

LIBERTY, VIRTUE, AND
SELF-DEVELOPMENT:
A EUDAIMONISTIC
PERSPECTIVE

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My argument is for the necessary conjunction of politics and ethics. It is therefore at odds with the modern resolve to divorce politics, as descriptive science, from prescriptive thinking, on the “is-ought” distinction. In the beginning of modernity, 400 years ago, the *realpolitik* initiative was expressly the resolve to rid politics of moral ideals and confine it to what Machiavelli termed *verità effettuale*, and what Hobbes termed “unvarnished facts.” This disjunction was institutionalized in classical liberalism’s distinction between the “public sector” and the “private sector,” the former being the sphere of politics and the latter the sphere of morality. And the disjunction has lately been perpetuated by positivism’s bifurcation between the objectivity of socio-political laws, and the subjectivity of the moral inclinations and disinclinations of persons as individuals.

Given the predication of political modernity upon the disjunction of politics and morality, to reopen the question of their interrelationship would be quixotic if the consequences of the *realpolitik*, classical liberal, and positivistic initiatives, as we live them today, were reasonably gratifying or satisfactory. But I believe they are demonstrably unsatisfactory, and in respects which directly reflect, and therefore call into question, the bifurcation of politics and morality.

As we understand it today liberty is a political concept which has scrupulously been cleansed of moral connotations. It is, as we say, “negative” in two senses. It is negative in the sense of representing “freedom from” rather than “freedom for;” and it is understood as a right which is negative, by which we mean a right to abstentions and not to performances by others. Liberty is understood as the condition in which the individual is not subject to coercion by other persons or

by human institutions. Historically it was the right to liberty in this sense that was the telling weapon in the enterprise to enfranchise the individual against the collective authorities of church and state, identifying the dominant theme in political modernity as “the rise of the individual.” But as Michael Oakeshott says, there were from the start premonitions of future trouble in this enfranchisement, for there were many “who found themselves invited to make choices for themselves in matters of belief, language, conduct, occupation, relationships and engagements of all sorts, but who could not respond. The old certainties of belief, of understanding, of occupation, and of status were being dissolved not only for those who had some confidence in their ability to inhabit a world composed of autonomous individuals (or who had some determination to do so) but also for those who by circumstances or temperament had no such confident determination.”¹

Modernity has nevertheless witnessed a substantial achievement of liberty in the Western democracies; yet today liberty is everywhere endangered, and the trouble can be recognized as those early premonitions cited by Oakeshott, coming home to roost. The threat to liberty comes not from ignorance of it but from knowledge of it, and not from external agencies which seek to extinguish it, but from the relinquishment of it by those who possess it and the rejection of it by those who might have been expected to aspire to it. It is being exchanged on the one hand for ideological servitude, and on the other hand for distributive benefits, and the burning question in both cases is, Why? I will try to show that the answers in both cases embody fundamental fallacies, but also that the fallacies embodied in the rejection of liberty are generated by the foundational *realpolitik* fallacy of conceiving of liberty in independence of morality.

Those who trade liberty for ideological servitude assume at least that they are free to do so with impunity, and at most that they are obligated to do so by the absolute moral character of the ideology in question. The legitimating supposition in either case is false, but it is endorsed by the rights-primitivism of classical liberalism. For if liberty is a right, and rights are primitive in the logical sense of being underived, then liberty can be traded with impunity. The reason for this is that exercise of a right is not obligatory; included in the concept of a right is one's freedom to forego his exercise of the right. To choose servitude is to choose to forego the exercise of one's rightful liberty in perpetuity, but this too is a choice one can make with impunity in a rights-primitive framework. Why persons in large numbers should so choose is not hard to see if we compare the security of dependence with what Michael Oakeshott identifies as the “notorious risks”² of self-responsibility. I think we see this in its proper light when we recognize the developmental fact that no human being is born autonomous and self-responsible. Every person is in the first stage of his life a dependent being in whom subsists the potentiality for becoming an autonomous and self-responsible individual. Devel-

opmentally this means that toward the end of one's obligatory dependence one is likely to be comfortable with the terms of one's dependence and skilled at enacting them. On the other hand one's autonomy is one's introduction into a wholly novel world, to be navigated at first only by the clumsiest groping. There is, then, a distinct attractiveness to regression and developmental arrest. It occasioned only momentary surprise in Nietzsche's prophet when his news of the death of God only produced in his hearers the demand for newly-invented gods to obey.³ Nietzsche himself was a moral individualist, and thus well-armed with arguments to deplore the rejection of liberty in favor of perpetuated dependence. But where liberty is conceived as an exclusively negative freedom, as it is in the tradition of modern political liberalism, then its exercise is strictly non-criteriological, and the choice to exchange it for perpetuated dependence is faultless.

