analysis is nonplussing. But this is what Kelley imputes to his critics, and what he succeeds in refuting. The real problem is of whether there can be unconscious/unintentional calculation, computation or inference in any meaningful sense, and of whether such processes in the causal chain from external object to mental event disqualifies the resulting situation from being describable as *perception*. Can one come to be aware, without inference, that when the barometer falls, the sky is overcast? If so, is one thereby perceiving the overcast sky? I think such learned unconscious inference is possible. I balk, however at the claim that one thereby is perceiving the overcast sky. This is especially problematic when the learned and now habitual inference is inductively weak, or even invalid—but may in the case at hand have a true “conclusion.”

I myself have no easy answer on how to demarcate perception from other modes of awareness of the external world—memory, unconscious inference, etc. I do not exactly see the point, and I am certainly not so obsessed as Kelley with finding one mode of awareness that is necessarily (but perhaps definitionally) veridical.

## PERCEPTION

Before turning to perception alone, I want to make only a couple of observations about the generally excellent chapter on the relation between perception and sensation. Here, Kelley argues that perception of whole objects, distinguished against a background, is our normal mode of experience, and that what philosophers have called sensation (the awareness of sense data) is a chimera, or occurs only in severely impoverished perception. This general point has of course frequently been made against sensationalism, but I know of no single source that presents such an extensive barrage of arguments against sensationalism as does Kelley. The use of contemporary literature from psychology and cognitive science is especially devastating.

But the weakness in this chapter is again partly one of the interpretation of historical sensationalism. What is this view? Roughly, of course, that any perception is analyzable as a complex of sensations. Much of the evidence Kelley gathers refutes the thesis that our own perceptual objects are phenomenologically experienced as sensations. Rather, perceptual objects are experienced holistically. He also refutes the claim that the development of "normal" perceptual objects arises from the initial awareness merely of sensations, whence one learns to assemble sensations into perceptions, never again attending to the parts that once went into making our first perceptual objects. But there is a far more slippery sensationalist theory that Kelley seems to have few weapons against: sensations form the theoretical *foundation* of perceptual objects. It is, of course, unclear what exactly such a "foundation" is, or why one should want one. But such a theoretical twist makes Kelley's sometimes banal use of phenomenological observations irrelevant. Namely, the fact that we can't find pure sensations in our consciousness counts as little against sensationalism as our inability to "see" a perfect triangle counts against Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics.

But let us now turn to the central point of Kelley's book. What is the "realist theory of perception" that he defends? This is more difficult to say than one would hope, for Kelley oddly is not given to single clear statements of his main positions; he is at his best on the attack. Saying, "Perception is always of existence/reality" comes close. So, interestingly, does saying, "Perceptual judgments are never mistaken." This last assertion is of course especially curious, and requires us to turn to Kelley's analyses of "illusions" such as a circle that appears as an ellipse or, still better, a stick half-submerged in water that "appears" bent. In both the case of seeing the stick out of water and then half-submerged, I think Kelley wants to say, we perceive *the stick*. Otherwise, it is not a case of *perception* at all. Kelley goes on: "The normal look of the stick and the refracted look are simply two different forms in which one can perceive the same external attribute." This external attribute is "the" shape of the stick. Perception now is not just *of a stick*, but rather of a stick in relation to a background—i.e., whether it is all

exposed in air, or half-submerged in water. Perception then is of a relational fact: the stick exposed, or the stick half in water (or, in the case of a circle, of the relational fact formed by the circle and the angle it is being viewed at). Mistaken "perceptual" judgments are then falsely abbreviated judgments about a necessarily veridical percept; "there is no such thing as a nonveridical percept."

My reply to this maneuver is as follows. This is all well and good. You may indeed define for your own purposes, the perceived (the percept) as that which cannot be mistaken. The perception of a stick is "what is common to all appearances of the stick, caused by the stick"—at least those in which it is distinguished at all from its background, to avoid (perhaps in an ad hoc way) *anything* appearing like the stick in suitably bad lighting, etc. But then it is our (abbreviated) perceptual judgment that can be mistaken. Whatever harm—whatever lack of certainty, unreliability, etc., that perceptual relativity formerly injected into your agenda—is now caused by the unreliability of perceptual judgments: how do we know they are correct, reliable, etc.

In fact, Kelley comes dangerously close to, if not actually succeeding at, trivializing his entire enterprise. He writes:

Perception should not be defined, then, in terms of a genus that includes hallucinations and the like, as if these were phenomena on a par with perceiving. It should be defined as a type of awareness of external objects, to be contrasted with other types of awareness. (p. 143)

But then, when is one certain that one is *perceiving* an object, and not in another type of awareness? Kelley's point is, of course, not a new one. It is that perception is a "success" word, like seeing and hearing. One does not say one *saw* a lake that was not there; one says one *appeared to see* the lake.

But co-opting the word 'perception' for veridical awareness of a certain type (apparently just "when the awareness is a unitary product of physiological causes," p. 80), does not give us an *interestingly* realistic theory of perception. It gives us a theory of perception that is "realist" *by definition*. The main difficulty for such a tautologous realist is then to decide when he is really perceiving an object, and when he is in one of the other states of awareness. How does he test whether he is *perceiving* the object? He must determine that his awareness is physiologically caused by an external object. This itself requires perception—never mind the problem of ascertaining that the object is "external", consider only the problem of determining when one's own awareness is "physiologically caused."

### A NON-TRIVIAL REALISTIC THEORY OF PERCEPTION

In spite of numerous compelling claims about sensation, sensory objects, perception, and representations, I think that Mr. Kelley's

main case for perceptual realism is embarrassingly trivial. Can any case be made for a perceptual realism? I think so, even if this realism is not so strong a version of realism as Mr. Kelley would like. Let us consider a number of theses about perception and the (external) world:

- I. The world is always exactly the way we perceive it to be.
- IIa. The world is never the way we perceive it.
- IIb. We cannot be certain the world is ever the way we perceive it.
- III. We can be certain the world is sometimes the way we perceive it.

(I) is the thesis Kelley attempts to defend. Given Kelley's notion of 'perceive', it is in fact a tautology. I use 'perceive' in the broader sense of being possibly non-veridical, i.e. as synonymous with "seem to perceive," or "appears." (IIa) is not an especially attractive hypothesis but, depending on what one takes to be the "way we (commonly) perceive it," the thesis might have been held by Berkeley or Leibniz. (IIb) is almost exactly Kantian Idealism. It intimates that "the world" (noumena) is very probably *not* the way we perceive it—e.g., in having no arrangement in time and space, no causal arrangement, etc. Although Kant does not emphasize it, it is just possible that the noumena have attributes that "mirror" the properties we experience them as having: they are numerically distinct, in "space", ordered in "time", etc. But his point is that we have no evidence that this is so.

I would like to sketch the beginning of an argument here that (III) is true, and that this is the best any sensible realist would want to do. I do so by showing that any argument for a position such as (IIb) makes at least one assumption that is equivalent to the negation of (IIb). That is, I suggest that all arguments in favor of (IIb) are self-defeating.

Consider the neurological discovery in the 19th century that was regarded (especially by Helmholtz) as a "confirmation" of Kantian idealism embodied in (IIb). This discovery is termed the "principle of specific nerve energy." The point is that the triggering of a given nerve ending, and the subsequent transmission of the nerve impulse to the central nervous system, tells the brain nothing about the specific nature of what caused the triggering. All that is necessary is a certain threshold stimulation—heat from a burner, an atomic bomb, or electrical stimulation applied by an evil scientist. The phenomena (what interpretation the brain puts on these received signals) need not bear any functional relationship to the noumena (what is in fact causing the neuron to fire). But is this evidence for (IIb)? Nerves, the brain, and what triggers neurons, are themselves perceptual objects, phenomena. Causal relations which the 19th century physiologists established are themselves phenomenal relationships among phenomena—established by experiment and observation. Thus belief in the principle of specific energy requires belief that something like nerves really exist and behave according to this principle. In short, the prin-

principle of specific nerve energy could be regarded as evidence for (IIb) only if one assumes that we are justified in believing what perception tells us about the existence of nerves and how they are stimulated—which is incompatible with (IIb).

Similar arguments can be made about conjectures that we are “always dreaming” or “always hallucinating.” Namely, the description of a single case of dreaming or hallucinating as non-veridical presumes a method (e.g., of perception) of describing what *is* the case, and of claiming that this is not what is dreamed or hallucinated. So the description of a single case of a dream or hallucination relies upon some method of establishing what *is* the case, contrary to (IIb). In short, we seem to have no tools to argue *for* (IIb)—no facts about nerves, dreams, or hallucinations—that we can reasonably use that do not presume the negation of (IIb). Ditto for brains in a vat. Although I will not here prove it, such reflections perhaps indicate that no direct evidence for (IIb) is possible, and that any alleged proof of (IIb) is presumably flawed along the lines I have indicated.

But as I observed above, Kant’s arguments for (IIb) do not invoke such “cheap tricks.” His argument is, roughly, that our conceptions of space, time, cause and free-will have characteristics that suspiciously smack of an “internal” origin in the mode of cognition. His precise argument is, for example, that the necessity—the a priori character—of certain judgments about space, time, etc. can, if not analytic, only acquire this necessity from “within.” Replies to Kant are of course possible along two paths: (1) space, time, etc., do not have these characteristics, or (2) even if they have them, this does not indicate an internal origin. Since Kant, and accelerated by the advent of non-Euclidean geometries, many writers have argued, for example, that the Euclidean conception of space does not have this suspicious necessity. But assertions about physical, a mathematically possible, or “scientific” space, and the desirability for science of non-Euclidean models, is irrelevant, since Kant was clearly concerned with perceptual, or “phenomenal” space. It has turned out to be quite difficult to show that this phenomenal space is not perfectly Euclidean; but then, it is also hard to show that it *must* be perfectly Euclidean. The mere discovery of non-Euclidean, non-Archimedean or non-three-dimensional spaces has of course been taken as evidence against Kant. But this is a hopeless position, since if Kant had believed that Euclidean geometry were the only consistent geometry, then he would presumably have accepted its analytic character, and been lacking an argument that the necessity of its Euclidean character were at all “suspicious.” I think the flaw in Kant’s argument is probably in (2): that whatever “unusual” characteristics—such as of a “necessity”—space may indeed have, this alone does not show that such a characteristic can only come from internal sources peculiar to the mode of cognition of any perceiving creature. Reflection on other forms of necessity, such as physical necessity, show the possibility of conceiving of, and even endorsing, an a posteriori necessity. I do not have room here

to argue for this thoroughly Aristotelian position, but perhaps the mere isolation of this inference in Kant's logic, and the gesture in the direction of the possibility of "internalizing" a perceived, a posteriori necessity gives an indication of the direction of a possible argument.

I have also not argued directly for (III). I have rather argued that arguments for (IIb) are flawed. I do not have—and possibly there cannot be—strong, direct arguments for (III). At this point I endorse Kelley's cautious assessment of any such principle as necessarily an *axiom*. *Vis a vis* (I) however, I regard my (III) as on much stronger footing. Certainly it could be true when (I) is not, but not vice versa. I suspect, as in Kelley's case, that the only case that can be made for (I) is hopelessly question-begging. What is more, I do not see the methodological reasons for assuming (I). I *do* see a reason for assuming that some of our perceptions are indeed veridical, even when we cannot ascertain which. My methodological reasons are directly analogous with those we might have for endorsing the negation of the Principle of Universal Causation. Admitting there are uncaused events in theory is harmless. Admitting that *this* event is uncaused is pernicious, because it will lead us to abandon any search for a possible cause. It damages our incentive, our emotional motivation, for searching.