Turning to the exchange of liberty for distributive benefits, the fallacy it embodies is what I will term the distributivist fallacy of supposing that all benefits can be conferred. If all benefits can be conferred, then an irresistible temptation exists to conceive of government as a vast distributive agency whose paramount function is to fulfill the needs and gratify the desires of citizens. The irresistibility arises from the inevitable problematicity of individual initiatives. As John Dewey says, "The distinctive characteristic of practical activity, one which is so inherent that it cannot be eliminated, is the uncertainty which attends it."⁴ Famously, Dewey identifies the Greek metaphysics of incorporealized, changeless essences and eternal truths, and also Christian soteriology, as compensatory myths arising from the uncertainty of practical life. But there is a third compensatory myth generated from the same source, namely the modern welfare-statist myth of government as the guarantor of benefits which persons can only problematically self-provide.

Here is the place to begin to speak of the virtues. In one important aspect, the virtues are the personal resources by which individuals qua individuals can in significant measure overcome the uncertainty of practical life and enjoy significant success at achieving their ends. This is most evident with such of the traditional virtues as courage, fidelity, and wholeheartedness, but our extended argument is that it is no less true in the cases of justice, temperance, honesty, wisdom, generosity, and love. For example, wisdom in the classical Greek meaning importantly includes the ability to distinguish in oneself between true and false desires, right and wrong desires. And one of the severest impediments to the gratification of one's true desires is one's distractability in this undertaking by false desires. It was in recognition of this that Democritus is reported to have plucked out his eye when it followed a passing woman, while he was engaged at his studies. (There is no suggestion in the tale that he would have done the same thing had his studies been in a condition in which he could leave them for a time.)

Or consider love—not, however, in its Christian but in its classical Greek meaning. As Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle make abundantly clear, love is a development. It begins in self-love, which, however, by no means precludes but is instead the precondition of love of others. As self-love its object is not the actual but the ideal self, i.e. the innate potentiality in each person which it is that person's responsibility to discover and progressively actualize. Eros is the energy of actualization associated with right aim, and is thus a cardinal resource in the armory of the individual by which to overcome obstacles and thereby diminish the problematicity of practical activity. But we must postpone consideration of other virtues and trust that the present point is sufficiently made for our immediate purpose.

In their aspect as personal resources, the virtues outfit individuals to more effectively achieve their ends, thereby diminishing the uncertainties of practical life. But in the first place the uncertainties can only be diminished, not removed; and in the second place, these resources can only be acquired by persons through extended hard work. If the ends with respect to which the virtues are (in one aspect) means can be conferred upon persons, then the arduous enterprise of acquiring the virtues is gratuitous, and the objective becomes that of constructing the distributive agency.

Perhaps, as has been argued by von Mises, Hayek, Oakeshott, Tibor Machan, and others, the notion of government as a beneficent distributive agency contains an internal contradiction which blocks its realization. But the fallacy I want to lay bare is the supposition that benefits can be conferred. I will put the supreme question as it was presented upon the tragic state of Hellenic Greece, but I do so in the belief that this same question lies unarticulated beneath much contemporary alienation and anomie. Does it matter that you and I live? Will it matter that you and I have lived? The answer of Greek eudaimonism is that it matters and will have mattered if we live lives of worth. But worth must be earned, it cannot be conferred. The task of living a worthy life is a job, a piece of work, namely the work of progressively actualizing the distinctive potential excellence subsisting within us as a potentiality and distinguishing each of us as the individual he or she is. The work is arduous but intrinsically rewarding. The intrinsic rewards are the virtues themselves in another aspect (and in this aspect virtue is rightly said to be its own reward). As Aristotle says, no person who has experienced these rewards will trade them for rewards of any other kind.⁵ And like the objective worth of actualized personhood, these rewards cannot be conferred but must be earned.