## CONCLUSION

My strongest reasons for complaint against Kelley's in places quite observant book harks back to my mere "stylistic" complaint. There is an emphasis, an obsession, with demonstrating the essential (epistemological) passivity of human life. This is radically out of tune with the "spirit" of individualism. What is needed as an antidote is a philosophically well-developed theory of the "active" portions of human life: planning, deliberating, intending, acting, in short, a respectable, modernized theory of practical reasoning in the sense of Aristotle. Bizarrely, one might note that Marx observed this over a century ago, and his successors have "capitalized" upon it, while his individualistic competitors have set out to show the passivity (Rand/Kelley) of the human mind, or the rule-governed, generalizably merely calculating nature of action (von Mises/Friedman). This is all quite unhealthy, and concedes far too much intellectual-rhetorical ground to the undeserving, non-individualistic opponent.

In Aristotle's work, but in hardly any other philosopher's since, we see due attention being given both to "speculative" and to practical—that is action-directed—reason. Indeed, the standards of speculative reasoning, such as the standard of certainty being applied, is necessarily conditioned for the rational acting agent by the place such judgments might occupy in action. One does not require, in order to make a choice between peas and carrots, absolute certainty about which is more nutritious—especially when the cost in such a trivial matter is excessive, e.g., as in the case of Buridan's Ass, postponing either action indefinitely. The *essential* action-directed nature of human ac-

tion, and ultimately of all reasoning itself, *pace* old saws about “knowledge for its own sake,” makes the appropriateness of a tool, standard, or inference pattern in speculative reason (as well as the reliability of information from any mode of awareness, such as perception), ultimately dependent on the place its product is to occupy in some chain of practical reasoning. It is for this reason that the standards of certainty demanded, say by Plato or Descartes, are excessive. We play a game as if there were some possible action for which *complete* certainty were required. Playing this game, perception and most forms of awareness and thought-transformation—perhaps logic itself—come up short-handed. But then, it is a frivolous and pretentious game, for there is no action for a rational person that requires such high standards. Not even the preservation of one’s own life, or of all of human life, is such a solemn end, as our automobile, eating and political habits seem to demonstrate.

My guess is that Aristotle, among very few philosophers, sensed this: the place of speculative reason with respect to practical reason, and thence the role that certainty plays in rational thought in the broadest sense—conceived as guide to action. If anything like this is so, then the approach of Kelley and Rand is fundamentally misguided, an attempt to play the “certainty” game that they will necessarily lose. Namely, they accept the demand for the chimeral absolute certainty arbitrarily imposed by our high-minded forbears, and try to show how some desperately-sought form of awareness meets it. What is needed however, is not some further development of the branches of philosophy devoted to speculative reason (epistemology, perception, inference, etc.), but of those devoted to practical reason—of action theory, a theory of deliberation, of intentions (their nature and origins), and so on. It is the development of this wing of philosophy, beyond where Aristotle left it millennia ago, that will both reinfuse philosophy with the theme of vigor and not of passivity, and put the numerous demands for certainty in their place. The last decades have indeed seen the awakening of interest in these substantive areas, finally acknowledging, one might say, Marx’s claim about the sterility of merely “describing” the world. The names Harman, Bratman, Brand, Castaneda come to mind. So too does recent work in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. But I think much work needs yet to be done before we will be in a position to assess the full “transaction” between world and human being, a word with which Kelley himself thrillingly launches his book (p. 1), but which for him turn out to be nothing more than the traditional languid one-way street of influence of the world upon us.

## *Reviews:*

*Elbow Room: Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.* By Daniel C. Dennett. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. 1984.

This is a book about free will, or, more precisely, about the philosophical “problem” of free will. Dennett believes that this problem is largely the making of the philosophers who have thought about free will. Overly simplified analogies, created by the “intuition pumps” of these philosophers, have led to a set of worries and confusions which together constitute the problem. When these analogies are carefully examined, the worries and confusions dissolve. When this dissolution is achieved, little if anything of the problem remains, although the potential for new variations on the anxiety-causing intuitions is abiding. Dennett allows, however, that when all the confusion has been stripped away there may remain a substantive philosophical issue.

The anxieties and worries which generate the free will problem arise because rejecting free will seems to threaten many things we hold dear: our sense of self-esteem, human dignity, moral responsibility, and human aspirations. The varieties of free will worth wanting are those connected with these values. Once confusions generated by oversimplified analogies are seen for what they are, we can be comfortable with a naturalistic, scientific account of human beings within which a compatibilist, if not determinist, account of free will is at home. Mysterious, metaphysical doctrines about agent causality or contra-causal freedom can be safely discarded without threat to the varieties of free will worth wanting.

The main technique Dennett uses for exposing the confusions and unwarranted fears generated by philosophers’ oversimplified intuitions and analogies is his ample and nuanced presentation of relevant parts of a naturalistic, scientific account of human beings. Dennett’s development of this account comprises much of the argumentation in the book. It is a witty, informed, and insightful—though at times speculative and sketchy—discussion of how a sophisticated, evolutionary explanation of human beings accounts for such things as practical reason, self-control, agency and deliberation.

This discussion is complemented by creative analyses of key notions in the free will discussion—concepts like control and avoidance. The presentation of the naturalistic view of human beings together with

these analyses sets the stage for Dennett's argument against what he calls the "could have done otherwise principle," and for his compatibilist interpretation of moral responsibility.

Dennett's case is not easily summarized, because its power depends precisely on its nuance and detail. It seems to me that he succeeds in showing that the naturalistic story about human beings does not present the threat to human dignity which the oversimplified intuitions of philosophers might suggest. Such bugbears and bogeymen as the invisible jailer, the nefarious neurosurgeon, and the cosmic child whose toys we are, while truly fearful possibilities, are not generated by a properly nuanced naturalistic story. Quite the contrary: such a story has the resources to keep them and all their kin in their proper place—to reveal them as conjured-into-being oversimplified models of determinism.

What is less compelling in Dennett's argument is his formulation of the free will problem, and his handling of some of the key contentions of defenders of the incompatibilist conception of free will.

For, when the naturalistic, compatibilist story has been told in all its persuasive detail, and the dissolution of confusion and exorcism of bugbears thoroughly executed, those inclined toward incompatibilism, thus enlightened, are likely to remain uneasy. Their worries and anxieties may well be calmed, but their concern that Dennett's story is true will remain. For incompatibilists, whatever fears may motivate their concern, believe that the issue of free will is not simply a question of defending values they cherish, but of the way human beings are. Their arguments are not of the form: if we deny free will, then we lose things we cherish, so let's not deny it. They are of the form: the data of human experience and their analysis require us to affirm free will, so it is unreasonable not to affirm it. The concern, in short, is not with the free will we want, but with the free will we are required by the data, their analyses, and the rules of inquiry to affirm. Dennett has not shown that all the premises in arguments of this kind are in fact accepted only because of unwarranted fears, nor has he shown that a naturalistic, compatibilist account sufficiently covers the data so as to make gratuitous the inference to free will.

Dennett's dismissal of Chisholm's view on agent causality is a case in point. Chisholm maintains that if human beings are responsible, then when a human acts, he or she is a prime mover unmoved. "In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing—or no one—causes us to cause those events to happen." (p. 76) Dennett thinks that this is "obscure and panicky metaphysics." But he recognizes that if this judgment is to be more than name calling, he must provide a naturalistic account which not only explains agency but reveals the illusory character of the intuitions supporting Chisholm's "vision".

Dennett maintains that Chisholm's vision of the self is a sort of cognitive illusion caused by two factors. The first of these is that in agency there is something like an illusion of scale. There is a magni-

fication of effects by the nervous system. The switches which control output factors of the person—such factors as our mouths, arms and legs—use very little input energy in controlling processes which expend observably dramatic amounts of energy. The second factor causing the cognitive illusion is the fact that much of the processing of information is invisible. “We see the dramatic effects leaving; we don’t see the causes entering; we are tempted by the hypothesis that there are no causes.” (p. 77) Further, these causal paths are no less invisible to introspection than to an outside observer. Dennett goes on:

Are decisions voluntary? Or are they things that happen to us? From some fleeting vantage points they seem to be the preeminently voluntary moves in our lives, the instants at which we exercise our agency to the fullest. But those same decisions can also be seen to be strangely out of our control. We have to wait to see how we are going to decide something, and when we do decide, our decision bubbles up to consciousness from we know not where. We do not witness it being *made*; we witness its *arrival*. (p. 78)

Of course, incompatibilists believe that one cannot predict even one’s own free choices before one makes them. Furthermore, there may well be “decisions” of the kind Dennett describes here. But surely these are not the kind of decisions on which claims about agent causality are based. These decisions are not experienced as simply the arrival of settled state of mind and will in the absence of awareness of what caused the termination of the earlier state of irresolution. They are experienced as the person’s own settling of the issue, as one’s settling the matter by making a choice of one over other possibilities. Thus, while one’s experience includes the negative element of not being aware that anything else settled one’s decision except one’s own choice, this negative element is not simple ignorance of the causes: one experiences one’s decision as the cause.

Nowhere in the book could I find a recognition of this positive aspect of the experience of choosing, or even an acknowledgement that incompatibilists think there is such a component to their experience. There is only the reference, quoted in the above passage, to what appears from certain fleeting vantage points. Dennett discusses cases where it is unclear whether one actually made a decision, and cases where one cannot pinpoint the time at which one’s mind became settled. (p. 80) He also discusses a smoker who should but does not quit; this person’s behavior can be explained in one of only two ways: as caused either by self-deception or by weakness of will. (p. 106) No doubt there are cases like these, but there also appear to be cases in which the experience is as I have suggested, and these are the cases on which claims about agent causality are based.

Thus, there is, or seems to be, an awareness of oneself as active which is not a cognitive illusion, not simply an exploiting of a cogni-

tive vacuum by filling it in with a magical, mysterious, active self. (p. 79)

Of course, this experience will have to be treated as like an illusion by the naturalist. But Dennett has not given even a hint of how what seems to be part of experience is really the creation of a diagnosable illusion. But if this aspect of the experience is not a diagnosable illusion, but must still be dismissed as illusory, Dennett's conception of the free will problem is in trouble. Here is something which he does not want, but seems to be given in experience—something which should continue to trouble one who accepts Dennett's naturalism even after all the bugbears have been exorcised. For the naturalistic compatibilist must admit that his account requires that a common part of the experience of many people must be dismissed as illusory just because it conflicts with the story. The substantive philosophical issue about how to deal with certain difficult data remains.

Dennett seems to recognize that there is a substantive philosophical issue concerning what he calls "the could have done otherwise principle," the proposition that one is free and responsible only if one could have done otherwise. For he argues that this proposition is false. But even here Dennett regards his own distinctive contribution to the discussion to be the further point that nobody is really interested in the incompatibilists' sense of "could have done otherwise;" the freedom connected with this notion is, presumably, not among the varieties worth wanting.

Dennett thinks there are clear counter-examples to the could-have-done-otherwise principle. One of Frankfurt's examples of over-determination is presented and endorsed, but with the recognition that the incompatibilist can "try for a patch," and evade the force of the example. The example is of a person who decides to do something, but could not have done otherwise because, had the person chosen not to do it, another agent would have caused him or her to do it anyway.