Let me return now to the fallacy alluded to earlier in the exchange of individual liberty for ideological servitude. If liberty is a right, and rights are logically primitive, or as Ronald Dworkin insists, "axiomatic",⁶ then this exchange can be made with impunity. But from the eudaimonistic standpoint rights are not logically primitive. In the minimal conception of personhood what is logically primitive is not

rights but responsibilities, beginning with the fundamental moral responsibility of every person to discover and progressively actualize his or her distinctive potential excellence. Rights derive from responsibilities by the logic that "ought" implies "can". If a person ought to discover and progressively actualize his distinctive potential excellence, and if such self-discovery and self-actualization has necessary conditions, then he or she is entitled to those conditions. Notice that this conception "takes rights seriously," in Dworkin's phrase, for to take rights seriously means to affirm their inalienability. True to the classical liberal tradition, Dworkin supposes that this can be done only by axiomatizing rights in a rights-primitive conception of man. But rights are also inalienable when they are entitlements to necessary conditions of inalienable responsibilities. Our main point here is that if liberty is a necessary condition of inalienable responsibility, then it cannot with impunity be exchanged for ideological servitude. To so exchange it is to default on one's fundamental moral responsibility.

Returning once again to the fallacy of supposing that all benefits are conferrable, we have by adopting a eudaimonistic perspective introduced the idea that the highest rewards which life affords must be earned and cannot be conferred. But to understand the illusion of conferrability it is important to recognize that eudaimonism is a developmental perspective. Thus Aristotle, for example, cautions that nothing he says in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is applicable to children or youths. The earned benefits of self-actualization presuppose the autonomy of individuals, and no person is born autonomous. From birth persons may be said to possess the potentiality for autonomy, but every person in the first stage of his life is a dependent creature. It is upon the external authority of parents and community that the child is dependent for language, for concept-formation, for judgments, for the principles of conduct which lift his behavior out of randomness, for his repertoire of functional feelings, and indeed for his very identity. In this stage and by the very nature of dependence itself, benefits cannot be earned and must be and are conferred. Developmentally, then, the belief that *all* benefits are conferrable represents the thesis that persons are dependent children, not just in the first stage of their lives, but from the beginning of their lives to the end. And this is precisely the assumption of the *realpolitik* initiative with which political modernity begins. In Hobbes famous words persons have a life that is by nature "nasty and brutish."⁷ Before him Machiavelli laid the *realpolitik* cornerstone by declaring that "one can make this generalization about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, liars and deceivers, they shun danger and are greedy for profit."⁸ What *realpolitik* did was to build social order out of this understanding of persons. It did so by teaching persons to conceive of themselves in exclusively economic terms as selfish utility-maximizers. As A.O. Hirschman documents in his book, *The Passions and the Interests*, the 16th and 17th centuries witnessed a striking "semantic drift" by which such terms as "interest", "enterprise", and "worth" became con-

stricted in their meaning to “economic interest,” “economic enterprise,” and “economic worth.”⁹ Social order was generated from the fact that, be he prince or peasant, so long as a man pursued his economic self-interest, his behavior became predictable.

The genius of *realpolitik* in building social order out of a conception of human being which corresponded to “the unvarnished facts,” in Hobbes’s phrase, is not to be denied. Indeed, *realpolitik* is faultless in its choice of starting-place. But by its non-developmental conception of human being, the social order it constructed was such as to ensure that the human life which was nasty and brutish should remain ever such. To put this in Aristotelian-developmental terms, the first stage of life subsequent to childhood dependence is devoted to what we would today term utility-maximization; it is what we would term the economic stage, and according to Aristotle it contains no virtue or excellence.¹⁰ But beyond it is the socio-political stage which is the stage of the moral virtues, and beyond this is the philosophical stage which is the stage of the intellectual virtues. In light of developmental knowledge today there can be no question of slavishly following Aristotle’s format of the stages, but his basic point remains telling, namely that political modernity has conspired to produce developmental arrest in the first, or economic stage, and that with respect to this stage, the amputation of morality from politics meets with no resistance, for in this stage moral initiatives are merely latent.