It seems to me, however, that the incompatibilist response to this example is not evasive tinkering. The person in question may not have been able to *do* otherwise, but he or she could have *chosen* otherwise, as the example admits. It is this possibility of choosing otherwise to which the incompatibilist is committed.

Dennett's own examples fare no better. He presents the case of Luther's famous statement: "Here I stand. I can do no other." As Dennett notes, Luther was not trying to duck responsibilities. Quite the opposite.

But Luther's statement is ambiguous. Did he mean to express his sense of obligation to take the stand he took? If so, perhaps he could have done otherwise in the relevant sense. Or did he mean that, having committed himself as he did, he was resolute in the choice he made? Or did he mean that he never had a choice to make concerning the matter of his religious stance? If this last sense is clearly distinguished from the others, and is taken to be Luther's meaning, then it

is not so clear that either he or we would hold him morally responsible for the stance he took.

Similar observations apply to Dennett's other examples: surely there are people for whom some actions are just out of the question—not live options. And this is often to their credit. Dennett is correct in thinking that part of the point of moral education is to rule out—to render unthinkable—some possible actions. But this says nothing about people who do face options which they would not face were they better educated or integrated. For them rejecting such temptations is doing good when they could have done otherwise, and that is to their moral credit. More important, Dennett has not shown that we would regard as morally praiseworthy persons who could not have done other than the good they did, if these persons never made a choice, for example, to accept and internalize the moral education which ruled out the bad alternative.

Dennett's attempt to show that the incompatibilist account of the could-have-done-otherwise principle is not anything people are interested in, has difficulties like those involved in his rejection of agent causality. He argues that no one could know that one could have done otherwise in the incompatibilist sense, and that this should be surprising because the information involved is taken to be so humanly significant. (pp. 135-136)

He supposes that in order to know that one could have done otherwise, one must be able to compare two situations which are exactly the same. Since no two situations in a person's life are exactly the same, it is impossible to know that one could have done otherwise. (p. 136)

But the incompatibilist need not accept Dennett's supposition. The meaning of "could have done otherwise" is instantiated in a single choice situation: one faces options and settles the matter by one's own choice. Since the choice is free, one can choose either option, and after the fact can correctly say that one could have chosen otherwise.

Of course, in a given case, a person may be mistaken in thinking that a choice was free. Some factor which determined the choice might come to light after the fact, or careful consideration of the experience itself might reveal some determining factor. On the basis of this kind of reflection people can have considerable confidence that in a given situation they could or could not have done otherwise. Only the acceptance of a naturalistic account of human agency can justify general skepticism about the results of such inquiry.

Dennett goes on to argue that even if we could know whether one could have done otherwise, by way of a divine revelation perhaps, that information would be useless. For knowing that one could have done otherwise in a given situation would not tell us anything about the person's character or anything useful for future planning. (pp. 137-138)

But this information would tell us something important from the incompatibilist point of view: that the person was responsible in a full

and distinctive sense for his or her action. That surely is relevant to one's willingness to praise or to punish in the incompatibilist understanding of these activities—an understanding not rendered empty by the fact that Dennett can provide an alternative account of moral responsibility. Further, from the incompatibilist point of view a person's free choices are not irrelevant to the estimation of the person's character. Choices are the key factors which establish a person's moral character and identity.

In short, Dennett's book is a useful propaedeutic to the free will problem. But not more than that. Incompatibilist resistance to a naturalist account of human beings is not simply a tissue of anxieties which dissolve when oversimplifications are unmasked. Substantive philosophical issues remain even when the naturalistic, compatibilist account is fully spelled out. Dennett fails to recognize the extent to which these issues remain because he does not take sufficient account of the data from which the incompatibilist account begins. This same oversight flaws his efforts to resolve the substantive issues he does recognize.

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*Liberalism.* By John Gray. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 1986.

Given its brevity—93 pages of text—John Gray's *Liberalism* is remarkable for its scope and for the amount of supporting argumentation it manages to include in its exposition of "the political theory [whose] postulates are the most distinctive features of modern life." Thanks to its clarity of presentation the book is an excellent introduction to its subject, while at the same time the handling of issues will offer rewards to many political philosophers.

The presentation is in two parts, the first historical and the second philosophical. In both cases the focal point is the "classical liberalism" that had its ancient anticipations in Greek Sophism, Roman jurisprudence, and Christian individualism and universalism, and its modern precursors in Hobbes and Spinoza. Gray finds its foundational formulation in Locke's *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, and its first comprehensive and systematic expression in the social philosophers and political economists of the Scottish Enlightenment. It was transformed into "revisionist" liberalism in the pivotal figure of J. S. Mill, but is today undergoing revival in classical form at the hands most notably of F. A. Hayek, Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin, and Ludwig von Mises, and, more equivocally, John Rawls and Robert Nozick.

Gray's overarching thesis is that throughout these changes, "liberalism" since Locke remains a unified tradition whose central elements are individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism (understood as belief in the "improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements"). In the political domain it is identified with constitutionalism and the principle of limited government, but only contingently related to popular democracy, and on guard against "totalitarian democracy." In the economic domain, classical liberalism endorses private property and the free market, and Gray offers an extended argument against "revisionist" liberalism where it compromises these principles.

The immediate problem with the thesis is the bedfellows it makes of intractable opponents: Berlin and Bosanquet, Hayek and Mill, Nozick and Mill, Hayek and Max Weber, Rawls and Bentham, Lock and Kant. By casting so wide a net, Gray appears to have hauled in a welter of contradictions, undermining his "unified tradition" thesis. A few examples will serve to illustrate the point.