The illusion of the conferrability of all benefits has been fostered by the economistic conception of man upon which political modernity was founded. From the standpoint of economics as the science which quantifies value, value is transferrable; it is exchange value. This eradicates the distinction between earned benefits and conferred benefits, for the unit of exchange value is monetary, and the money in one’s possession represents the same purchasing power, no matter whether one has earned it, found it, or received it as a gift. But to generalize an exclusively economic conception of man, *realpolitik* had to overturn the ancient *moral* doctrine of intrinsic, non-transferrable, earned rewards which had received new currency in Renaissance humanism and the so-called *via moderna*.¹¹ It did so by a slow but relentless *redefinition* of benefits which rendered them distributable.

Consider “happiness.” In Aristotle’s meaning it is activity in accordance with virtue, and must be earned. In the modern meaning, happiness is “pleasure in the long run,” or “a sum of pleasures,” where “pleasure” is the feeling of gratified desire. If what we desire is economic in the sense of distributable, as *realpolitik* teaches, then happiness is conferrable, for our desires can be gratified by awards by others or by distributive agencies.

Another telling example is afforded by the concept of “worth.” From the eudaimonistic standpoint, fundamental moral motivation subsists in all persons and consists of the aspiration to live a life of worth, where living a life of worth consists in self-discovery and progressive self-actualization. This motivation is neither selfish nor al-

truistic, but is instead a unity from which “egoism” and “altruism” are subsequently extracted and developed as abstractionist fallacies. Eudaimonistically, worth is to be earned by self-actualization, and as objective, is *of* worth to and for whomever is capable of appreciating and utilizing it. But in Hobbes we find the famous redefinition according to which “The value of Worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price—that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power—and therefore is not absolute but a thing dependent upon the need and judgment of another.”¹² It is the Hobbesian spirit at work today when B. F. Skinner economistically identifies “dignity” as being in no sense intrinsic to the person who possesses it, but instead awarded as a distributable commodity.¹³

I will conclude on the modern redefinition of benefits with a note on the progressive devolution of the concept of justice to an exclusively distributive justice. Eudaimonistically, justice is first of all not “recipient” but “productive”, and centers in each person doing what he or she does best and finds intrinsically rewarding to do. Distributive justice derives from this through the indispensable concept of *desert*. On the face of it what we mean by desert still requires to be earned, and for this reason many modern theories of justice endeavor to disregard it. But modernity’s striking enterprise of redefinition is in this case epitomized in John Rawls, for as Wallace Matson has been the first to point out, *A Theory of Justice* makes desert a distributable commodity.¹⁴

First Rawls disposes of the ground of desert according to eudaimonism. That ground is the innate potentiality within every person which it is his or her responsibility to discover and progressively actualize. Desert has both a lower limit and upper limit. Its lower limit is the desert which inheres by virtue of pure unactualized potentiality; its upper limit is entitlement to the distributable goods whose potential values can be actualized by virtue of the actualized potentialities of the individual. The foundation of this thesis is the recognition of potentiality as responsibility. Rawls disposes of it by regarding potentialities as benefits, unevenly distributed by the “natural lottery” of birth. As benefits they are not merely non-deserved but undeserved, and require “to be somehow compensated for.”¹⁵ But Rawls retains the concept of desert and furnishes it with a new foundation in connection with his “difference principle.” He says, “At this point it is necessary to be clear about the notion of desert. It is perfectly true that given a just system of cooperation as a scheme of public rules and the expectations set up by it, those who, with the prospect of improving their condition, have done what the system announces that it will reward[,] are entitled to their advantages. In this sense the more fortunate have a claim to their better situation; their claims are legitimate expectations established by social institutions, and the community is obligated to meet them. But this sense of desert presupposes the existence of the cooperative scheme...”¹⁶