Gray includes T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet as revisionist liberals, but as we have just indicated, one of the four hallmarks of liberalism according to Gray is individualism, and Green and Bosanquet were not individualists in anything resembling the liberal meaning of the term, but anti-individualists. True, both Green and Bosanquet regarded themselves as individualists, and both use the term "the individual" normatively. But ac-

ording to both the one true individual is the Absolute, which is everything that is, brought to fulfillment in an undifferentiated One. Persons as distinctive individuals among others of their kind are mere appearances, representing a low level of evolutionary development toward the inevitable final outcome which is the Absolute. Certainly it is the Absolute Idealists that Isaiah Berlin has foremost in mind when he finds totalitarian implications in the concept of "positive" freedom. What is decisively anti-liberal in Absolute Idealism is the metaphysical doctrine that greater reality is possessed by the more inclusive whole. The Absolute, being all-inclusive, is totally real; but beneath it and on the way to it, society is a more inclusive whole than particular persons, therefore (by Absolute Idealist reasoning) it is more real than they, and unconditionally authoritative with respect to them. What this makes of the freedom of persons is most forthrightly put by F. H. Bradley in "My Station and Its Duties." Freedom enables persons to gladly accept the station that society assigns to each.

Perhaps not contradiction, but certainly semantic and conceptual confusion enters Gray's delineation of the liberal tradition by the amplitude he allows to the idea of limited government. At one end it includes "night watchman" minimalists (Humboldt, Herbert Spencer, Robert Nozick), while at the other it "may even encompass something akin to a welfare state." This raises the question whether the "unified tradition" thesis derives its credibility from vagueness in the definition of the tradition's essential characteristics. After all, all governments are "limited" by the logical principle, *omnis determinatio est negatio*; a government is not a porpoise, or a tree, the present government of the United States is not the present government of Mexico, etc. To be sure, liberals are concerned with a certain kind of limitation, namely limitation of a government's authority with respect to the persons who are its subjects; but without narrower specification "liberalism" will include every political view short of unmitigated totalitarianism and anarchism.

To the question, "Is there a distinctively liberal conception of freedom?," Gray offers an interesting and—to me at any rate—compelling answer, but not without serious problems of internal consistency. To begin with he cites as "not altogether mistaken" the familiar identification of classical liberalism with "negative" freedom and revisionist liberalism with "positive" freedom. His response to Berlin's argument that positive freedom is anti-liberal is to contend that Berlin fails to distinguish among very different positive conceptions, only some of which are anti-liberal. In particular Gray points to the positive conception of freedom as autonomy in the sense of individual self-determination, which he says "seems entirely congenial to liberal concerns and to have an assured place within the liberal intellectual tradition." Citing Spinoza, Kant, and Mill as leading advocates, Gray himself defends autonomy as the best candidate for the distinctively liberal conception of freedom.

Gray is correct about the deficiency—a glaring one—in Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty." He correctly notes that it is first of all Hegel against whom Berlin's attack is properly directed. But this makes an anomaly of Gray's inclusion of T. H. Green and Bosanquet among "revisionist liberals," for as fellow Absolute Idealists, their conception of freedom is identical to Hegel's.

As part of his endeavor to establish "autonomy" as liberalism's conception of freedom, Gray takes up an issue between Mill and Hayek on the subject. In Chapter 3 of *On Liberty* ("Of Individuality") and elsewhere, Mill holds that individual autonomy, or self-direction, is irreconcilable with convention-bound thought and conduct, and with the blind perpetuation of received tra-

dition. Hayek responds that Mill has unwittingly attacked perhaps the most important condition of individual freedom, namely perpetuation of the conventions and received tradition of liberalism itself. Gray sides with Hayek, arguing that Mill has misconceived autonomy. "A conception of autonomy that is plausible and defensible need not be infused with the animus towards convention and traditions that pervades some of Mill's writings. The ideal of autonomy, as it figures in social psychology, connotes not the inner-directed man who is unmindful of his social environment, but rather the critical and self-critical man whose allegiance to his society's norms is informed by the best exercise of his rational powers." But Gray here mistakes Hayek's position, for Hayek expressly precludes individuals' exercise of their rational powers on their received (liberal) tradition and conventions in the (I think warranted) belief that this is sure to introduce rupture. Thus in volume one of *Law, Legislation, and Liberty*, Hayek says that a tradition is "likely to be fairly constant ... so long as [the rules at its core] are not articulated in words and therefore also are not discussed or consciously examined." This is a long way from Gray's "critical and self-critical man whose allegiance to society's norms is informed by the best exercise of his rational powers." (Incidentally Gray says "man" throughout the book where he should be saying "person"—or has this convention not yet in his native England received the critical scrutiny that has been directed to it elsewhere?)

On the contrary, I think that Gray's position is in fact that of Mill, who does not argue for (an impossible) traditionless and conventionless life (and certainly did not himself endeavor to live in such a fashion). Mill opposes the mindless perpetuation of received tradition and conventions, and he does so in behalf of chosen tradition and conventions. He perceives that by choosing one's lifestyle one at the same time chooses one's meaningful tradition, made up of the contributions of one's predecessors in that lifestyle. Putting the matter in the narrower terms of vocation for purposes of illustration—Mill knew as well as anyone that to choose (say) to become an engineer is not to re-invent the profession of engineering, but to commit oneself to the tradition of engineering, beginning with the obligation to learn from that tradition. At the same time Mill saw that to unreflectively perpetuate (say) the religious beliefs that one was trained to accept in one's dependent childhood is, in this measure, to live not autonomously but derivatively.

Correlatively Mill recognized that traditions lapse into empty forms and die out when they do not receive perpetual revitalization from successive generations of persons who choose to perpetuate them in full knowledge of alternatives. To be sure, Hayek is correct in his judgment that given the opportunity of choice, not all choosers will commit themselves to the perpetuation of their received tradition. But the path endorsed by Hayek leads to the desuetude of liberalism by precluding the requisite revitalizations.