It takes but a moment’s thought to note the striking transformation

which is wrought by Rawls. That desert is the product of the just system means that Rawls's conception of justice is logically independent of desert. Moreover desert cannot here be a criterion of good government, as it is for Aristotle, for as Matson observes, Rawlsian desert is the creation of government.¹⁷ Desert is here distributed, as worth is distributed by Hobbes, and dignity by Skinner, as the reward for accepting the terms laid down by the social system. The reason that Rawls, here as elsewhere, finds the *prima facie* intuitive support upon which he relies,¹⁸ is that Rawls's readers are the end products of 400 years of conditioning in political theory based upon a rights-primitive conception of man, and rights-primitivism establishes a fundamental *recipient* orientation by which, not merely benefits, but the very self-identity of persons is conferred. Developmentally, a recipient orientation is appropriate to the essential dependence of the first stage of the life of all persons. Here the paramount question necessarily is, What shall I receive? But adolescence marks the displacement of this question by the primacy of the question, What shall I do?, with consequent exchange of a rights-primitive for a responsibilities-primitive framework. Consonant with political modernity as a whole, Rawls does not acknowledge the development of autonomy out of dependence, and what he means by autonomy turns out to be the internalization and voluntary endorsement of the terms of dependence.

If we now undertake to rectify the *realpolitik* conception of man with which modernity began by introducing the responsibility for the development of persons, the right to liberty exhibits new-found significance. It expresses the thesis and the determination that this development is to be the *self*-development of individuals, with respect to which political liberty is a paramount condition. But this conception of individuality as moral development is a eudaimonistic doctrine. The reason that man thus conceived is *zoon politikon*, is that this development has necessary preconditions, some of which cannot be self-supplied by persons as individuals, and are therefore social conditions. As Professor Fred D. Miller has pointed out, to follow Aristotle in identifying man as *zoon politikon* is not necessarily to imply the apparatus of the modern state, for in Aristotle the concepts of politics and the *polis* are not clearly identified with what we would term the political state as distinguished from the social community.¹⁹ There are serious questions of responsibility and authority here, but to try to answer them at this point would be premature. What must be done first is to demonstrate the paramount importance of the self-development of persons as individuals, while recognizing that the imperative of self-development applies to all persons, and not an elite few who are privileged by the "natural lottery" of birth. What follows will be an attempt at such demonstration, by connecting the virtues of the self-development of which political liberty is a paramount condition.

Eudaimonistically conceived, the virtues are not a number of things which they have regularly been mistaken to be. In the first place they are not innate dispositions given to some but denied to oth-

ers by the "natural lottery" of birth. Nor are they socializing or moralizing "side constraints" on natively acquisitive conduct. Neither are they portable attributes, first learned independently and thereafter attached to selected behaviors. Finally they are not in a proper sense supererogatory functions. Eudaimonistically conceived, the virtues are the natural expressions of self-actualizing individuality. They are not supererogatory because self-actualization itself is each person's fundamental moral responsibility. They are not "side constraints" because, in the first place, "side constraints" are a concession to the social character of existence, while for eudaimonism, true individuality is intrinsically social in character. In this light the virtues are not concessions, but expressions of self-fulfillment which are themselves self-fulfilling. They are not sparsely distributed innate dispositions, but potentialities in all persons which are only rarely actualized, and the politics of eudaimonism is directed to securing the conditions under which their actualization can be generalized. And they are not portable attributes but natural expressions of an individuality which, by Spinoza's dictum *omnis determinatio est negatio*, is highly selective. It was the mistake of regarding the virtues as portable attributes that produced in Kant, for example, the conclusion that they are in themselves morally neutral, becoming good or evil according to the purpose to which they are put.²⁰ In this light courage, for example, is epitomized in the six-guns of an old West gunslinger, which are available for hire to the highest bidder. But in fact courage is highly selective, arising in the recognition that what the individual is responsible for doing will not and cannot be done if he or she does not do it.

To set forth eudaimonism's theory of the virtues as concretely as possible we can consider by way of example the much misunderstood virtue of generosity. Generosity is not self-sacrifice but self-fulfillment. For the self-fulfilling life is not the life of idle self-indulgence but the life of meaningful work, and in meaningful work lies a native theme of generosity which is expressed in two ways. In the first place meaningful work is self-actualizing work, and self-actualization is the objectivization of the self which is to be recognized as the gift of the best that one is to others. But "objective" here must be strictly distinguished from that objectivity which has shaped modernity in the depersonalization of civil association and objective social structures. In this modern usage "objectivity" and "subjectivity" bear mutually exclusive meanings, and endorsement of the objective has been accompanied by active disparagement of the "merely subjective." But this is an abstractionist fallacy. Nothing in human experience is "merely subjective." Every human impulse is subjective in its inception but objective in its intended outcome, and because its outcome is within it implicitly in its inception, it is never "merely subjective."

When objectivization is understood as the expression of subjective selfhood in objective and public form, then the generosity inherent in self-actualization becomes apparent. Self-actualization expresses the intention to live a worthy life which, as objectively worthy, is of worth

to whomever is capable of appreciating it as such. It is in this sense a gift which enriches the giver. It is likewise a gift which by its own nature selects its recipients. The gift comprises, distinguishably but inseparably, the distributable products of the enterprise of self-actualization and the qualities in the self-actualizing individual which we term the virtues. As Aristotle notes, "every virtue or excellence (*arete*) both brings into good condition the thing [person] of which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be well done."²¹ By virtue of the nature of self-actualization as objectivization we may say that giving to selected others is the intention of the self-actualizing individual, implicit perhaps in the beginning, but becoming progressively more explicit as self-actualization proceeds. If this is correct, then the corollary of the labor theory or value, namely that the products of labor are by nature the exclusive property of the laborer, is a serious error. To account for it we may say, first, that it derives from the error of conceiving of individuality "atomistically", i.e. as exclusive of other persons.²² But to this must be added the consideration of theft, which not only thwarts generosity, but can turn it into the reaction-formation of possessiveness and hoarding. Here it will not be purse-snatching and embezzlement that lay first claim upon our attention. What extinguishes the native generosity in meaningful work necessarily lies deeper than these. We find it where theft is ubiquitized under the aegis of law and popular morality, as it is by the egalitarian supposition that at bottom all persons are alike, and that every person is by nature possessed of equal entitlement to everything. This thwarts the native generosity in meaningful work, for when the individual gives himself through objectivization, he selects his recipients by virtue of the qualitative distinctiveness of the gift. The gift is *meant* for those who can appreciate and utilize the qualitatively distinctive values which have been embodied in it by the expressive labors of its maker. Thus Stravinsky's *Rite of Spring* is meant for those who possess the cultivated capacities to appreciate and utilize its distinctive values. This appreciation and utilization by others is a condition of the self-fulfillment of the individual. The reason is that self-actualization causes objective worth to appear in the world which, as objective, is of worth, by no means to the self-actualizing individual alone or primarily, but in principle to all persons, and in fact to such persons as fulfill in themselves the conditions of appreciation of worth of the distinctive kind in the given case. Therefore self-actualization is incomplete without recognition of its worth, not, to be sure, by all other persons, but by some others. We spoke earlier of necessary conditions of self-fulfillment, some of which cannot be self-provided by persons as individuals. Here is one such non-self-supplyable condition, namely the proximity of other persons who through their own self-actualization have the capacity to appreciate and utilize the contributions of a given individual. I think the glorification of solitude by romantic individualists is a reaction-formation to their own discovery that no one in their time and place is capable of appreci-

ating their distinctive excellence. Where such is the case, then by eudaimonistic lights genuine injustice exists. But the glorification of solitude, though perhaps satisfying to the vanity of the individual, is a self-defeating resort. The task instead is to generalize self-actualizing individuality by uncovering and instituting its necessary preconditions, thus insuring as far as possible that virtues do not go unrecognized.

Our description of the eudaimonistic conception of generosity is far from complete, but within the limits of this paper I can only very briefly touch upon one more aspect. Eudaimonism abhors what Durkheim called the "malady of infinite aspiration."²³ Individuality is qualitative finitude, which means that in the domain of value the fulfilled, self-actualized individual is a determinate *this* which is not *that* and the *other*. But the "thats" and "others" are likewise determinate kinds of value. To actualize them is the responsibility of others. It is an aspect of the native generosity in the self-fulfilling individual that he entrusts to others the varieties of value which it is their responsibility to actualize. In so doing he acknowledges the entitlements of others to those distinctive kinds of goods, in appropriate amounts, which constitute conditions of their fulfillment of their responsibilities. To their goods he recognizes that he has no claim, and he advances none. On the other hand egalitarianism extinguishes this form of generosity by endorsing equal claim by all persons to all goods. The effect of this is supply mindless envy with spurious warrant.