What Mill sought, I think, was a *tradition* of autonomous individuality within which persons choose their determinate traditions by choosing their lifestyles. This can be conceptualized as a metatradition embracing a panoply of alternative limited traditions. Such an arrangement is depicted by Robert Nozick in Part 3 ("Utopia") of his *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*.

Gray defines the autonomy of the individual as "his ability effectively to implement his life-plans," and recognizes that this ability has necessary conditions. Accordingly he recommends that "basic liberties" (freedom of speech, of association, of movement, etc.) be "conceived as framing the necessary

conditions of autonomous agency." What this does is to transform the freedom of classical liberalism from an intrinsic to an instrumental value, for that freedom *consisted* in the "basic liberties."

Having introduced the idea of necessary conditions of freedom, Gray is bound to grant that coercion may take the form not just of direct obstruction or control, but also of preclusion of necessary conditions. Moreover it remains coercion whatever may be its source, i.e. whether it results from interpersonal action or inaction, or from structural features of society. Gray affirms that property is among the necessary conditions of autonomy, and is therefore consistent in defending property as a basic right. Regarding the distribution of property he argues that "free markets represent the only non-coercive means of coordinating economic activity in a complex industrial society." But he has made this an empirical question. According to the latest governmental study (1983), the top fifth of families in the United States own 80 percent of net family wealth, while the bottom fifth owns 0.2 percent, which is to say that the top fifth has 400 times the wealth of the bottom fifth. I think that if Gray's connection (through "autonomy") of freedom to necessary conditions and thence to property be granted, then these figures belie his claim that "free markets represent the only non-coercive means of coordinating economic activity in a complex industrial society." Granted, the United States is not and never has been a pure free market economy; but if (as I think) the maxim that "wealth begets wealth" is true, then the above disproportion would be much greater if we were a free market society.

When the disproportion is factored into freedom and thence into individuality, as it is by Gray's definition of freedom as autonomy, then it makes a mockery of liberalism's *egalitarianism*, included by Gray among its four definitive characteristics. Classical liberalism maintained equality of persons by defining freedom purely formally (freedom under law by constitutional guarantee), and I think any classical liberal must condemn Gray's identification of freedom with autonomy as opening the floodgates with respect to positive rights. Nevertheless I think that Gray moves in the right—indeed, the obligatory—direction, for where the concept of freedom is totally divorced from questions of enablement, it is, as Anatole France said, but the freedom of rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, in which case those who do not possess it are prudent to seek tangible benefits instead, and the majority of those who possess it are prudent to trade it for tangible benefits.

To sum up on Gray's overarching thesis, I think that his endeavor to show that classical and revisionist liberalism constitute a single unified tradition demonstrates the very opposite, namely that they are disparate and irreconcilable traditions that produce grinding contradictions when combined. But this aside, the book has many virtues, among the foremost of which is Gray's work with freedom as individual autonomy.

In order to reconcile individual autonomy with liberalism Gray recognizes that he must distinguish between "relatively open or closed" conceptions of autonomy. A conception of autonomy is relatively closed when it holds that "autonomous agents are bound to converge on a single form of life or agree on a unified body of truths." Such a conception is illiberal (and indeed self-contradictory) because it pre-determines the choice that must be made by whomever it will regard as possessing "true" freedom. Gray acknowledges that the best-known conceptions of individual autonomy in the history of philosophy—he mentions the Stoics, Spinoza, and Kant, and earlier has included Hegel—are closed conceptions. But he rightly holds out the possibility of an

open conception that does not demand convergence upon a single plan of life, but regards moral progress as the progressive realization of many rational plans of life.

This is a productive line of thought; but Gray shows no sign of recognizing that it saddles him with the very problem that he has earlier termed "decisive" against "any prospect of reviving a natural law ethics." It is "that the various components of human flourishing may often be in intractable conflict with one another." The conflict is of two sorts, interindividual and intraindividual; that is, one person's flourishing may conflict with other persons' flourishing, and also, the requirements for flourishing "may be conflicting or competitive even in a single man."

Gray defines the autonomous individual as "the individual who is not ruled by others, and who rules himself," and it is plainly the case that self-ruling individuals will sometimes be in conflict with one another, and also that the various components of the self (e.g. beliefs, reasons, dispositions, habits, volitions, desires) will sometimes be in internal conflict. Why is this recognition "decisive" against natural law ethics, but not against Gray's own conception of freedom as individual autonomy?

For my part I think that the two kinds of conflict in no way constitute a refutation, either of Gray's "autonomy" or of natural law theory. They constitute, exactly, a problem for both theories, which is to say, a difficulty, but were theories refuted by difficulties, there would be no theory that was not instantly self-refuting. The question is, can the difficulties that arise for a given theory be managed (solving, dissolving, overcoming, coping, are among the forms of management) in a reasonable way without fatally compromising the theory?

What Gray does by taking the difficulties of natural law theory to be decisive refutation of it is to cut himself off from the tradition of profound and constructive thought about the difficulties of conflict that beset his own theory of freedom as individual autonomy. I have in mind the tradition of eudaimonistic thought founded by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. All three are advocates of freedom as individual autonomy, to be sure of the "closed" variety, and it is surprising that Gray does not include at least Aristotle in his list of prominent advocates of "closed" autonomy, since Aristotle figures prominently throughout the book.

I think it is not an exaggeration to say that ninety percent of the extant writings of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are devoted directly or indirectly to the problems of interpersonal and intrapersonal conflict, in terms on the one hand of analysis, and on the other of proposed resolution. What do they offer? It would not be mistaken to say that the beginning and the end of it is the metaphysical principle of the inherent "congeniality" of the varieties of goodness or human excellence. But to dismiss this as unwarranted and counter-intuitive apriorism, as is routinely done today, is to ignore what goes on *between* the beginning and the end. What the metaphysical principle of the congeniality of excellences is is a functional presupposition. It attests that among actual human excellences as they appear in the world, harmony subsists *in potentia*. This is not to say that harmony is already achieved, nor is it to hold that it will be the inevitable outcome of processes that work independently of human initiative, by some metaphysical "invisible hand."