We have spoken here only of generosity, but the extended eudaimonistic thesis is that what is true of generosity holds equally for such of the virtues as wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, honesty, wholeheartedness, resourcefulness, and love. Alike they are natural expressions of developed individuality. Alike they represent the explication of a form of sociality which inheres in personhood from the beginning, and is progressively explicated through self-development, namely the intrinsic sociality of true individuals. The principle of this sociality, as I have argued elsewhere,²⁴ is not the "at bottom" uniformity of persons, but the complementarity of perfected differences. In this aspect the virtues *are* this complementarity, as it is manifested in different but overlapping situations. Justice, for example, is not a non-natural artifact, but an expression of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is knowledge of one's fundamental moral responsibility, and of the finite entitlements which derive from it by the logic that "ought" implies "can". The foundation of justice appears in the acknowledgment by the individual with the lesser claim to a distributable good that his claim is the lesser.

The history of political liberalism has been the history of resolute defense of the right of the individual to political liberty. What remains is to connect liberty with worthy, self-responsible, self-determined, intrinsically rewarding individuality. But to do this requires going beyond liberty to identify others of the necessary preconditions of self-discovery and self-actualization, and by instituting them, to generalize self-actualizing individuality itself. It is noteworthy that Hobbes

acknowledged self-responsible, self-determined individuality to be the securest foundation of justice, but declared it politically irrelevant by reason of its rarity.²⁵ But Hobbes took it to be an endowment sparsely distributed by the natural lottery of birth. The eudaimonistic thesis is that it is, instead, a potentiality in all persons which is only rarely actualized, thanks to neglect of its preconditions. Today we possess sufficient knowledge of development to be able to identify these necessary preconditions, and we are capable of instituting these preconditions, thereby generalizing the opportunity of self-development. The meaning of Aristotle's identification of man as *zoon politikon* is that self-actualizing individuality requires a supportive cultural context. To provide such is, I suggest, our paramount social responsibility.*

1. Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 275.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), pp. 95-96.
4. John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons Capricorn Books, 1960), p. 6.
5. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1166a, 20-23.
6. Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (London: Duckworth, 1977), p. vx., p. 181.
7. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan Parts I and II* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Library of Liberal Arts, 1958), p. 107.
8. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, translation by George Bull (London: Harmondsworth, 1961), p. 96.
9. A.O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), esp. pp. 31-42.
10. Aristotle, *Politics* 7, 13; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1, 13.
11. For an excellent presentation of the moral politics of Renaissance humanism and the *via moderna*, see Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), vol. 1.
12. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 79.
13. B.F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Bantam Books, 1972).
14. Wallace Matson, "What Rawls Calls Justice," *The Occasional Review*, Issue 8/9, (Autumn 1978), pp. 45-55.
15. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 100.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
17. Matson, "What Rawls Calls Justice," p. 50.
18. R.M. Hare has documented Rawls's extensive reliance upon the "intuitions" of his readers; see Hare, "Rawls' Theory of Justice—1," *Philosophical Quarterly*, 23, No. 91 (1973), pp. 144-155.
19. Fred D. Miller, Jr., "The State and the Community in Aristotle's *Politics*," *Reason Papers* No. 1, pp. 62-69.
20. Immanuel Kant, *The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics*, translation by Otto Manthey-Zorn (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938), pp. 8-9.
21. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1106a, 15-18.
22. Eudaimonistically conceived, personhood is intrinsically social in the beginning (as dependent childhood) and intrinsically social in the end (as autonomous individuality); but the two socialities are very different in kind. This is developed in my *Personal Destinies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Chs. 8-10.

23. Cited in Steven Lukes, *Essays in Social Theory* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 78.
24. *Personal Destinies*, Chs 8-10; and in a book forthcoming from Princeton University Press entitled *Political Individualism: A Eudaimonistic Perspective*, Ch. 3, "The Two Socialities."
25. See Michael Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975, rev. ed.), p. 124.

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