Briefly on internal (intraindividual) conflict: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle held that it is the given condition of the individual soul (depicted in Plato's image of the soul as chariot, charioteer, and two fractious horses). This is the

basic problem that every person is to him- or herself, upon the solution to which depends all hope of progress with problems of any other sort: human being is problematic being, and therefore the primary virtue is integrity (*eudaimonia*), an internal organization achieved under the governance of reason, through its apprehension of a goal of development, which is the proper or best life for (a) a human being, and (b) the particular human being one is.

With respect to interindividual conflict, the approach to its resolution is laid down by the recognition that self-sustaining harmony in social relations presupposes inner harmony ("integrity") in the persons who interrelate. There is no invisible hand being invoked here. Because conflict exists, while the ideal of conflict-free harmony is largely ideal and only minimally actual, human institutions (the law, the judiciary, customs, mores, patterns of education) must be brought to bear upon the problems of conflict resolution and conflict prevention. Nearly all political theories agree on this. What distinguishes eudaimonistic political theory is its prescription that the methods of conflict, resolution and prevention, and the kinds of institutions brought to bear, be such as are conducive to, and not obstructive of, the moral growth of individuals that eventuates in worthy lives.

A leading example of obstruction to worthy living as eudaimonistically conceived is the Hobbesian premise of intractable egoism in all persons, and the institutions built upon this premise. I think it will be evident on reflection that if Hobbes is right, then classical liberalism's "negative" freedom is the appropriate understanding, and there can be no point in Gray's move to the positive conception of individual autonomy.

Gray cannot himself do all of the philosophical work that his conception of freedom demands, any more than can a person who chooses to become an engineer re-invent engineering. Nor can he get the help he needs from modernity, where the concept of individual autonomy (as Gray's book abundantly attests) sits uncomfortably. But there is real promise, I think, in a revival of classical eudaimonism as revised in the direction of Gray's "open" conception of individual autonomy.

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*Saints and Scamps: Ethics in Academia.* By Steven Cahn.  
Rowman and Littlefield. 1986.

With this book the author proposes to give faculty members in higher education a code of professional ethics akin to codes in medicine and law. Under the major headings of teaching, scholarship and service, personnel decisions, and graduate education, he covers such topics as the role of instructors, examinations, grades, the morality of scholarship, departmental obligations, faculty appointments, tenure, voting procedures, faculty dismissals, and some serious shortcomings of graduate faculty performance.

Since the book is very simply written, even when most insightful and incisive, and is right 99.44% of the time, the best among us (i.e., the saints adverted to in the title) may feel it so obvious as to be redundant and so simple as to be simplistic. But when we reflect upon some, even many whom we know or have known in academia and remember the horror stories told us by students, perhaps it is needed, greatly needed in fact. Indeed, a strong case could be made for putting a copy of it (at institutional expense) into the hands of each new person entering the profession.

Like a course in ethics this book has no magical power to make its recipients ethical by exposure alone, but if it were well understood by all and sundry in institutions of higher learning that this book has the status of a code, upholdable in the profession in general and consistent with relevant laws, then its effects could well be reformative and salutary in the conduct of the scamps in question and the potential scamps it envisions.

Having already proclaimed it 99.44% correct, it remains for me to raise concern over the missing .56% and to supplement Cahn's book in one respect. He is entirely correct in criticizing the mistake of using student evaluations alone (or for the most part) in assessing a given instructor's teaching performance, but he is a bit too optimistic about the success of peer visitation. Visits by peer groups, even when including professionals from other disciplines and/or institutions, are not foolproof either. If there is prior notification, the instructor can prepare especially well for the occasion, turn on the pyrotechnics, and thus exceed by far his/her normal performance. If, however, there were a policy of visit-at-any-moment, a certain paranoia might set in among all who are up for tenure or promotion. Ideally, of course, each of us ought to be prepared to welcome sincerely any visitor with the requisite bona fides at any time for the purposes of evaluation and review. The effect of this on faculty morale and harmony, however, might be counter-productive. A testiness borne of being on edge all the time is probably not conducive to the best in education. In short, Cahn puts a bit too much trust in peer review and ignores what might be done at the outset to improve instruction.

What he leaves out everybody else leaves out too, or so it seems. Let me,

then, introduce this missing factor. Graduate students who are being prepared for ordinary classroom teaching, especially its lecturing aspect, ought to have to take something resembling what the better seminaries call "practice preaching." Whether we who lecture know it or not, we are continuously being compared in our auditors' mind with TV and with the professional actors who appear thereon. In this comparison, most of us come off poorly. Granted that we are not prepared to be entertaining, we should, nevertheless, have the benefit of seeing and of hearing ourselves on videotape, not once but numerous times and of being criticized and aided by professionals in communication. In graduate philosophy and speech departments this kind of experience could be provided by appointing a rhetorician who in addition to being well informed in an aspect of the discipline also knows how to communicate the contents of that discipline equally well. Other kinds of departments could work out similar arrangements.

In short, those who expect to lecture should have to take a practicum in "practice lecturing" and should be criticized and improved by experts in communication. There are, of course, always eucratic individuals who are simply good at what they do with a minimum of tutelage, but for the general run of graduate students what I am proposing (that Cahn forgets) could be invaluable. Surely the ethics of the profession calls upon all of us to be at our best at the entire range of our work. Areas in which we can improve or be improved for the common good of education are areas in which we should improve or be improved.

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